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Contemporary hamartological treatises usually begin by pointing out that the concept 
of sin has lost its meaning in the modern world.1 While the causes of this situation are many 
and varied,2 part of the problem lies in the fact that the basic notions that underlie the concept 
of sin are themselves problematic. The concept of sin presupposes the existence of an 
objective moral order, as well as humanity’s ability to apprehend this order. It also 
presupposes freedom to choose to act or not to act in accordance with what we have judged to 
be either morally justifiable or morally reprehensible. These presuppositions, however, are 
not easily demonstrated, as they involve concepts that require in-depth empirical analysis. 
Furthermore, the notion of an objective moral order that can be known, and the notion of 
human freedom are challenged by the counter-notions of moral scepticism and certain forms 
of determinism. Because of these challenges, it is crucial that a study in the theology of sin 
demonstrates the rational plausibility of the concept of sin. Such a study must attempt to 
establish the possibility of both ethical knowledge and human freedom.  
The importance of understanding ourselves as beings who are capable of knowing 
good from evil, and who are capable of freely choosing to do either the former or the latter, is 
reflected in the teachings of Pope Benedict XVI and his predecessor, Pope John Paul II. Pope 
Benedict, in his World Youth Day address of 2008, speaks of one form of moral scepticism 
that has for a long time been denounced in Christian circles, namely, moral relativism.3 In his 
address, he speaks of the loss of genuine freedom and of self-respect that comes from moral 
                                                          
1 See for example the introductions to the following books: Josef Pieper, The Concept of Sin, trans. Edward T. 
Oakes (Indiana: St Augustine, 2001), 1; Seán Fagan, Has Sin Changed? (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978) 1; 
Hugh Connolly, Sin (London: Continuum, 2002), v. 
2 Pope Benedict XVI, for example, suggests that the ‘eclipse of God necessarily brings the eclipse of sin.’ See 
‘Pope Benedict XVI: The Eclipse of God Leads to a Loss of the Sense of Sin,’ 15 March 2011 [article on-line]; 
available from www.catholic.org/clife/lent/story.php?id=40691; Internet; accessed 17 May 2013.    
3 See for example, C.S. Lewis, ‘The Poison of Subjectivism,’ in Christian Reflections (London: Geoffrey Bles, 
1967), 72-81, and C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (London: Harper Collins, 1999); first published in 1943 by 




relativism: ‘Relativism, by indiscriminately giving value to practically everything, has made 
“experience” all important. Yet experiences, detached from any consideration of what is good 
or true, can lead, not to a genuine freedom, but to moral or intellectual confusion, to a 
lowering of standards, to a loss of self-respect, and even to despair.’4 Similarly, in his 
discussion of personal and social sin in his Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, Pope John Paul II 
speaks of the denial of a person’s dignity and freedom that comes from a belief in 
determinism: ‘This truth [that the human person is free] cannot be disregarded, in order to 
place the blame for individuals’ sins on external factors such as structures, systems or other 
people. Above all, this would be to deny the person’s dignity and freedom, which are 
manifested – even though in a negative and disastrous way – also in this responsibility for sin 
committed.’5 
 Magisterial teaching and contemporary theologies of sin reflect on the necessity of 
human knowledge and freedom if a wrongful act is to be considered a sin. Neither, however, 
has engaged sufficiently with the rational possibility of either objective moral knowledge or 
the freedom to choose between alternative courses of action. Magisterial documents and 
contemporary treatises in fundamental moral theology, while dealing in some detail with the 
issues of ethical knowledge and human freedom before formulating a conception of sin, 
contain many presuppositions regarding knowledge and freedom. These presuppositions are 
based on scripture, and the arguments presented in these works rely heavily on biblical 
sources and the Church’s theological tradition. 
 In my dissertation I shall develop a synthetic account of sin that examines and takes 
seriously the theological anthropology provided by the magisterium and contemporary 
theologians. I shall also attempt to make this account of sin accessible to the more sceptical 
                                                          
4 ‘Benedict XVI on Moral Relativism in His World Youth Day Address,’ July 17 2008 [article on-line]; 
available from berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/recourses/quotes/benedict-xvi-on-moral-relativism-in-his-world-
youth-day-address; Internet; accessed 17 May 2013. 




reader by drawing on the work of the Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan 
(1904-84). In his works, especially Insight (1957), Lonergan provides solid foundations for 
the possibility of sin, ethical knowledge, and human freedom.  
While recent works have dealt with Lonergan’s notion of sin, they have not engaged 
with the philosophical question of the possibility of sin, or the related questions of the 
possibility of ethical knowledge and human freedom. For example, Cynthia S.W. Crysdale 
develops a theology of sin using Lonerganian categories, in order to demonstrate the 
necessity of conversion for authentic moral development in both individuals and 
communities.6 Eamonn Mulcahy examines aspects of Lonergan’s soteriology. He explores 
Lonergan’s notion of sin as alienation and dehumanisation, as failure to achieve authentic 
humanness. He goes on to explore how this evil is transformed into good through what 
Lonergan terms ‘the law of the cross.’7 My focus, however, is on Lonergan’s demonstration 
of the possibility of sin, his grounding of the notion of sin in his rationally developed notions 
of ethical knowledge and human freedom.  
My dissertation will be divided into three sections. In the first section I shall offer an 
exposition and critique of contemporary theologies of sin. This section will be divided into 
two chapters.  
In the first chapter I shall examine the work of four theologians who have contributed 
significantly to the theology of sin: Bernard Häring, Richard Gula, Germain Grisez, and 
William E. May. My selection of these particular theologians is designed to indicate the 
broad spectrum of approaches to moral theology in general. Häring and Gula represent a 
primarily inductive approach to moral theology that draws general conclusions about the 
moral life by observing human experience in its concrete historical contexts. Grisez and May, 
                                                          
6 Cynthia S.W. Crysdale, ‘Heritage and Discovery: A Framework for Moral Theology,’ Theological Studies 63, 
no. 3 (2002): 559-578. 
7 Eamonn Mulcahy, The Cause of our Salvation: Soteriological Causation according to some Modern British 




on the other hand, represent a largely deductive approach that begins with universal moral 
principles and assesses human behaviour based on compliance or non-compliance with these 
principles. In my examination of the themes of sin, natural law, conscience, and human 
freedom in these authors, I shall argue that they are too reliant on scripture and the Church’s 
theological tradition in their reflections on sin. Consequently, they offer little or nothing to 
the sceptical reader who doubts the possibility of sin.  
 In the second chapter I shall outline and critique contemporary Church teaching on 
sin. I shall examine sections of the Catechism of the Catholic Church as well as selected 
writings of Pope John Paul II. As in the first chapter, I shall examine the themes of sin, 
natural law, conscience, and freedom. I shall argue that while these works show profound 
insights into the human condition we call sin, they are greatly lacking when it comes to 
rationally demonstrating the possibility of sin. Again, this is because they are too reliant on 
scripture and the Church’s theological tradition. 
 In the second section of my dissertation I shall examine Lonergan’s notions of sin, 
ethical knowledge, and human freedom. This section will be divided into two chapters.  
 In the first chapter I shall critically examine the notions of sin, ethical knowledge, and 
human freedom in Lonergan’s Insight. In this work, Lonergan provides a thorough empirical 
analysis of the possibility of both ethical knowledge and human freedom, and proceeds to 
develop a notion of sin that relies on these anterior notions. I shall then compare Lonergan’s 
approach to these themes with contemporary theological reflection on the same themes. The 
central question guiding this chapter will be whether Lonergan’s approach to sin and ethics is 
more effective than contemporary theological reflection in terms of dialoguing with moral 
scepticism and determinism.  
In the second chapter, I shall examine the same themes in Lonergan’s other major 




development in the fifteen years between the publication of Insight and that of Method in 
Theology, our critique of Method in Theology’s approach to sin and ethics will involve a 
comparison of these two works.  
The third section of my dissertation will consist of a single chapter. In this chapter I 
shall attempt to merge Lonergan’s reflections on sin, ethical knowledge, and human freedom 
with contemporary theologies of sin. I shall attempt this synthesis by using St Thomas’s 
dialectical method. We shall ask the following two questions: 1. Is there an objective moral 
order which is discernible by human beings? 2. Are human beings free to act morally? In our 
answers to these questions, we shall examine the notions of moral scepticism and 
determinism. We shall follow this with a presentation of the antithesis to these notions in 
magisterial teaching. Finally, we shall draw on Lonergan to provide a more thorough rational 




















PART ONE  


























THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON SIN 
   
The idea that the notion of sin presupposes knowledge and freedom is formulated in 
the long-standing distinction in Catholic theological reflection between mortal and venial sin. 
In this tradition, there are three criteria involved in determining which of these categories a 
particular sin falls in to: serious matter, full knowledge, and deliberate consent. We shall see 
in this chapter and the next that these criteria have their origins in the work of St Thomas, and 
are still in use in contemporary moral theological reflection and Church teaching on sin. I 
shall argue, however, that today’s moral theologians fail to provide adequate empirical 
foundations for their theologies of sin in terms of knowledge and freedom. Consequently, 
their theologies of sin are incapable of dialoguing with the philosophies of moral scepticism, 
which denies the possibility of ethical knowledge, and hard determinism, which denies the 
existence of human free will.    
Contemporary moral theology sees two distinct approaches to the notions of sin and 
moral truth, that of the classicist and that of the historicist.8 James Keenan provides 
descriptions of these two approaches to truth and their relevance to moral theology:  
For classicists, the world is a finished product and truth has already been revealed, 
expressed, taught, and known. In order to be a truth it must be universal and unchanging. 
Clarity is key. Its logic is deductive: we apply the principle to the situation and we derive 
an answer from the syllogism.  
The moral law is found, then, in that which is always true, never changes, and 
always applies.9 
                                                          
8 These distinctions were developed by Bernard Lonergan in three articles published in 1967: ‘The Transition 
from a Classicist World-view to Historical-mindedness’, ‘The Dehellenization of Dogma’, and ‘Theology in its 
New Context’. All three articles appear in A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, ed. William 




This approach to truth in moral theology is utilized by theologians such as Germain Grisez 
and William E. May. 
Keenan goes on to provide a definition of the historicist: 
Historical-minded theologians look at the world and the truth as constantly emerging. 
They argue that we are learning more, not only about the world, but about ourselves. 
As subjects we are affected by history: we become hopefully the people whom we are 
called to become. What the world and humanity will be is not yet known, but rests on 
the horizons of our expectations and the decisions we make and realize. The moral 
law then looks to determine what at this period corresponds to the vision we ought to 
be shaping. It admits that the final word on the truth is outstanding but emerging.10 
This approach to truth in moral theology is utilized by theologians such as Bernard Häring 
and Richard Gula. 
 In this chapter we shall examine the work of these key figures in both of the above-
mentioned approaches to moral theology. The central argument of the chapter is that both the 
classicist and the historicist approach to moral truth are philosophically weak. They fail to 
provide adequate empirical foundations for their theologies of sin in terms of the possibility 
of ethical knowledge and human freedom.  
In the first section of this chapter, we shall look at some basic definitions of sin. This 
will be followed by an examination of the notions of mortal and venial sin: definitions, roots 
in scripture, and the foundations of the three determining criteria in the work of St Thomas 
Aquinas. The second section will examine historicist discussions of mortal and venial sin, as 
well as discussions of the above-mentioned themes, ethical knowledge and human freedom. 
Finally, the third section will examine the classicist approach to these same themes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 111. 




1. MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN 
1.1. Definitions of Sin 
 Part three of the Catechism of the Catholic Church provides some useful definitions 
of actual, mortal, and venial sin. In the next chapter I shall offer a more detailed exposition 
and critique of the Catechism’s discussion of sin. For now, however, the Catechism is useful 
for providing a number of definitions that will help us to begin our discussion of the various 
theological approaches to mortal and venial sin.   
 The Catechism defines sin as ‘an offence against reason, truth and right conscience,’ 
and as a ‘failure in genuine love of God and neighbour caused by a perverse attachment to 
certain goods.’ Sin ‘wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity.’ It has been 
defined as ‘an utterance, a deed or a desire contrary to the eternal law.’11 
 Sin is also seen as an offence against God. To support this, the Catechism quotes from 
the Book of Psalms: ‘Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in 
your sight.’ Sin opposes itself to God’s love for us and diverts our hearts away from it. Like 
the first sin, it is disobedience; we rebel against God through the will to become ‘like gods,’ 
by knowing and determining good and evil. The Catechism quotes St Augustine, who defines 
sin as ‘love of oneself even to contempt of God.’ In this proud self-exaltation, the Catechism 
continues, sin is ‘diametrically opposed to the obedience of Jesus, which achieves our 
salvation.’12 
 
1.2. Definitions of Mortal and Venial Sin 
 The Catechism begins by stating that ‘mortal sin destroys charity in the heart of man 
by a grave violation of God’s law.’13 By preferring a lesser good to God, mortal sin turns 
                                                          
11 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1849. For more detailed references that include information on the sources 
used in writing this section of the Catechism, see the next chapter. 
12 Ibid., 1850. 




human beings away from their ultimate end and beatitude. Venial sin allows charity to 
continue, even though it damages it. By attacking charity, the vital principle within us, mortal 
sin makes necessary a new action of God’s mercy and a conversion of heart. Such conversion 
is usually achieved within the setting of the sacrament of reconciliation. 
 Following this definition there is a discussion of the three criteria for discerning 
whether or not a sin is mortal or merely venial. ‘Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter 
and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent.’14 Grave matter is 
identified by the Ten Commandments. This corresponds to Jesus’ answer to the rich young 
man: ‘Do not kill, Do not commit adultery, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Do not 
defraud, Honour your father and your mother.’ Particular sins have different levels of 
seriousness; murder, for example, is graver than theft. Who has been wronged by a given 
offence has also to be taken into account; so, for example, violence against parents is in itself 
more serious than violence against a stranger. 
 The Catechism goes on to discuss the second and third criteria for discerning whether 
a sin is mortal or venial: full knowledge and deliberate consent. Mortal sin presupposes 
knowledge of the sinful nature of the act, and of its disparity from God’s law. It also implies a 
consent that is sufficiently deliberate that it may be said to constitute a personal choice. 
Pretended ignorance and hardness of heart do not reduce the voluntary character of a sin; 
rather, they increase it. 
 Unintentional ignorance can decrease or even remove completely the responsibility 
for a grave offence. But no one, the Catechism says, is considered to be ignorant of the 
principles of the moral law, as these laws are ‘written in the conscience of every man.’15 
Feelings and passions can also reduce the voluntary and free character of the offence. 
External pressures and pathological disorders are also taken into account when judging the 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 1857. 




individual’s freedom in committing the offence. The most serious sin is the one committed 
through ill will, by a deliberate choice to do evil. 
 Mortal sin, like love itself, is ‘a radical possibility of human freedom.’16 It results in 
the loss of charity and sanctifying grace. If such a sin is not redeemed by repentance and 
God’s forgiveness, it results in the exclusion of the sinner from Christ’s kingdom and the 
eternal death of hell. This is because our freedom has the power to make choices for ever, 
without turning back. However, although we may deem that an act is in itself a serious 
offence, we must leave judgement of persons to God’s justice and mercy. 
 The Catechism defines venial sin as follows: ‘One commits venial sin when, in a less 
serious matter, one does not observe the standard prescribed by the moral law, or when one 
disobeys the moral law in a grave matter, but without full knowledge or without complete 
consent.’17 Venial sin weakens charity. It displays an unhealthy fondness for created goods. It 
blocks the soul’s advancement in the exercise of the virtues and the practice of the moral 
good. Such sin deserves temporal punishment. Deliberate and unrepented venial sin, 
according to the Catechism, ‘disposes us little by little to commit mortal sin.’18 Venial sin, 
however, does not put us in direct opposition to God’s will and friendship. Nor does it break 
the covenant with God. With the grace of God it is humanly reparable. ‘Venial sin does not 
deprive the sinner of sanctifying grace, friendship with God, charity, and consequently 
eternal happiness.’19 
 
1.3. Scriptural Roots of the Distinction between Mortal and Venial Sin 
 In the Old Testament, inadvertent sins of human weakness necessitated a sacrificial 
offering. ‘If any one sins unwittingly in any of the things which the Lord has commanded not 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 1861. 
17 Ibid., 1862. 





to be done . . . let him offer for the sin which he has committed a young bull without blemish 
to the Lord for a sin offering’ (Lv. 4:4-5). Other sins, however, could not be expiated because 
they were in the nature of offences against the covenant community and its God. Such sins 
were punished by death or exile: ‘For every person who eats of the fat of an animal of which 
an offering by fire is made to the Lord shall be cut off from his people’ (Lv. 7:25). 
 This distinction of sins that can be expiated and those that cannot is maintained in the 
New Testament. In teaching his disciples to pray, Jesus instructs them to ask forgiveness for 
their daily transgressions (see Mt. 6:12; Lk. 11:4). In contrast, he threatens his obstinate 
opponents with consignment to hell: ‘You serpents, you brood of vipers, how are you to 
escape being sentenced to hell?’ (Mt. 23:33).  
Some sins involve exclusion from the kingdom forever: ‘Lord, when did we see thee 
hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to thee? 
Then he will answer them, “Truly, I say to you, as you did it not to one of the least of these, 
you did it not to me.” And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into 
eternal life’ (Mt. 25:44-46). Some sins are forgivable while others are not: ‘Every sin and 
blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. 
And whoever says a word against the Son of man will be forgiven; but whoever speaks 
against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come’ (Mt. 
12:31-32). 
 In a similar manner, the Epistles speak of commonplace sins of which anyone may be 
guilty: ‘For we all make many mistakes, and if any one makes no mistakes in what he says he 
is a perfect man, able to bridle the whole body also’ (Jas. 3:2). In contrast to this, there is the 
slavery to sin which leads to death: ‘Do you not know that if you yield yourselves to any one 
as obedient slaves, you are slaves of the one whom you obey, either of sin, which leads to 




excommunication: ‘Drive out the wicked person from among you’ (I Cor. 5:13). The most 
serious sins, however, involve exclusion from the kingdom: ‘Do you not know that the 
unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God?’ (I Cor. 6:9). 
 According to Germain Grisez, there is a long tradition that has taken a passage in St 
Paul as marking the distinction between mortal and venial sin. Paul says that people build 
differently on the foundation which is Jesus. Some build with gold, silver, and jewels, others 
with wood, hay, or straw. In his judgement God will test the quality of each one’s work. 
Those whose structure burns because of its poor material can be saved, but, as Grisez 
observes, ‘as fleeing through a fire.’20 Others, however, completely destroy God’s temple, for 
in their actions they completely separate themselves from Jesus. In the final judgement, these 
will be destroyed, not saved (see 1 Cor. 3:10-17).  
 
1.4. Criteria for Discerning Whether a Sin is Mortal or Venial: Thomas Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologica 
 In this section we shall examine some texts from St Thomas’s Summa Theologica in 
order to see why the Church uses the criteria of grave matter, full knowledge, and deliberate 
consent in its reflections on mortal and venial sin. While this section deals with the themes of 
knowledge and consent, it is only intended to supply a brief background to official 
magisterial teaching. The author understands that the brevity of the section and the limited 
selection of texts cannot begin to do justice to the complexity and the development of St 
Thomas’s thought on these topics. Part two of this dissertation offers a more comprehensive 
analysis of a Thomistic approach to these themes in the work of Bernard Lonergan. 
 
 
                                                          
20 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus Christ, Vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan 




1.4.1. Grave Matter I-II, 18, 2 
 In this article, St Thomas asks: Does a human act get good or moral evil from its 
objective? He begins by suggesting that it would appear that an act does not get good or evil 
from its objective. For the objective, he says, is a thing, and evil does not lie in things, but in 
the use to which sinners put them. He concludes, therefore, that a human act does not get its 
good or evil from the objective. 
 He further suggests that the objective is like the act’s material in which it works. Now 
a thing’s goodness comes not so much from its material as from its form that actually shapes 
it. Likewise in acts as well – it is not their objective which makes them good or bad. 
 On the other hand, St Thomas suggests, a man becomes abominable in the sight of 
God because of the evil he does, which in its turn is because of the evil objects he chooses. 
The same reasoning applies when he does good. 
 St Thomas’s response is that good or bad in actions, as elsewhere in things, is judged 
according to the completeness or incompleteness of their reality. In relation to this criterion 
for judging the good or bad in actions, he asks: ‘what provides a thing’s specific character?’ 
As in a physical thing the specific character is supplied by its form, so in an action it is 
supplied by its objective character. Hence as a natural thing’s basic goodness is provided by 
its form, which makes it the kind of thing it is, so also a moral act’s basic goodness is 
provided by the proper objective on which it set itself. Hence, St Thomas observes, some 
moralists refer to an act as being ‘good of its kind,’ bonum ex genere, for example, using 
what belongs to you. 
 Continuing the comparison, St Thomas continues: as in things of nature the basic evil 
is for the specific form to be missing, likewise the basic evil in moral acts arises from the 
objective, for instance to take what does not belong to you: then an act is referred to a being 




  St Thomas concludes that external things, while good in themselves, are not always 
proper objectives for particular actions. Considered, then, as the objectives of such actions, 
they are not invested with the quality of being good. 
 He further concludes that an objective is not the material out of which an act is made, 
but the material with which it deals. Thus it takes on the role of form in that it gives an act its 
specific nature. 
 
1.4.2. Full Knowledge I-II, 6, 8  
 In this article St Thomas poses the question, ‘Does ignorance render an act 
involuntary?’ He begins by suggesting that apparently it does not. He points out that 
Damascene says that the involuntary deserves forgiveness. This is not so with some acts 
which are done through ignorance. Thomas quotes St Paul: ‘If a man know not, he shall not 
be known.’ (1 Cor. 14:38) So then, Thomas concludes, ignorance does not cause the 
involuntary. 
 Besides, he says, every sin stems from ignorance, quoting a text from Proverbs: ‘They 
err that work evil’ (Prov. 14:22) If ignorance makes an action involuntary it follows that all 
sins are involuntary. This goes against Augustine’s saying that all sins are voluntary.21 
 Thomas continues by referring to Damascene’s remark that distress goes with 
involuntary action. However, some acts are done in ignorance and yet without regret, for 
example when a man shoots an enemy he wishes to kill while thinking he is shooting a buck. 
Therefore, Thomas concludes, ignorance does not make for involuntariness. 
On the other hand, both Aristotle and Damascene allow that some sort of 
involuntariness results from ignorance. 
                                                          
21  ‘Sin is so voluntary an evil that it is by no means sin if it is not voluntary.’ From Augustine’s Vera Religione, 
quoted by Augustine in his Retractations. See vol. 60 of The Fathers of the Church, trans., Mary Inez Bogan 




 St Thomas’s reply: Ignorance makes an action involuntary insofar as it deprives it of 
the prerequisite knowledge. Not every sort of ignorance does this. Thomas considers three 
ways in which ignorance is considered relevant to willing: concomitantly, consequentially, 
and antecedently. 
 1. Concomitant ignorance. This form of ignorance affects the deed that is done. 
However, the deed would still be done even if knowledge was present; the ignorance does not 
lead to its being done, it merely happens that deed and ignorance are conjoined. Such is the 
case in the example given above, of a man desiring to kill his enemy and succeeding 
unbeknown to himself when he thought he was shooting game. Such action does not cause an 
involuntary action, for, as Aristotle points out, it does not produce an effect against a man’s 
will. The effect is, however, non-voluntary, for we cannot will what we do not recognize. 
 2. Consequent ignorance. This is the case when the ignorance itself is voluntary or 
willed. This can happen in two ways: First, and positively, the ignorance may be willed, as 
when a person chooses not to be informed, so that he might find some excuse for sin or for 
not avoiding it. Thomas cites the Book of Job: ‘They say to God, Depart from us! We do not 
desire the knowledge of thy ways’ (Job 21:14). Thomas calls this ‘affected ignorance.’ 
Second, and negatively, ignorance may be voluntary in the sense that not willing and not 
acting can be voluntary: it is an ignorance of what we can and should know.  
 Consequent ignorance is present when a person does not actually attend to what he 
could and should consider. St Thomas calls this ‘ignorance in wrongly choosing,’ and it may 
result, he says, from passion or a settled attitude. Or a person may have made no effort to 
acquaint himself with the proper notions. He calls this ‘ignorance of right principles.’ It is 
voluntary insofar as it is a not knowing of what one should know and insofar as it results 




 Since these types of ignorance are voluntary they cannot have the effect of making an 
action simply involuntary. However, Thomas points out that in a qualified sense consequent 
ignorance may be regarded as involuntary, inasmuch as the ignorance precedes the motion of 
will towards doing something, an act that would not occur if knowledge was present and 
operative. 
 3. Antecedent ignorance. This precedes the act of willing, and consequently is not 
voluntary. Nevertheless, it is the cause of willing that which otherwise would not be willed. 
Such is the case when a man is ignorant of some circumstance of his act which he was not 
bound in duty to know, although if he was aware of it he would not complete the act. For 
example: having used all due care a man fires a shot which kills another man who unknown 
to the shooter has entered the line of fire. The effect of such ignorance is quite simply 
involuntary. 
 
1.4.3. Deliberate Consent I-II, 10, 2 
 In this article St Thomas asks the question, is volition moved of necessity by its 
object? He begins: ‘It seems so.’ Aristotle, he says, makes it clear that the influence of its 
object on the will is one of the mover on the movable. If strong enough, a mover will 
necessarily move the movable. The will, therefore, can be moved of necessity by its object.  
 Thomas continues: The will, like the mind, is a spiritual power; both are ordered to a 
universal object. The motion of mind is necessitated by its object. Hence the motion of the 
will is also necessitated by its object.  
Furthermore, Thomas continues, whatever we will is either an end or a means. It 
would seem, according to Thomas, that the end is willed of necessity, as it is compared to the 




the means. So they too (the means), it would seem, are willed of necessity. The will, 
therefore, is moved of necessity by its object. 
 On the other hand, according to Aristotle the rational powers are open to opposites. 
The will is a rational power. Aristotle says in the De Anima that will is in the reason. It is 
therefore able to take alternative courses, and as a result is not moved of necessity by a 
particular object. 
 In response, Thomas suggests that the will’s motion can be looked at in two ways: 
first, in regard to the exercise of its activity, and second, in regard to the meaning it holds, 
which comes from the object it engages. 
 Regarding the first, Thomas says that no object necessitates the will. Whatever the 
object, a person always has the power not to think about it, and as a result not to actually will 
it. 
 Regarding the second, however, he says that the will is necessitated, but not by every 
object. When we are studying a power’s motion from its object, he says, we should focus on 
that part of it which is the power’s special interest. A visible object moves the sight by its 
colour being actually seen. If the colour is presented then it is registered – unless we turn 
away our gaze or close our eyes, which, however, regards the exercise of the act. Now if an 
object is presented which is not coloured in every part, but only in one, then it would not 
necessarily be seen: in struggling to see the part in the shade the eye might miss the rest. As 
being coloured is the object of sight, so being good is the object of will. Accordingly if the 
will is presented with an object which is universally good, that is, good from every point of 
view, then it will of necessity respond to it. It cannot, Thomas says, will the opposite. But if 
the object presented is good, but not good from every point of view, then the will will not go 




 The good alone which is complete, and which lacks for nothing at all, is that object 
which the will is unable not to want. This, Thomas says, is beatitude. All other particular 
goods, inasmuch as they fall short of some good, can strike us as being in some sense not 
completely good, and the will is able to refuse them or accept them, for it is able to respond 
to one and the same object from different points of view. 
 Hence: 1. Only that object which completely answers to a power is its sufficient 
moving force. If there is anything lacking in this regard, the power will not move towards it 
of necessity. 
 2. An object which is at all times and necessarily true inevitably moves the mind, but 
not one which may be either true or false, that is, a contingent truth. In a parallel way, this 
also applies to that which is contingently good. 
 3. Because it is the complete good, the ultimate end of necessity moves the will. 
Those things, without which the possession of the end is impossible, such as being and life, 
are also willed of necessity. Other goods, however, which are not strictly necessary for the 
possession of the end may or may not be willed when the end is willed.  
 
 
2. MORTAL SIN AS NEGATIVE FUNDAMENTAL OPTION: BERNARD HÄRING AND 
RICHARD GULA 
 In this section, we shall examine the theologies of sin of Bernard Häring and Richard 
Gula. In order to understand the notion of mortal sin as negative fundamental option, it is 
vital to study the work of Bernard Häring. As one of the key figures in the renewal of moral 
theology in the twentieth century, Häring contributed greatly to the development of a 
theology of sin based on the more historicist approach to moral truth mentioned in the 




renewal of moral theology. His book, Reason Informed by Faith, which draws heavily on 
Häring’s work, has been widely used in seminaries and theological colleges since its 
publication in 1989. 
 In this section, we shall examine the themes of sin, knowledge of the good, and 
human freedom. As I have already indicated, the discussion of sin in this chapter will focus 
on the notion of mortal sin. The notion of the good is critical to theological discussions on 
sin, as it is the good that we seek in our efforts to counteract sin. As Gula puts it: ‘the good is 
the foundation and the goal of all moral striving.’22 Finally, our discussion of the notion of 
freedom will focus on our theologians’ attempts to supply some sort of empirical basis for 
positing this notion.  
 
2.1. Mortal Sin 
 In this subsection we shall examine the notion of mortal sin in the work of Bernard 
Häring and Richard Gula. We shall place particular emphasis on the sections of their works 
that speak of mortal sin as negative fundamental option.  
 
2.1.1. Häring’s Notion of Mortal Sin as Negative Fundamental Option 
 While the notion of mortal sin as negative fundamental option can be found in all of 
Häring’s reflections on sin,23 it is best observed in the first volume of his Free and Faithful in 
Christ. In this work, Häring writes comprehensively on the meaning of fundamental option 
and its implications for the theological distinction between mortal and venial sin. 
 For Häring, the concept of fundamental option is close to the concept of ‘basic 
intention.’ This basic intention is not merely a pious intention regarding particular works. 
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Rather, it is ‘an intention that has at least the dynamics of being all-pervasive in the 
orientation and quality of all one’s free decisions and actions.’24 Arising from the basic 
intention, then, are the ever increasing basic attitudes. The basic intention is invalid if it fails 
to show the dynamics that penetrate and reshape all convictions and patterns as well as the 
very character of the person. 
 Häring considers whether the fundamental option, as an expression of ‘basic 
freedom,’ is also an option for creative freedom and creative fidelity. Looked at from this 
perspective, he says, the very fundamental option, although theoretically pointing towards the 
good, can be ineffective if, for example, the ‘good’ is conceived legalistically and statically.  
 Häring claims that a person’s way of life may seem to express faith in God, but it is 
often more a kind of polytheism. Although, he says, we profess in the creed our faith in one 
God, in our lives we worship many other gods. The fundamental option or basic intention, he 
says, ‘truly reaches out to the ultimate end in the one God if all our life gradually becomes 
adoration of God in spirit and in truth.’25 The healthy fundamental option involves being 
open to what Häring calls ‘the Other and the others.’26 The fundamental option is false or 
ineffective unless it includes ‘cooperative relationship in trust and self-transcending love.’27 
 While we can explicitly and with purpose, Häring claims, make a basic intention, for 
example, to serve God with all our being, the fundamental option is, by its very nature, more 
than just a single act set into our lives. ‘Rather, it includes a continuing free activation that is 
inherent in all our important choices, or at least tends to give all of them the character of 
basic freedom.’28 However, Häring observes that the fundamental option can be ‘contradicted 
by superficial inconsistencies, which, although they do not reverse, can still weaken the 
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fundamental option for the good.’29 It can also be contradicted, he argues, by free actions 
sufficiently deep and relevant that they can turn basic freedom and fundamental option in the 
opposite direction. 
 Fundamental option, according to Häring, is ‘the activation of a deep knowledge of 
self and of basic freedom by which a person commits himself.’30 The fundamental option is 
not fully activated, he says, by dedicating oneself to a mere idea, for a person is more than an 
idea. Fundamental option is authenticated in its very being only when the person, as a person, 
dedicates herself to the Other. In the fundamental option, human freedom shows itself as ‘the 
capacity for the eternal.’31 However, this does not leave out the fact that a radical 
commitment to one’s fellow human being in self-transcendent love can implicitly be 
dedication to the Eternal, to a personal God. 
 Häring goes on to discuss the fundamental option against God and the good. He 
considers the possibility that human beings can, with adequate freedom, choose false gods 
over the true God. A fundamental option such as this corresponds to the theological concept 
of mortal sin. This does not mean, Häring argues, that all grave sins are a fundamental option 
against God and the good, just as not every serious sickness results in death. However, a 
person who has committed a mortal sin and persists in it is in a state of death. 
 In speaking of mortal sin in this way, Häring says that he is not speaking of the many 
sins but of the sin that underlies the many sins. St Paul, he says, in Romans 5-7, and often in 
other places, distinguishes between hamartia and hamartiai, the former signifying sin in the 
singular and the latter signifying the many sins. 
 Sin, in its most malevolent sense, is turning away from God; it terminates the 
fundamental option for the good self-commitment to serving God and loving neighbour. 
Häring provides a similar definition of mortal sin is his book, Sin in the Secular Age: ‘Mortal 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 168. 




sin is always grave, as death is grave. It is a refusal of God’s friendship, opposition to the 
covenant, and total alienation of the person from God, from himself and from the community. 
It is a fundamental option against God and, explicitly or implicitly, a conscious idolatrous 
option for one’s own egotism or idols.’32 Häring argues that it is impossible to make a 
distinction between serious and non-serious sins, as by its very nature sin is always serious. 
The venial sins that slowly lead to the grave danger of mortal sin, that is, the fundamental 
option against God, are to be regarded as being very serious. 
 Häring points out the important difference between the grave venial sin of one who 
remains in the state of grace and any grave sin of the person who has already turned his/her 
back on God’s friendship. In the enemy of God there is ‘that utter poison of his inimical 
fundamental option affecting each sin.’33 On the other hand, one whose fundamental option is 
for friendship with God does not hold this mark of hostility in the caverns of his/her being. A 
similar distinction between venial and mortal sin can be observed in the first volume of 
Häring’s The Law of Christ: ‘Venial sin by its very nature can co-exist with the soul’s 
fundamental orientation to God, does not involve opposition to the habit of divine love, but 
fails transiently to realize or actualize it.’34 However, Häring warns that if a person is sick but 
does not care for healing, that very neglect may become the cause of his/her ultimate 
destruction. 
 
2.1.2. Gula’s Notion of Mortal Sin as Negative Fundamental Option 
 In his discussion of mortal sin in his book, Reason Informed by Faith, Gula points out 
that some theologians speak of mortal sin as a negative fundamental option. This, he says, 
means that ‘mortal sin, as an expression of the person from deep levels of knowledge and 
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freedom, is a conscious decision to act in a way which fashions a style of life that turns us 
away from relating to God, others, and the world in a positive and life-giving way.’35 
Through mortal sin, he says, we no longer erect and foster healthy relationships, nor are we 
instrumental in the well-being of the human community and all creation. 
 Gula goes on to provide a quotation from Persona Humana, which in its presentation 
of the notion of mortal sin refers to the theory of fundamental option: 
In reality, it is precisely the fundamental option which in the last resort defines a 
person’s moral disposition. But it can be completely changed by particular acts, 
especially when, as often happens, these have been prepared for by previous more 
superficial acts. Whatever the case, it is wrong to say that particular acts are not enough 
to constitute mortal sin.36 
Clearly, Gula suggests, Persona Humana embraces at least the basic features of the theory of 
fundamental option. However, in its treatment of fundamental option, it is critical of 
exaggerated forms of the theory which down-play the importance of the individual act in 
evaluating sin. Responsible use of the theory, he says, would not allow this minimizing. In 
fact, he says, ‘the theory of fundamental option, properly understood, can help us to take sin 
more seriously by showing how sin is truly a corruption of the person.’37 It can also, he says, 
aid in restoring a balance between the three essential requirements for mortal sin by 
demonstrating that actions are certainly important and must always be examined in the 
context of the person if we are to effectively and truly evaluate sin. 
 The way in which Persona Humana uses the fundamental option theory, Gula 
suggests, demonstrates two serious ways of committing mortal sin. The first happens when a 
person, although keenly aware that a particular act is contrary to God’s love, nevertheless 
                                                          
35 Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, 110. 
36 Ibid.; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona Humana (London: Catholic Truth Society, 
1976), sec. 10. 




chooses that act in such a way that it reaches into the core of the person’s being, reshaping his 
or her entire self. The second happens when regular failures to love and to do the good that 
one may reasonably do result in mortal sin. Such growing neglect, Gula suggests, stifles the 
person’s receptiveness to the good and his or her duty to other people. If such neglect 
persists, it reaches a point where a particular act symbolizes more clearly than others the 
deterioration of the partnership of love. This treatment of mortal sin does not deny that we 
may in a definitive action alter our fundamental dedication to the good. It does, however, 
demonstrate why we should consider the pattern of our decisions and actions rather than just 
single acts taken out of context. The theory of fundamental option, Gula suggests, while 
conceding that individual actions can drastically affect a person’s fundamental orientation, 
stresses the fact that these actions are not ‘isolated, self-contained units of personal 
meaning.’38 They are, rather, considered to be mortal sins as they embody an increased lack 
of concern for others and secure an already on-going process of degeneration.  
 According to Gula, actions cannot be divided from persons or from a relational 
context. A single act is the result of interactions, deliberations, and desires over a period of 
time. In order to help the reader understand the contextual nature of our actions, Gula 
provides an analogy. He suggests that we may consider the moral life as a story. Individual 
actions are like the various occurrences that comprise the story. No act has real moral 
significance if it separated from the whole narrative. ‘Since all moral action is interaction, 
each individual action finds its proper meaning from within the total narrative that is the 
moral life.’39 The plot of our story, Gula suggests, is ‘the fundamental orientation which 
flows from our basic commitment and gives shape to the stable identity of our moral 
character.’40 We realize the plot only after we are well into the story. The plot is discovered 
by looking back at what has occurred in the past and how it occurred. By this retrospective, 
                                                          






we can gather from the series of on-going incidents a plot line on which each incident is 
positioned. Once realized, the plot produces a sense of unity to the story and provides each 
particular incident with a relevance that stretches beyond its immediate context. In this way, 
we regard every incident not as a detached episode, but as in continuity with other episodes. 
Only taken together do the individual episodes comprise the story. 
 In order to illustrate the personal and relational nature of the particular act, Gula takes 
as an example the sin of adultery. What makes adultery sinful, he argues, is not merely the 
physical act of intercourse with someone who is not our spouse. The physical act becomes 
truly significant only in the larger context of the interaction between husband and wife and 
the experiences of neglect, plans to meet another, regular meetings, and other unfaithful acts. 
Adultery, Gula argues, is ‘the accumulation of a lack of concern and infidelities.’41 We 
understand the seriousness of a single act only in the context of the broader orientation of the 
person’s life and within the larger context of moral growth and decline.  
  In understanding mortal sin in this way, Gula suggests, we should be cautious about 
designating as ‘mortal sin’ physical actions in themselves separated from the person and the 
broader context of interpersonal relations. Gula refers to a tradition in Catholic theology that 
draws a distinction between formal and material sin. Formal sin is sin in the truest sense of 
the term. ‘It is precisely the action for which we are morally culpable because it proceeds 
from knowledge and freedom and so carries a significant degree of personal involvement.’42 
On the other hand, material sin is only ‘sin’ by analogy. A material sin is an act of objective 
wrongdoing. Although the act may cause great harm, the objective wrongdoing itself does not 
necessarily result in moral culpability; nor does it make the action subjectively sinful. It is 
only when we evaluate the level of self-possession and self-determination involved in an 
                                                          





action that we can truly call it sin, or more specifically ‘mortal sin,’ in the fullest sense of the 
term.  
 
2.1.3. Summary and Analysis  
 The notions of knowledge and freedom are included in the presentations of mortal sin 
of both Häring and Gula. Both of these authors speak of mortal sin in terms of a person’s 
fundamental option towards God and the good. Häring defines fundamental option as ‘the 
activation of a deep knowledge of self and of basic freedom by which a person commits 
himself.’43 It includes, he says, ‘a continuing free activation that is inherent in all our 
important choices, or at least tends to give them the character of basic freedom.’44 Sin, he 
says, ‘in its fully malicious sense [i.e., mortal sin], is turning away from God, and it destroys 
the fundamental option for the good self-commitment to the service of God and love of 
neighbour.’45 In other words, in mortal sin, one’s deep knowledge of self and one’s basic 
freedom is turned away from God and neighbour, and is turned instead towards the self. Gula 
provides a similar definition of mortal sin. Mortal sin, he says, ‘as an expression of the person 
from deep levels of knowledge and freedom, is a conscious decision to act in a way which 
fashions a style of life that turns us away from relating to God, others, and the world in a 
positive and life-giving way.’46  
Häring’s and Gula’s approach to moral truth in general, and to mortal sin in particular, 
is that of the historicist. In the introduction to this chapter we looked at Keenan’s definition 
of the historicist, in which he says that ‘historically minded theologians look at the world and 
the truth as constantly emerging.’ Consequently, Häring and Gula tend not to focus on 
particular acts which they regard as universally and immutably sinful. Instead they focus on 
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the person’s general orientation towards God and the good, recognizing that the act itself tells 
us something of the person’s fundamental option, i.e., whether it is for God and the good, or 
whether it is for the self. What this approach has in common with the classicist approach (as 
we see in the next main section of this chapter), is the emphasis on knowledge and freedom in 
its reflections on mortal sin. Knowledge and freedom are essential prerequisites for 
determining whether or not a person is in a state of mortal or venial sin. For this reason, we 
shall examine in the next subsections Häring’s and Gula’s approaches to the notions of 
knowledge of the good and human freedom. We seek to determine whether their approaches 
to these themes provide a sufficient empirical grounding to their notions of sin, thus making 
their theologies of sin capable of dialoguing with the moral sceptic or determinist.   
  
2.2. Knowledge of the Good 
 In this subsection, we shall analyse and critique Häring’s and Gula’s discussions of 
the notion of the good and of the possibility of discerning the good.  
 
2.2.1. Knowledge of the Good in Häring 
Exposition 
In the section on natural law in his book, Free and Faithful in Christ, Häring 
discusses the question, ‘what is abiding in natural law?’ He says that neither Christian nor 
humanist ethics relies on a natural law theory that suggests that we establish rationally an 
ethics for all people. However, he continues, the acceptance of historicity and the possibility 
of approaching natural law in a number of different ways, does not mean that we accept an 
unlimited relativism. ‘We always insist that man has to discover what is good and evil; he 
cannot determine it arbitrarily.’47 There are abiding truths, he says, and we may hope that, 
                                                          




throughout history, humankind will affirm more and more clearly these abiding human rights 
and moral values. He cites as examples the abolition of slavery, the United Nations’ 
declaration on human rights, and the right to conscientious objection to military service.  
 According to Häring, there is one enduring purpose for humankind and this purpose 
necessitates faithfulness to knowledge of the past, and receptivity to current opportunities for 
better knowledge and teaching about the faith. It also requires growth in duty towards the 
future. This growth can be continually endangered, however, by individuals’ sins and by the 
decay in culture that is so often just the manifestation of the many sins of numerous people, 
particularly of those in positions of power and influence. Widening the discussion and 
sharing human experience and reflection, according to Häring, should result in greater 
deepening of our moral knowledge and to greater discrimination regarding what is enduring 
and what is time-bound. 
 He continues by pointing out that our conception of human nature is relational. This 
does not mean, he says, that we deny our individuality. It simply means that the individual 
person understands himself or herself as one who acts in fellowship with other people and 
with communities. One cannot understand the particular shape of morality outside this 
relational context. 
 Häring suggests that by appreciating the relational character of human nature we 
bridge the vital and enduring insight that no group, nation, or section of the Church may 
inflict time-bound norms on others. This, he says, is ‘a warning for all times against a 
superiority complex that leads to ethical colonialism, to dangerous tensions and even to 
wars.’48 The United Nations’ affirmation on basic human rights to be recognized and 
safeguarded by all civilized states is an important development in the perception and 
advancement of the unchangeable demands of human nature. 
                                                          




 In the section on conscience, Häring discusses the notion of synderesis. The 
synderesis, according to Häring, ‘tells the person that “the good is to be done,” or “love your 
neighbour as yourself.” ’49 He discusses a number of theories regarding conscience which he 
regards as incomplete because they emphasise either the practical intellect or the inborn 
disposition of the will. Häring attempts to develop a more holistic view of conscience that 
gives equal weight to intellect and will and also emphasises human emotions.  
 Most moral theologians today, he says, concur with the view of psychologists and 
therapists who maintain that conscience is not just a single faculty. Conscience does not 
reside more in the will than in the intellect; it is a ‘dynamic force in both because of their 
belonging together in the deepest reaches of our psychic and spiritual life.’50 
 Quoting Erich Fromm, Häring describes the dynamic of our conscience as ‘the 
reaction of our total personality to its proper functioning and disfunctioning, not to the 
function of this or that capacity but to the capacities which constitute our human and 
individual existence.’51 Human beings are begotten for wholeness biologically, 
psychologically, and spiritually. In the innermost depths of our being, Häring contends, we 
are acutely aware of what can either foster or jeopardize our wholeness and integrity. 
 The particular judgement of prudence, recognized as a judgement of conscience, is 
dependent on many conditions. However, that which makes the judgement of prudence 
urgent and at once attractive is the longing for wholeness which belongs to conscience. 
Because we are created for wholeness, we are able to ‘dynamically decipher and experience 
the good to which God calls us in the particular situation.’52 One’s conscience, Häring tells 
us, is only healthy when the complete person – the emotional and the intellectual as well as 
the energies of the will – is working in profound harmony at the deepest levels of a person’s 
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being. This innermost depth is the point where the person is moved by the creative Spirit and 
led to continually greater wholeness and integrity. It is ‘the pivotal personal centre of man’s 
total response to the dynamics, direction and personal thrust of the divine claim on him.’53 
Conscience involves the person’s complete selfhood as a moral agent. The intellectual, 
volitional, and emotional aspects of the conscience are not divided; rather they come together 
in the innermost depths where, as Häring puts it, ‘the person is person to himself.’54 
 Insofar as a person’s conscience is complete and receptive he or she is a true sign of 
the encouragement of the Spirit who restores his or her heart and, through him or her, the 
whole world. Although on the deepest levels of the human spirit, Häring tells us, intellect and 
will are separate, they are unable to survive without each other. However, the fact that 
intellect and will can counter each other is a sign of their limited nature. This opposition of 
intellect and will does not take place without releasing a depth of sorrow in the very centre in 
which they are united. The conflict that this opposition creates is felt intensely. In this wound, 
Haring maintains, the soul cries out for healing. This cry is a sign of the closeness of the 
Spirit who calls the person to shut the awful rift of opposition by restoring the integrity and 
balance that makes the person a veritable image and likeness of God. 
 Because of the deep interpenetration and integration of intellect, will, and affectivity 
in a person’s very being, the intellect’s desire for the true and the good is perturbed when, out 
of malevolent motives, the will works against it. The will also must struggle as it attempts to 
resist the longing of the intellect for improved knowledge and realization of the good. The 
person suffers in his or her entire being if there emerges a separation into two different 
selves, the true self that desires wholeness and truth and the selfish self that looks for that 
which is merely an image of the good. As the foundation and origin of the oneness of all 
one’s powers, the soul is tormented, torn apart by conflict. 
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 According to Häring, as we have seen, ‘we always insist that man has to discover 
what is good and evil; he cannot determine it arbitrarily.’ There are, he says, abiding truths, 
and we may hope that humankind will affirm ever more clearly these abiding human rights 
and moral values. He cites as examples the abolition of slavery, the United Nations’ 
declaration on human rights, and the right to conscientious objection to military service.  
It seems sensible to suggest that human beings should not determine arbitrarily what 
is good and evil, and that we should discover this for ourselves. However, the possibility of 
such discovery of the good, or even the existence of the good, is presupposed in Häring’s 
work. The fact that Häring ‘insists’ that we must discover for ourselves what is good and evil 
is not evidence that such a discovery is possible. Simply citing a few examples of ‘abiding 
human rights and moral values,’ is an insufficient method of engaging with the sceptic’s 
suggestion that knowledge of the good is impossible. 
According to Häring, the enrichment of moral knowledge and a greater discernment 
between that which is abiding and that which is time-bound will come from a broadening of 
dialogue and a sharing of human experience and reflection. Agreement on issues pertaining to 
morality will no doubt be fostered by dialogue, as long as the partners in the dialogue agree 
that moral knowledge is possible. If, however, one of the dialogue partners cannot see how 
moral knowledge is possible, it is up to the other partner to attempt to convince his opponent 
of this possibility. This is a necessary first step in a dialogue with somebody who does not 
necessarily share our world-view. Unless this first obstacle is overcome, any further 
discussion regarding the particulars of the moral life, i.e., questions of what is morally 
acceptable or not, is meaningless. 
 In his discussion of conscience, Häring says that the synderesis ‘tells the person that 




argue with the statement ‘the good is to be done.’ There are those, however, who might add 
to this statement in something like the following terms: yes, the good should be done, but 
how do we determine what exactly is good? Is such discernment possible? Can we really say 
that there exists something which we can objectively call the good? Is the good not just a 
human construction dependant on the time, place, and culture of the person attempting to 
decide what is good or evil?  
Häring doesn’t really engage with these questions. His notion of conscience is based 
on the understanding that human beings are begotten for wholeness biologically, 
psychologically, and spiritually, and because we are created for wholeness, we are able to 
‘dynamically decipher and experience the good to which God calls us in the particular 
situation.’ This argument fails to engage with the sceptic because it is just too theological. 
This may seem like a strange criticism. After all, why should a theologian not be as 
theological as he or she wishes to be? My answer to this question is that theology is 
essentially about communication. In doing theology we attempt to understand something of 
our faith and to communicate our understanding to others. By suggesting that knowledge of 
the good is possible because we are ‘begotten for wholeness’ and that because of this we can 
decipher and experience the good to which God calls us, Häring limits his audience to those 
who already share his basic world-view, namely other Christians.  
 In discussing the interpenetration of intellect, will, and affectivity, Häring claims that 
‘the intellect’s desire for the true and the good’ is perturbed when the will works against it. 
He makes the further claim that the will must struggle as it attempts to resist ‘the longing of 
the intellect for improved knowledge and realization of the good.’ This argument rests on two 
presuppositions: 1) there is an objective reality called the good, 2) the intellect desires 




of these positions. As a result, his argument is unconvincing to anybody who does not share 
his basic world-view. 
 
2.2.2. Knowledge of the Good in Gula 
Exposition 
 In his book, Reason Informed by Faith, Gula discusses the notion of the good in two 
different contexts. The first discussion of the good is within the context of the debate on the 
distinctiveness of Christian morality; the second is within the context of his discussion of 
conscience. 
 (a) Gula begins by observing that philosophers’ convictions about the good have for a 
long time influenced moral dispositions and actions. For Aristotle, Gula points out, the good 
is happiness, for hedonists it is pleasure, and for utilitarians it lies in that which is most 
useful. Scholastic philosophy establishes an identity between ‘good’ and ‘being’s own 
perfection.’55 This means that the nature of the good is to fully realize one’s potential, or to 
attain perfection. The inborn propensity within the person to search for perfection is ‘the 
ontological basis for the fundamental moral obligation – to realize one’s potential, or to be all 
that one can be.’56 Moral actions are those that proceed from this inborn propensity and 
contribute to the full realization of human possibilities. As faith informs reason on the nature 
of the good, the believer regards God as the fullness of being. Consequently he or she sees 
God’s actions as good because they proceed from love, which is the divine nature.  
  Gula points out that Christians are not set apart by the fact that they have strong 
beliefs about the good; they are set apart by the kinds of beliefs they hold. Christian 
conviction regarding the good is directed by the religious beliefs revealed in biblical stories, 
especially in Jesus, and further developed in the Church’s theological tradition. The 
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fundamental Christian assertion regarding the good and where the good can be found is that 
God is good. All other things are good only as they relate to God as an image or mediation of 
God. Christianity, which proclaims a belief in one God, permits only one source of value. 
Other types of goodness always have their source in and are reliant on the antecedent 
goodness of God. To set up anything else but the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus as 
the source of that which is good is idolatrous. 
 God’s goodness, Gula continues, is revealed in scripture, especially in Jesus the 
Christ. Knowledge of God’s goodness is attained through knowledge of Jesus in scripture, 
and through interpreting human experience in view of Jesus and the scriptures. The beliefs 
we hold regarding God shape our assumptions about the moral life. According to Gula, the 
fundamental belief in the goodness of God, who is the only source of goodness and the 
unchanging point of reference for morality, gives Christian morality an objective grounding. 
It also makes response to God a categorical moral duty. 
 The conviction that God is the source of the good gives the Christian a reason for 
being moral. In answer to the question ‘Why be moral?’ the Christian looks to his or her 
experience and belief in God’s goodness. The Christian is moral because God is good, and 
because the goodness of the omnipresent God allows and obliges us to take responsibility for 
the world’s goodness. This belief about God’s goodness and presence produces a normative 
assertion regarding the moral life informed by faith: ‘Human moral striving ought to be 
responsive to God and to be governed by what we can know of the goodness of God and of 
God’s own good activity.’57 The central question that this outlook broaches for morality is: 
‘What is God enabling and requiring me to be and to do?’ To answer this question, Gula tells 
us, continuing discernment is an essential aspect of the moral life so that we may bring to 
light the ways in which we may be more receptive to God. 
                                                          




 (b) In his discussion of conscience, Gula speaks of the three dimensions of conscience 
to which, he tells us, the Catholic tradition ascribes. The first is the synderesis, which Gula 
defines as ‘the basic tendency or capacity within us to know and to do the good.’58 The 
second is moral science, the process of realizing the particular good which should be done or 
the bad that must be avoided. The third is conscience, ‘the specific judgement of the good 
which “I must do” in this particular situation.’59 
 Synderesis is the ability to know and do that which is good and to avoid that which is 
evil. The reality of this inclination to the good makes possible lively debate about what is 
right or wrong in each occurrence of moral choice. The vast display of moral disagreement 
that we experience in our lives does not invalidate the existence of synderesis; rather it 
affirms it. Synderesis gives us a general perception of moral value and the general perception 
that it matters that we do the right thing in every particular instance. 
 We also, Gula tells us, need moral science. The strength of synderesis gives us power 
to seek the objective moral values in each particular instance so that we may uncover the 
right thing to do. The discovery of the active moral values and the right thing to do is the 
function of moral science. Its primary functions are precise discernment and right moral 
reasoning. Consequently, much attention is given to moral science in moral debates and in 
moral education. It is the domain of moral blindness or insight, moral disagreement or error. 
It requires education, formation, information, examination, and transformation. In other 
words, moral science is the subject of the practice we call ‘the formation of conscience.’ This 
practice aims at accurate seeing and correct thinking. In its responsibility to moral truth, 
moral science is enlightened and aided in diverse ways to apprehend and take hold of this 
truth. Moral science, then, is shaped in community and extracts from numerous sources of 
moral wisdom in order to know what it means to be a truly moral human being. 
                                                          





 Conscience in the third sense of the term (‘the specific judgement of the good which 
“I must do” in this particular situation’) takes us from perception and reasoning to action. The 
general inclination to the good (synderesis) and the process whereby we consider the 
significant moral factors (moral science) meet to create ‘the judgement of what I must now 
do and the commitment to do it’60 (conscience). Others can aid us in making this judgement, 
but nothing can take the place of making the judgement that only I can make. That which 
characterizes the judgement of conscience (in the third sense) is that it is invariably a 
judgement for me. It is never a judgement of what someone else must do, but only what I 
must do. The essence of conscience’s dignity and freedom is to be found in this third sense of 
conscience. The demand that conscience in this sense makes on me is this: ‘I must always do 
what I believe to be right and avoid what I believe to be wrong.’61 If one sincerely believes 
with one’s whole being that a particular course of action rather than another is the objective 
will of God, then that course of action is no longer just one alternative among a multitude. It 
becomes, rather, a moral requirement for the person; this is the meaning of the term ‘bound to 
follow one’s conscience.’ Conscience, in the third sense, must not be contravened. It is what 
Gaudium et Spes calls the ‘most secret core and sanctuary of the person’62 where he or she is 
alone with God. 
 
Critique 
 Like Häring, Gula fails to dialogue with the moral sceptic by directly equating the 
good with God: ‘The basic Christian conviction about what is good and where it can be found 
is that God is good.’63 In terms of knowledge of the good, Gula asserts that knowledge of 
God’s goodness is attained through knowledge of Jesus in scripture, and through interpreting 
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human experience in view of Jesus and the scriptures. The beliefs we hold regarding God 
shape our assumptions about the moral life. The fundamental belief in the goodness of God, 
who is the only source of goodness and the unchanging point of reference for morality, gives 
Christian morality an objective grounding. 
 By simply equating the good with God, Gula, as I have already suggested, alienates 
the more sceptical reader. Furthermore, his notion of how knowledge of the good is attained 
causes the same alienation. The idea that knowledge of the good is only to be found through 
knowledge of Jesus in scripture, and through interpreting human experience in view of Jesus 
and the scriptures, rules out the possibility that the non-Christian can properly know anything 
about the good. More importantly though, for the purposes of this dissertation, is the fact that 
Gula’s assertion that knowledge of the good is to be found through knowledge of Jesus in the 
scriptures, fails to provide an adequate empirical grounding to the notion of the good and the 
possibility of its been discerned by human beings. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that 
God is, from our perspective, the complete good, and that we come to know God through the 
scriptures, we must, if we are to communicate with the moral sceptic, be able to speak of the 
good and the possibility of its discernment in terms that are not so overtly theological.   
 As we have seen, in his discussion of conscience, Gula speaks of the three dimensions 
of conscience: 1. Synderesis; 2. Moral Science; 3. Conscience. Gula describes the synderesis 
as ‘the basic tendency or capacity within us to know and to do the good.’ In arguing for the 
existence of the synderesis, Gula claims that the reality of the inclination to the good makes 
possible lively debate about what is right or wrong in each occurrence of moral choice. The 
vast display, he says, of moral disagreement that we experience in our lives does not 
invalidate but in fact affirms the existence of synderesis. Synderesis gives us a general 
perception of moral value and the general perception that it matters that we do the right thing 




on matters pertaining to morality is evidence that we have a general perception of moral 
value and that doing the right thing matters. This argument makes sense up to a point. I agree 
with Gula that the fact of moral disagreement indicates a general perception that doing the 
right thing matters. However, this still leaves us with the same questions we observed in 
relation to Haring’s presentation of synderesis, questions regarding the possibility that there 
exists an objective reality called the good, and the possibility of human discernment of this 
reality. Gula’s argument for the existence of something called synderesis is plausible, but the 
question of whether or not what we perceive in the synderesis reveals an objective reality is 
left unanswered (and indeed unasked). 
 Because Gula’s presentation of the synderesis has not established the possibility of 
revealing an objective reality that we call the good, the notion of moral science, the process 
of realizing the particular good, falls apart. According to Gula, as we have seen, moral 
science has a responsibility to moral truth; it is enlightened and aided in diverse ways to 
apprehend and take hold of this truth. Gula’s notion of moral science, looked at empirically, 
is invalidated by the failure of his discussion of synderesis to rationally demonstrate the 
existence of the good and the possibility of its discernment, as the realization of the particular 
good presupposes the existence of the good in general. The third dimension of conscience, 
‘the specific judgement of the good which “I must do” in this particular situation,’ is also 
invalidated by the failure of Gula’s presentation of the synderesis to demonstrate the 
possibility of human discernment of the objective good. The imperative ‘I must do’ is only 








2.3. Human Freedom 
 In this subsection, we shall examine Häring’s and Gula’s discussions of the notion of 
human freedom, focusing on their attempts to supply some sort of empirical grounding to this 
notion. 
 
2.3.1. Häring’s Notion of Human Freedom 
Exposition 
 In a book entitled Free and Faithful in Christ it is not surprising that Häring gives 
‘great attention throughout this book to the nature and dynamics of freedom.’64 In a section of 
this book entitled ‘Responsibility in Creative Liberty,’ Häring’s intention is to ‘show that 
creative freedom is a main trait of a Christian ethics of responsibility.’65 Indeed, he continues, 
‘no genuine ethics can be understood without explaining clearly what freedom means and 
does not mean.’66 It is because of this positive statement of intent to clearly set out the 
meaning of freedom that we turn our attention to this section of Häring’s work. 
 According to Häring, ‘we can be creative in freedom only because we are called and 
liberated by Love Incarnate, Jesus Christ, our Redeemer.’67 In his creative love, he beckons 
us and makes us participants and co-revealers in his continuing creative and redemptive 
work. For Häring, God’s creative and redemptive love is the overflowing of God’s own 
freedom. But, he says, if this is so, God desires that we become co-creators and co-artists, not 
just insipid perpetrators of his will. 
 Following Bultmann, Häring conceives love as the object and the law of freedom.68 
The law of Christ is, then, in essence a law of pure and perfect freedom. The freedom we 
attain through that freedom whereby God makes known his boundless love is complete 
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freedom for genuine love. God, Häring tells us, has no need for us. However, in his limitless 
freedom he made us to be co-creators through the world’s history. In Christ God has selected 
human beings to be collaborators in the continuing redemptive work. 
 Through his creativity, God has demonstrated that he does not want spiritless 
administration of his laws or tedious, unoriginal responses. He gives us and asks from us ‘a 
creative response in generosity beyond general norms.’69 The relationship is one of dialogue. 
A sincere dialogue is somewhat different from reeling off a studied text. If we listen 
attentively to the other, something new is created within us. While we keep positively in our 
minds that everything is a gift from God and warrants thankfulness, this does not imply that 
our response is in any way determined by God. Through God’s very gift, he assists and wants 
human beings to creatively enhance salvation history.  
 This history is one where people communicate with God and with each other, where 
all participants take part in the co-creative dialogue. The consequences of our response are 
not already established. ‘It is something which God does not reveal directly to man but he 
looks to man to complete the revelation himself.’70 This, of course, does not imply that the 
revelation is a human creation. The creative discernment that takes place through the course 
of history is very much God’s work. Yet it is also the work of human beings in what Häring 
calls ‘co-creativity.’ This gift of co-creativity has its origins in the deepest levels of God’s 
freedom. 
 God does not bestow these gifts upon us without a purpose. He wills that we use these 
gifts in his work of redemption. Those who squander or refuse God’s gift of creativity impede 
the redemptive mission, and are accountable. Such absence of creativity is most apparent in a 
legalism that fails to highlight the freshness of a Christian morality that transcends the letter 
                                                          
69 Häring, Free and Faithful, 69. 




of the law. To be so deficient in creativity is to sin against the Lord of history who desires at 
all times to reveal his own creative love and freedom, through our participation. 
 According to Häring, it is only in sin that human freedom is utterly uncreative. When 
a person neglects to do the good he/she could and should do, or does the bad he/she could 
have refrained from, he/she not only lessens his/her own freedom but also impoverishes 
salvation history by the uncreative or damaging use of his/her freedom.  
 Yet, Häring says, it must be clearly understood that we are able to talk about personal 
sin only because we possess freedom. The human being ‘has the power of contradicting 
himself and his essential nature. Man is free even from his freedom; that is, he can surrender 
his humanity.’71 Through the misuse of the ‘very freedom which is our title to the human 
dignity granted by God, the sinner gradually destroys his freedom to choose the good.’72 In 
freedom he/she chooses to disregard the truth that ‘the freedom of the Christian is a freedom 
for Jesus: to be free for a divine purpose that is from the beginning.’73 
 
Critique 
 The notion that our freedom stems from God’s own freedom insofar as God calls us to 
participate in his redemptive work, from a theological point of view is unobjectionable. 
However, in terms of demonstrating empirically the existence of human freedom, this way of 
viewing freedom is of little use. Again, Häring is being too theological to convince anyone 
who does not hold the same basic world-view as himself. For Häring, love is the object and 
the law of freedom, and the law of Christ is a law of pure and perfect freedom. This notion of 
freedom is Christocentric, an extremely important element in Häring’s work, as the title of his 
two major treatises on moral theology suggest: The Law of Christ and Free and Faithful in 
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Christ. The same critique, however, applies: Häring’s conception of freedom is just too 
theological to engage with people with other world-views. 
 Häring understands human freedom as an historical ‘co-creative dialogue’ between 
human beings and God. The creative discernment that takes place through the course of 
history, he says, is very much God’s work. Yet it is also the work of human beings in ‘co-
creativity.’ This gift of co-creativity, Häring says, has its origins in the deepest levels of 
God’s freedom. This argument for human freedom contains a number of presuppositions: 1) 
the existence of a supernatural being, namely God, 2) the ability of human beings to 
communicate with this supernatural being, 3) the freedom of this supernatural being. These 
are things that as Christians we take for granted. However, if we are to convince those who 
do not share our basic world-view that human freedom is possible, we must leave aside these 
presuppositions and attempt to dialogue with the sceptic or determinist in terms that he/she 
can engage with. This is not to suggest that our Christian presuppositions are unimportant or 
that we should lose sight of who we are. On the contrary, it is probably precisely because we 
are Christians and because as Christians we hold certain views about the world, that we find 
ourselves in a position of defending the possibility of human freedom. However, if our 
dialogue is to be fruitful, we must engage with our dialogue partners in a way that takes 
account of and respects their often quite contradictory world-views. 
To say that we can only speak of personal sin because we possess freedom makes 
perfect sense. Insofar as we are not free, we cannot be held accountable for our actions, and 
where there is no culpability we cannot speak of sin. However, Häring goes on to attempt to 
demonstrate the existence of freedom in a manner that is completely unscientific and 
therefore incapable of convincing the non-Christian. He simply quotes two theologians who 




that it is the truth. However, he presents no rational argument or empirical evidence to 
support this position.    
 For Häring, as we have seen, it is only in sin that human freedom is utterly uncreative. 
When one neglects to do the good one could and should do, or does the bad one could have 
refrained from, one not only lessens one’s own freedom but also impoverishes salvation 
history by the uncreative or damaging use of one’s freedom. Häring again provides us with an 
argument that contains many presuppositions: 1) Human beings have free will, 2) there is an 
objective good and an objective bad, 3) there is such a thing as salvation and salvation 
history. As I noted in relation to the presuppositions of Häring’s argument that freedom is a 
‘co-creative dialogue’ between human beings and God, these are things that the Christian 
takes for granted. The world, however, contains more than just Christians, and effective 
dialogue is essential if we are to find some common ground on which to discuss matters 
pertaining to morality. For this reason, we must set aside our presuppositions and engage with 
our dialogue partners – in this instance, determinists – in a way that does not alienate them.     
 
2.3.2. Gula’s Notion of Human Freedom  
Exposition 
 In his book, Reason Informed by Faith, Gula gives an account of freedom which 
directly engages with the notion of determinism. As we grow in self-knowledge, he says, we 
come to identify the restrictions to who we can become and to what we are able to 
accomplish. We become aware that we are the product of something outside ourselves. To 
illustrate, Gula looks at the influence of genetics and social-cultural conditioning. Our genetic 
endowment, he argues, is unchangeable. No matter how much we will, we cannot change 
what has been passed on to us through heredity; we may, however, change the way we 




possibilities. Genetic inheritance, however, does not determine definitively what we do or 
who we become. Our freedom, Gula argues, ‘can be exercised across a broad spectrum of 
genetic possibilities and is subject to environmental influences. We must find our way within 
the limits of these potentials and the forces of the social-cultural conditions which shape our 
worldview and influence not only the way we interpret experience but even the kinds of 
experience we have.’74 The regularly offered advice ‘Be yourself’ is not just consent to ‘turn 
in on oneself;’ it is, rather, a prompting to ‘express oneself within one’s own limits according 
to one’s own predispositions.’75 Freedom inevitably acts within the already existing 
restrictions of genetic inheritance and milieu. 
 In confronting these restrictions or limitations, Gula argues, we risk selling out to 
determinism. This selling out is an effort to flee freedom by suggesting that human beings are 
impelled to be who they are and to do what they do by inheritance or environment. By selling 
out, we fail to take responsibility for any of our choices or actions. By rejecting the freedom 
which belongs to us, we demonstrate fear of taking responsibility for ourselves. One of the 
goals of life is to accomplish freedom in the areas where we have not yet attained freedom. 
The principle aim, therefore, of moral education is to liberate us from becoming guided by 
the unchangeable specifics of genetic inheritance or by the variable restrictions of an external 
authority. It is to free us to live a good life within the restrictions of inheritance and 
environment. 
 Gula proceeds by arguing that ‘the behavioural sciences have clearly shown that our 
freedom is limited. Our actions fall somewhere on the continuum between absolute freedom 
and absolute determinism.’76 If this was not the case, he continues, we would not experience 
feelings of unease or indecision about the choices we make. Furthermore, reflection and 
deliberation would be invalidated if human beings were totally free or totally determined. 
                                                          






 ‘Assuming, then, some freedom of self-determination in the moral life, we recognize 
that one purpose of this freedom is to appropriate actively what happens to us into the persons 
we are and can yet become.’77 We do not, Gula argues, look at human life as if we should be 
given a winning hand. What matters, rather, is that we skilfully play the hand we have been 
dealt. Freedom allows human beings to incorporate the ‘slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune’ into their lives in order that they may move toward wholeness and integrity and live 
in harmony. In order to accomplish this we must make the events of our lives part of who we 
are. The ability to turn necessity into virtue is an indication that we possess a robust moral 
character; it is a manifestation of our potential for self-determination. 
 We cannot, Gula argues, be considered morally culpable for the determining factors 
of our lives. However, since these factors make up a part of who we are, we must appropriate 
them into ourselves. As we become ever more conscious or ourselves and as we possess 
ourselves more and more, including all determining factors, we will see ourselves as being 
responsible for our actions and for the people we become. 
 Our freedom to choose what we make of ourselves puts us directly in contact with 
what theologians refer to as basic or core freedom. Basic freedom looks toward a loving 
relationship with God, who is the ultimate goal or end of our lives. However, because we 
experience God by various means of mediation, we finally build our friendship with God in 
and through the means by which we connect with everything in the world. This is why basic 
freedom of self-determination before God is always manifested in the specific decisions we 










 In his discussion of freedom, Gula directly engages with the notion of determinism. 
The way in which he does this, however, is unscientific and unconvincing. He argues that 
genetic inheritance does not determine definitively what we do or who we become. In terms 
of a dialogue with determinism, this is a very important point. However, Gula provides no 
evidence to support his argument. In fact to call this an argument is inaccurate: he simply 
states this as a fact and the reader is expected to accept it without question.  
He proceeds by suggesting that freedom inevitably acts within the already existing 
restrictions of genetic inheritance and milieu. Gula speaks of freedom as if it is a given. His 
attempts to engage with the notion of determinism amount to nothing more than an assertion, 
unsupported by evidence, that determinism is wrong and that freedom is a reality. He 
suggests that determinism is a sell out, a fear of taking responsibility for ourselves. This is a 
plausible suggestion up to a point. It makes sense that people might take the notion of 
determinism and use it to avoid taking responsibility for their actions. Indeed, the refusal to 
take responsibility for one’s actions is one of the defining characteristics of sin. However, the 
implication is that all determinists are moral cowards. This is unfair, unwarranted, and, more 
importantly, unsupported by evidence.  
Gula goes on to state that ‘the behavioural sciences have clearly shown that our 
freedom is limited. Our actions fall somewhere on the continuum between absolute freedom 
and absolute determinism.’ However, he fails to provide any support for this contention. He 
does not provide even a footnote to suggest where one might find evidence of this assertion.  
If it was not the case that human beings possessed some level of freedom, he suggests, 
we would not experience feelings of unease or indecision about the choices we make. This is 
a weak argument. It could just as easily be argued that feelings of unease about decisions we 




could reason that the psychological experience of trying to make the right choice regarding an 
action would be identical whether or not freedom was an objective reality or merely an 
intellectual belief. 
Apparently satisfied that his argument is convincing, Gula continues: ‘Assuming, 
then, some freedom of self-determination in the moral life, we recognize that one purpose of 
this freedom is to appropriate actively what happens to us into the persons we are and can yet 
become’ (my italics). This is a big assumption and, as we have seen, it is based on 
unsupported arguments. Gula attempts to say what the purpose of our freedom is, but fails to 
achieve what is more fundamental, namely the necessary first step of demonstrating the 
possibility of freedom. 
Gula’s discussion of freedom gets progressively worse as he resorts to a number of 
clichéd expressions in an effort to explain the meaning of freedom. We do not, he says, look 
at human life as if we should be given a winning hand. What matters is that we skilfully play 
the hand we have been dealt. Shakespeare is then invoked as Gula suggests that freedom 
enables human beings to incorporate the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune into their 
lives in order that they may move toward wholeness and integrity and live in harmony. The 
ability to turn necessity into virtue, he continues, is an indication that we possess a robust 
moral character; it is a manifestation of our potential for self-determination. This method of 
argumentation is one of personal reflection on personally held beliefs. Gula is apparently 
attempting to be somewhat poetic in his reflections. The result, however, is a sentimental 
account of human freedom that is scientifically weak and completely incapable of convincing 






3. MORTAL SIN AS CONSCIOUS AND FREELY CHOSEN ACT: GERMAIN GRISEZ 
AND WILLIAM E. MAY 
In this section, we shall examine the theologies of sin of Germain Grisez and William 
E. May. The work of these theologians is representative of a more classicist approach to 
moral theology than that of Häring and Gula. For Grisez and May mortal sin lies not in one’s 
fundamental option against God or the good, but in particular acts that demonstrate a 
conscious and free decision to go against God’s will. This approach to moral theology 
emphasises the universality and immutability of moral truths as revealed in scripture and 
interpreted unquestionably by the magisterium.  
 As in the previous section, our discussion will focus on the themes of mortal sin, and 
Grisez’s and May’s attempts to provide a solid rational foundation for this notion in their 
discussions of knowledge of the good and human freedom. 
 
3.1. Mortal Sin 
 In this subsection, we shall examine the notion of mortal sin in the work of Grisez and 
May.  
 
3.1.1. Grisez’s Notion of Mortal Sin 
 Grisez, in his book Christian Moral Principles, defines mortal sin as ‘a sin which is 
incompatible with divine life.’78 Those, he says, that commit and remain in mortal sin 
exclude themselves from the kingdom of God, separate themselves from Jesus, and banish 
the Holy Spirit from their hearts. They render themselves incapable of life in the Church, 
especially of receiving Holy Communion, which communicates and nurtures the living 
oneness of humankind redeemed in Christ. 
                                                          




 Grisez goes on to discuss the three conditions required for mortal sin: grave matter, 
sufficient reflection, and full consent. We shall focus on the second and third conditions, as it 
is these conditions that are most relevant to our discussion. 
 Sufficient reflection, Grisez begins, necessitates more than mere consciousness of 
what one is doing. Without this consciousness, he says, an act is not human at all. Sufficient 
reflection also involves knowing that the act is gravely wrong. Reflection sufficient for 
mortal sin exists, then, if two conditions are met: first, if one disregards one’s conscience, and 
second, if one’s conscience tells one that the matter is either grave or may be grave. 
 At the relevant time, a person must in fact be conscious of the wrongness of the act. It 
is not enough that one could be, and indeed has a responsibility to be, aware. In such a 
situation one is responsible chiefly for failing to form one’s conscience; one is not, however, 
gravely responsible for every unseen evil that results from this failure. 
 The relevant time, according to Grisez, is not the time of execution, but the time of 
decision. He gives the example of an alcoholic who, while realizing that he or she has a 
serious duty to look for help, and foreseeing future neglect of family responsibilities if help is 
not sought, nevertheless makes a decision not to seek help at this time. The relevant time is 
the time when one makes this decision. While the decision is made with sufficient reflection, 
the neglect that results from the decision occurs later, when the alcoholic can no longer 
reflect properly on or demonstrate proper concern for family responsibilities. 
 Reflection can be insufficient when one’s mental state incapacitates one to think 
clearly about what one is about to do. Grisez gives the examples of extreme fatigue, 
semiwakefulness, partial sedation, great pressure, and distraction. In these instances it can 
signify insufficient reflection that the person in question did not in any way plan the act in 
that situation, that the act was not the type of act normally committed by this person, and that 




 Full consent, Grisez continues, is a definite choice. Even when one knows that an act 
would be gravely wrong, one has not sinned until a positive decision has been made. The 
choice itself need not pertain to a wrongful act; it can effect an immoral commitment, or it 
can be concerned instead with an omission. It may also involve acquiescence to outcomes we 
have a serious duty to avoid. 
 According to Grisez, one can make a choice without communicating it in words or 
implementing it in any type of behaviour. One can also, he says, choose in such a way that a 
range of possibilities is left open to be settled by additional choices. He gives the example of 
a person who decides to indulge in some form of immoral satisfaction and only after the 
decision thinks about specifics. In such a situation, the choice required for a mortal sin is 
made at the moment when a suggestion concerning grave matter, however generally this term 
is understood, is assented to with sufficient reflection.  
 Judgements of conscience can pertain to the activity of deliberation itself as well as to 
other acts. If a person is sufficiently conscious of a serious duty to reflect upon and decide a 
particular matter and chooses not to do so, or is sufficiently conscious of a serious duty to put 
aside a particular reflection (perhaps by thinking about something else) yet chooses to 
continue in it, then, according to Grisez, a definite choice has been made which is mortally 
sinful. 
 To illustrate, Grisez provides the following example: knowing that someone else is 
committing a seriously wrong act, a person can be conscious of a duty to reflect upon 
possible ways of rectifying the situation. Although this duty might be acknowledged as 
serious, the potential discomfort of carrying it out could cause the person to be a tempted to 
abandon this duty. Such a choice would be inconsistent with a judgement of conscience that 





3.1.2. May’s Notion of Mortal Sin79 
 May defines sin as ‘a morally evil act, i.e., a freely chosen act known to be contrary to 
the eternal law as this is made manifest in our conscience.’80 According to May, the freely 
chosen act, as morally evil, is stripped of the goodness it can and should have. The sinful act, 
seen as an evil or privation in the moral order, obstructs the realization of human beings on 
all levels of existence, damaging and distorting the person in his or her depths. The sinful act 
also injures human community and fractures the friendship that God wants to exist between 
himself and all of humanity. 
 May continues by defining sin as ‘a freely chosen act of self-determination opposed to 
the eternal law.’81 Seen in this way, he says, sin is an act bereft of the openness it can and 
should have to the complete good of human beings, the good to which they are guided by 
God’s eternal law. Sin, he says, is a consciously chosen act which the person knows 
contravenes the fundamental rule or basic norm of human activity, namely, that such activity, 
‘in accord with the divine plan and will, should harmonize with the members of society to 
pursue their total vocation and fulfil it.’82  
 According to May, God’s eternal law, his sagacious and benevolent design for 
guiding human beings to their full realization, is known, to some degree at least, even by 
those who do not believe. This is because the basic requirements of God’s eternal law are, as 
St Paul put it, written in their hearts.83 Or as Vatican II puts it, the requirements of God’s 
eternal law are revealed to persons through the mediation of conscience.84 For this reason one 
who knowingly acts against the truth revealed in conscience always diverges from the 
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benevolent plan of the eternal law; in this way he or she offends and resists God. May here 
quotes St Thomas: ‘it is precisely from the perspective of its nature as an offence against God 
that sin is considered in theology.’85 Indeed, May continues, St Thomas maintained that even 
those who are not baptized can, due to their power of self-determining free choice and with 
the aid of God’s unfaltering grace, acknowledge God and his law of love or renounce him 
and his law in their first completely human act of self-determining free choice.   
The substance or matter of the sin, for May, is the word, deed, or desire. What makes 
the particular word, deed, or desire sinful is the fact that the person freely chooses what he or 
she knows to be opposed to God’s benevolent design. In doing this he/she gives him/herself 
the identity of one opposed to this benevolent design, that is, a sinner. For believers, 
moreover, God’s eternal law is revealed not just through the mediation of conscience 
illuminated by reason but also through the mediation of the revelation pronounced by the 
Church and acquiesced to in faith. The faithful know, or should know, that immoral acts that 
are freely chosen not only contravene God’s benevolent design for the human race but also 
savagely reject his gift of life and love. For May, sin, regarded as an offence against God, 
becomes particularly heinous for the faithful as it is an act of ingratitude and unfaithfulness. It 
is for this reason, May observes, that the prophets frequently equated sin with adultery.  
By sinning, Christians substitute the life of liberty procured for them by Christ for 
continued death and slavery.86 Furthermore, since the Christian, because he or she is 
baptized, is irreversibly a member of Christ’s body the Church,87 there is an ecclesial 
dimension to every sin of a Christian. Sin, in other words, contravenes the Christian’s duty to 
Christ and to the Church.88   
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3.1.3. Summary and Analysis 
 In contrast to the approach of Häring and Gula who speak of mortal sin in terms of the 
person’s fundamental option against God and the good, for Grisez and May mortal sin is 
constituted by particular acts committed in full awareness of the seriousness of the act and in 
full freedom. For example, Grisez defines mortal sin in terms of a single act that destroys 
human union with God. Mortal sin, he says, is ‘a sin which is incompatible with divine 
life.’89 When Grisez speaks of the second criterion for discerning whether or not a sin is 
mortal or venial, he says that ‘sufficient reflection also requires awareness that the act is 
gravely wrong.’90 And when speaking of the third criterion, he says that ‘even when aware 
that an act would be gravely evil, one has not sinned until one has made a definite choice.’91 
Similarly, May defines mortal sin as ‘a morally evil act, i.e., a freely chosen act known to be 
contrary to the eternal law’92 and as ‘a freely chosen act of self-determination opposed to the 
eternal law.’93 This approach is generally classicist as it emphasises universal and unchanging 
truths that human beings are capable of knowing and expressing. This is in contrast to the 
generally historicist approach of Häring and Gula which emphasises a person’s general 
orientation towards God and the good, and regards truth as continually emerging. These 
approaches are strikingly different, and the differences have been, and continue to be, the 
subject of much controversy and debate.  
 However, while these two approaches to moral theology in general and to the notion 
of sin in particular are very different, they have something very important in common: they 
both use the traditional criteria used by the Church for discerning whether a sin is mortal or 
venial: grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent. Grisez and May, like Häring and 
Gula, attempt to ground their notions of mortal sin in their discussions of knowledge of the 
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good and human freedom. In the following subsections, we shall examine these discussions. 
As in our examination of Häring and Gula, we seek to determine whether or not these 
discussions provide sufficient empirical evidence for positing the notions of ethical 
knowledge and human freedom to an audience that does not necessarily share our religious 
presuppositions, namely, moral sceptics and determinists.   
  
3.2. Knowledge of the Good 
 In this subsection, we shall examine and critique Grisez’s and May’s notions of the 
good and the possibility of discerning the good. 
 
3.2.1. Knowledge of the Good in Grisez 
Exposition 
 As a Thomist, the first principle of practical reason for Grisez is the synderesis. In 
chapter 7 of volume 1 of his The Way of the Lord Jesus, he formulates the synderesis as 
follows: ‘The good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided.’94 The first principle 
of practical reason, Grisez contends, is a self-evident truth. One understands it to be true as 
soon as one understands the meaning of its terms. In chapter 5, Grisez has already examined 
the central meaning of the term ‘good.’   
As it originates from the hand of God, he says, all creation is good. Grisez here cites 
Genesis: ‘God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good’.95 Even things 
contaminated by sin, he continues, can be saved, for their primary goodness is not completely 
corrupted. ‘For everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is 
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received with thanksgiving; for then it is consecrated by the word of God and prayer.’96 Made 
in the likeness of God, human beings as created and carnal are completely good. 
 Grisez goes on to discuss the notion of good as ‘fullness of being.’ Creatures, he says, 
do not possess complete fullness of being, but they can possess true fullness in keeping with 
their kind and condition – in keeping with their particular and real potentialities for 
developing and becoming more. As creatures, human beings develop, that is they do not exist 
fully from the beginning. Their goodness necessitates that they come to be the most that they 
can be at each successive juncture of their lives. Yet, Grisez observes, not every fulfilment of 
potentialities is good. Goodness consists in a realization of potentialities which results in 
being and being more, whereas badness lies in the fulfilment of a potentiality which stifles 
further possibilities and decreases prospects for self-realization which would otherwise be 
available to a person. 
 Because God is infinite in being, Grisez says, he is also infinitely good; in God there 
can be no deficiency. God creates in order to communicate and give something of his 
unfathomable perfection. While in God there can be no separation between what he is and 
what he should be, every creature has a function in the universal order which it has a duty to 
realize. Its realization and completeness of being will be that share in the communication of 
his goodness which God designated for it in creating it. Badness is want of that fullness to 
which every created entity is invited. But what, positively, Grisez asks, is this fullness? 
Clearly, he says, it is not the limitless perfection of God himself, as the badness of creatures 
lies not in the fact that they are finite as God intended them to be.  
 According to Grisez, the fullness of being and the goodness of every created being is 
that fullness of which it is able, insofar as it is a creature of a particular type, with particular 
capabilities and prospects, to be and be more. A turtle, he says, is not deficient inasmuch as it 
                                                          




unable to run like a gazelle, nor is there anything wrong with an ape because it does not have 
a sense of justice. Goodness is the fullness or completeness befitting each created being. 
Badness is not mere lack; rather, it is privation, a lack of what should be. 
 In a certain sense, every created being is good by possessing the reality which makes 
it the sort of being and the peculiar thing it is. This basic goodness, however, is not what we 
usually intend when we name something ‘good.’ Usually, when we say that X is good, we 
mean that it has a completeness which not every X has. ‘Good’ endorses some X by 
comparing it with another X. This, Grisez says, is the goodness we are trying to understand. 
 Creatures are not like God in the sense that they do not exist all at once; rather they 
come into being slowly and progressively, that is, they grow and develop. Their fullness in 
being necessitates their fulfilling their potential. 
 Goodness, then, according to Grisez, is in the realization of potentialities. Yet not all 
realizations of potentialities, he says, are good. People who fall ill and die, who make errors 
in judgement, who burn the potatoes, or who hurt others are fulfilling potentialities just as 
surely as those who live a healthy life, who reason and judge well, who cook good meals, and 
who help other people. Numerous types of badness are objectively possible, and the 
realization of privations as such is not good. Goodness, Grisez repeats, is in the realization of 
potentialities which results in a person being and being more.  
 
Critique 
 Grisez begins his examination of the central meaning of good with a quotation from 
Genesis: ‘God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.’ This 
approach is fine if we presuppose that our readers share our faith and acknowledge the 
authority of scripture. If, however, we wish to convince others of the possibility of moral 




Grisez’s starting-point is not scripture but the synderesis, but, as Grisez himself observes, the 
first principle of morality is understood as soon as one understands the meaning of its terms. 
In explaining the meaning of the term ‘good’ Grisez begins with scripture, and, as I shall 
presently argue, does not go beyond his point of departure. 
 Even things contaminated by sin, he continues, can be saved, for their primary 
goodness is not completely corrupted. ‘For everything created by God is good, and nothing is 
to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving; for then it is consecrated by the word of God 
and prayer.’ Again we see Grisez using scripture to equate the good with God’s creation. 
 In Grisez’s discussion of the notion of good as ‘fullness of being,’ he says that 
creatures do not possess complete fullness of being, but they can possess true fullness in 
keeping with their kind and condition – in keeping with their particular and real potentialities 
for developing and becoming more. He does not, however, state explicitly the nature of such 
developing and becoming more. The reader may infer from the general thrust of Grisez’s 
argument that this developing and becoming more refers to a person’s behaviour and being in 
the world coming more and more into harmony with the will of the Creator. He goes on to 
say that the goodness of creatures necessitates that they come to be the most that they can be 
at each successive juncture of their lives. Goodness consists in a realization of potentialities 
which results in being and being more. Again Grisez here fails to be explicit. The phrase 
‘being and being more’ appears meaningless because it is not supported by a vision of what 
this being and being more consists. The notion of ‘being and being more’ is rooted in a 
theology of creation that is incapable of communicating to an audience that does not hold the 
same presuppositions as Grisez, namely, that we can accept the authority of scripture which 
tells us that we are creatures created by God. 
 Because God is infinite in being, Grisez says, he is also infinitely good; in God there 




unfathomable perfection. The creature’s realization and fullness of being will be that share in 
the communication of his goodness which God designated for it in creating it. The notion that 
God is perfect, or even that he exists, is not self-evident; it is, rather, a matter of faith and 
belief. Grisez contends that human goodness is a share in God’s perfection that will lead to 
fullness of being. Again he provides an argument for human morality that is supported by 
faith presuppositions not held by everyone, thereby failing to dialogue with the more 
sceptical reader.  
 Grisez’s discussion of the central meaning of ‘good’ continues in the same manner. In 
the next few paragraphs we find the phrases ‘creature,’ ‘created,’ ‘fullness of being,’ 
‘realization of potentialities,’ and ‘being and being more’ continually repeated. This approach 
to the possibility of moral discernment is important insofar as it roots the notion of human 
morality in a theology of creation, thereby providing a strong anthropological foundation to 
human morality. In other words, human morality is not something arbitrary; rather, it stems 
from our very nature as beings created by God. However, while this approach to morality 
reveals a vital truth, it is incapable of convincing anyone who does not necessarily believe in 
the authority of scripture which tells us that we are created by God. In order to convince those 
who do not share our faith presuppositions we must be able to provide an account of the good 
which does not begin and end with a biblical theology of creation.   
 
3.2.2. Knowledge of the Good in May 
Exposition 
 In his book, An Introduction to Moral Theology, May discusses the natural law theory 
of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle. 
 These authors, he says, in company with St Thomas, contend that the first principle or 




avoided. This is a prescription for discerning and positive human activity. This principle, 
May suggests, is instantly understood to be true once one comprehends the meaning of 
‘good’ and ‘evil.’ ‘Good’ refers not only to the morally good but also to whatever can be said 
to be genuinely perfective of human beings, while ‘evil’ or ‘bad’ refers to whatever divests 
human persons of their perfection or completeness of being. 
 The first principle of practical reasoning, according to May, guides human beings to 
their fulfilment as it will be realized in and through human acts. Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, 
again developing the thought of St Thomas, contend that this first principle is given its 
general determinations by detecting the goods which in truth fulfil human beings. May 
contends that the general determinations of this first principle of practical reasoning can be 
formulated as follows; ‘such and such a basic human good is to be done and/or pursued, 
protected, and promoted.’97 
 Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle seek to locate all the basic human goods. They contend that 
these goods can be differentiated by observing ‘the assumptions implicit in the practical 
reasoning of ordinary people, by considering the “ends” or “purposes” for whose sake people 
ultimately engage in various activities.’98 The basic goods of persons, while manifold, are 
similar insofar as each of these goods is a good of persons, not a good for persons. The basic 
goods make perfect various features or elements of human beings in their single and 
collective flourishing. Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, May tells us, have, to some extent, differed 
a little in their catalogue of basic human goods. They now concur that there are seven 
categories of such fundamental goods. Four of these categories have as their common theme 
the notion of harmony, with the following relevant goods: (1) self-integration or ‘inner 
peace,’ which comprises harmony among a person’s judgements, feelings, and choices; (2) 
‘peace of conscience and consistency between one’s self and its expression,’ a good in which 
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a person takes part by setting up harmony among one’s judgements, choices, and 
performances; (3) ‘peace with others, neighbourliness, friendship,’ or harmony between and 
among individual persons and groups of persons; and (4) ‘peace with God . . . or some more-
than-human source of meaning and value,’ a good that we can name the good of religion.99 
 Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis call these basic human goods ‘reflexive’ or ‘existential.’ 
This is because ‘they fulfil persons precisely insofar as they are able to make choices and are 
thus capable of moral good and evil.’100 Choice is incorporated into the precise meaning of 
these goods, because the choice by which a person acts for them is included in the 
actualization or ‘instantiation’ of these goods. May provides us with the following example: 
one is unable, he says, to take part in the good of friendship without making a choice whose 
object encompasses harmony between that choice itself and the other person’s will, i.e., the 
person whose friend one wishes to be. 
 May points out that it would be an error to see these goods, which have harmony as 
their unifying theme, as having moral value per se. We should not, he says, in formulating 
these goods, bring moral value into them. This is because a person can choose to establish in 
immoral ways these various goods whose unifying motif is harmony. For example, one can 
look to bring about the good of harmony between judgements and choices by rationalizing 
immoral decisions; one can look to take part in the good of friendship and harmony with 
others by compromising his or her moral principles or by collaborating with others in 
immoral ventures. Consequently, not every decision to take part in these reflexive goods is a 
morally good choice.  
 The first principle of practical reason, May contends, is used by bad people as well as 
good ones to justify their actions to themselves and to others. As May puts it: ‘one chooses to 
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do what is morally bad only because one thinks that by doing so one will ultimately 
participate in some good and avoid some evil.’101 For this reason, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, 
again taking the lead of St Thomas, ‘explicitly distinguish between the first principles of 
natural law that are principles of practical reasoning, i.e., principles directing us to pursue 
and do good and avoid evil and identifying the goods we are to pursue and do, and the first 
principles of natural law that are moral principles.’102 Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, May 
contends, demonstrate that there has to be a first principle of morality or of practical 
reasonableness corresponding to the first principle of practical reasoning. The function of the 
first principle of practical reasoning is to guide human beings to the goods which perfect 
them and to rule out meaninglessness in human decision and action. The purpose of the first 
principle of morality, on the other hand, is to provide a means of differentiating between 
choices that are morally good and ones that are morally bad. Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle note 
that St Thomas considered the twofold command of love to be the first principle of morality: 
‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all 
your mind;’103 ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself.’104  
 
Critique 
 Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, according to May, contend that the basic human goods can 
be distinguished by observing ‘the assumptions implicit in the practical reasoning of ordinary 
people, by considering the “ends” or “purposes” for whose sake people ultimately engage in 
various activities.’ This approach at first glance appears to be scientific insofar as it is based 
upon observation of people in the process of practical reasoning. However, what Grisez et al 
observe are the implicit assumptions of people. This is hardly a solid foundation on which to 
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build an indisputable list of human goods. There is in fact a double assumption at play here: 
the assumptions of the ‘ordinary people’ observed by Grisez et al, and the assumptions of 
Grisez et al that these assumptions provide a solid empirical basis for the possibility of moral 
discernment. I shall challenge the second of these assumptions. 
 May provides the following list of basic goods which are considered the ‘ends’ or 
‘purposes’ for whose sake people ultimately engage in various activities: (1) self-integration 
or inner peace, (2) peace of conscience, (3) peace with others, (4) peace with God or the good 
of religion. It seems to me highly questionable that ordinary people in reality engage in 
various activities for these reasons. If we were in fact to ask a group of ordinary people why 
they engage in their various activities – their work, their family life, their hobbies, etc. – I 
doubt very much that many of them would name even one or two of the above list as 
answers. I think that if asked why he does the work he does, the average man would give one 
of two answers: money, or enjoyment (or possibly both). If asked the same question about 
family life, I think the same man would answer by saying that he does things with and for his 
family out of a sense of responsibility and love. If asked the same question about his hobby, I 
think the same man would answer by saying that he engages in his hobby for fun or 
enjoyment.  
Perhaps this is why May uses the word ‘ultimately.’ This word allows that while 
people may on one level be acting for other reasons, their ‘ultimate’ motivation is in fact self-
integration, peace of conscience, etc. For example, a man works hard for his family out of a 
sense of duty and feelings of love. Ultimately, however, the sense of doing the right thing for 
his family gives him a feeling of self-integration or inner peace or peace of conscience . . . 
and so on.  
This may be true, but it does not completely solve our problem. Let us return to our 




and harmony of conscience? It is true that people do not want to experience feelings of inner 
turmoil or an uneasy conscience, but to turn this into a suggestion that these people are acting 
for the specific purpose of inner peace and peace of conscience is, in my view, not rationally 
defendable. How many people engaged in everyday activities are doing so for the sake of 
‘peace with others, neighbourliness, and friendship’? Normally ordinary people act for 
themselves and perhaps their families. This may seem pessimistic but I think it is a realistic 
observation. And how many people act out of a desire for peace with God or the good of 
religion? Again I think it realistic to say that most ordinary people in this society do not 
engage in any of their various activities for this reason. Not only would they not recognize 
that they were doing so, some of them might explicitly deny it. This list of human goods does 
not, then, come from ordinary people, but from the assumptions of Grisez et al about what 
constitutes the good of human persons. The list, therefore, has no value in terms of an 
empirical analysis of the notion of human morality.  
 My second critique relates to what May terms ‘the first principle of morality.’ A brief 
summary is necessary here. May observes that it would be an error to see the above goods as 
having moral value per se, because one can choose to establish in immoral ways these various 
goods. The synderesis, or the first principle of practical reason, he further contends, can be 
used by bad people as well as good ones to justify their actions to themselves or to others. For 
this reason, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle ‘explicitly distinguish between the first principles of 
natural law that are principles of practical reasoning . . . and the first principles of natural law 
that are moral principles.’ The function of the first principle of morality is to provide a means 
of distinguishing between choices that are morally good and ones that are morally bad. 
Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, following St Thomas, present the double commandment of love as 




 If we follow the logic of this argument we may reasonably conclude that the first 
principle of practical reason, the good is to be pursued and evil avoided, as a foundational 
principle for human morality, does not work without the accompanying first principle of 
morality, namely, the two-fold commandment of love. This is because, as we have seen, 
taken on its own the first principle of practical reason can be used to justify bad actions as 
well as good. The first principle of morality is a necessary supplement which ensures that the 
synderesis is related to what in fact are objectively good or bad choices.  
 The first principle of practical reason, then, while it may be self-evident, does not 
provide us with a fully satisfactory foundation for human morality. This is why May, 
following St Thomas, brings in the two-fold command of love. My problem with this is by 
now probably obvious. May’s first principle of morality comes straight from scripture. That 
we should love God and neighbour is not a self-evident truth but a truth of faith. For this 
reason, May’s attempts to provide a rational foundation for human morality ultimately fail 
because in the final analysis he resorts to scripture instead of rational principles to 
demonstrate the possibility of moral discernment.  
 
3.3. Human Freedom 
 In this subsection, we shall examine and critique Grisez’s and May’s notions of 
human freedom. 
 
3.3.1. Grisez’s Notion of Human Freedom 
Exposition 
 In chapter 2 of his book, Christian Moral Principles, Grisez attempts to answer the 
question: ‘Can human persons make free choices?’ He begins his discussion by pointing out 




throughout the Bible. The reality of free choice, he says, is made clear in the book of Sirach. 
The most commonly cited portion of this text is as follows: ‘It was he who created 
humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice.’105 
Human persons, Grisez says, are ‘not simply subject to fate, to natural necessity, or to their 
heredity and environment. In what is most important, human persons are of themselves.’106 
 Grisez goes on to point out that during the period of the Reformation, Luther and 
others, in their desire to stress sinful humankind’s utter dependence on God’s grace, denied 
human free choice. Against them, the Council of Trent solemnly defined the truth that human 
beings, even after Adam’s sin, can make free choices.107 
 Free choices, Grisez says, are created entities. They exist because God causes them. 
The free choice to believe in God and to obey his commandments is the result of God’s 
grace; neither saints nor sinners can do anything without God.  
 If God’s causality was similar to causality as we generally understand it, then for 
something to be both created and a free choice would make no sense at all. However, Grisez 
continues, we do not comprehend what God is in himself, and consequently, we have no 
understanding of what it means for him to cause. The reality of free choice in the world is 
part of the existence of the entire creation; this is explained by referring all things to God the 
creator. There is no contradiction, Grisez says, in God ‘creating human-persons-making-free-
choices.’ We know there is no contradiction, he says, because ‘it is a fact that there are free 
choices, and they could not exist if God did not cause them to be.’108  
Grisez goes on to engage with the philosophical concept of determinism. Experience 
and philosophical reflection, he says, concur with faith that human persons are capable of free 
choice. Yet determinists, he continues, deny the existence of free choice. Since, Grisez 
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argues, this denial goes against experience, determinists must prove their case. In attempting 
to do so, determinists appeal to our reason and attempt to demonstrate that we ought to accept 
their position. The problem is, however, that this ‘ought’ itself encompasses an appeal to 
freedom. Determinists entreat us to be faithful to the search for truth, but such faithfulness is 
impossible if we are unable to make free choices. Any attempt, therefore, to show that the 
experiences of choice and moral guilt are imaginary is ultimately self-defeating. 
 Underlying most deterministic arguments, Grisez continues, is the assumption that 
nothing can come into existence without a ‘sufficient reason’ which explains it. A ‘sufficient 
reason,’ he explains, would be one that establishes clearly why the thing has come into 
existence rather than not coming into existence, and why it has come into existence exactly as 
it is rather than in some other form. Grisez explains that free choice has an adequate cause, 
namely, the person who chooses. However, he says, the notion of sufficient reason entails 
more than just adequate cause: it attaches the idea that all things can be fully explained. Thus 
a sufficient reason for a choice would clearly state why the person made this precise choice, 
and not another. However, Grisez contends, the theory that there must always be a sufficient 
reason is not self-evident. If in fact either human persons or God make free choices, the 
theory will prove to be false. 
 Grisez continues: ‘God does act freely – that is, without a sufficient reason – for 
example, in creating and redeeming.’109 Of course, he says, God at all times acts in 
accordance with his own wisdom; his love, however, is not determined by his wisdom. With 
regards to human beings, Grisez argues that they too have reasons, but not sufficient ones, for 
their choices. In order to explain why they made the decisions they made, people draw 
attention to the good promised by the possibility on which their decisions were based. Yet, 
Grisez contends, if they had made other decisions, they would also have explained these other 
                                                          




decisions in a comparable manner. Thus, he concludes, there are reasons but not sufficient 
reasons to explain human free choices.  
 Determinists also indicate that there are numerous elements which restrict the 
possibilities open to us, some of which we are normally not even aware of. The determinists 
are, however, Grisez says, mistaken in surmising that elements which are not in our control 
which restrict our possibilities also decide what we will choose within these restrictions. 
While there are restrictions or limitations on what we can choose, this does not mean that we 
cannot choose freely within these restrictions or limitations. 
 
Critique 
 Grisez begins his discussion of human freedom by pointing out that the human 
person’s ability to make free choices is taken for granted throughout the Bible. He proceeds 
by citing the standard biblical text for demonstrating the reality of freedom: Sirach 15:14. 
Grisez goes on to cite, against the Reformation theologians, the Council of Trent which 
‘solemnly defined’ the truth that human beings, even after Adam’s sin, can make free 
choices. Thus far Grisez has presented no rational argument or empirical evidence for the 
existence of human free will. Those who accept the authority of scripture and magisterial 
teaching will have no difficulty accepting the reality of human free will. In terms of a 
dialogue with those who do not hold our religious presuppositions however, this approach to 
the notion of human freedom is woefully inadequate, as it fails to challenge the notion of 
determinism on its own terms, i.e., using rational principles. Consequently, it will ultimately 
fail to convince anyone who does not already believe in the reality of human free will.  
 Grisez proceeds by observing that free choices are created entities: they exist because 
God causes them. He goes on to observe that the free choice to believe in God and to obey his 




similar to causality as we generally understand it, then it would make no sense to say that 
something is both created and a free choice. To explain this apparent paradox, Grisez 
contends that we do not comprehend what God is in himself, and we therefore have no 
understanding of what it means for him to cause. The reality of free choice in the world is 
part of the existence of the entire creation; this is explained by referring all things to God the 
creator. This brings us to the crux of Grisez’s argument. There is no contradiction, he says, in 
God ‘creating human-persons-making-free-choices.’ We know there is no contradiction 
because ‘it is a fact that there are free choices, and they could not exist if God did not cause 
them to be.’110  
This argument can be broken down and analysed as follows: There are four premises, 
a conclusion, and the ‘evidence.’ Premise 1: free choices are created entities; Premise 2: free 
choice is the result of God’s grace; Premise 3: God’s causality and human causality are 
different; Premise 4: free choice is part of creation; Conclusion: there is no contradiction in 
God creating ‘human-persons-making-free-choices;’ Evidence: we know this because ‘it is a 
fact that there are free choices, and they could not exist if God did not cause them to be.’ The 
argument that there is no contradiction in God creating ‘human-persons-making-free-choices’ 
is fairly convincing if we accept Grisez’s premises. However, his premises are by no means 
self-evident and he has not demonstrated them. Furthermore, as ‘evidence’ that his 
conclusion is true he simply provides a synthesis of his undemonstrated premises. Again this 
approach to the notion of human freedom will only make sense to someone who holds the 
same religious presuppositions as Grisez himself. To anyone who may be sceptical about the 
possibility of human freedom, this approach will not be convincing.  
 In Grisez’s discussion of determinism, he presents the following argument: in 
attempting to prove their position, determinists appeal to our reason and attempt to 
                                                          




demonstrate that we ought to accept their position. However, this ‘ought’ itself encompasses 
an appeal to freedom. Determinists entreat us to be faithful to the search for truth, but such 
faithfulness is impossible if we are unable to make free choices. Any attempt, therefore, to 
show that the experiences of choice and moral guilt are imaginary is ultimately self-defeating.  
Analysis: Do determinists in fact claim that we ‘ought’ to accept their position? This, it 
seems, is an assumption on Grisez’s part. We could, however, assume a quite different 
attitude of the determinist. For example: the determinist presents a thesis, realizing that a 
number of people will hear or read this thesis, and that depending on their heredity, past 
experiences, etc., some of them will accept it and some will reject it. While the hearer or 
reader of the thesis might ‘feel’ like he/she is conscious of choosing to accept or reject it, 
he/she is in fact bound by heredity, or environment, or experience to accept or reject it. The 
determinist has not appealed to anyone’s freedom; he or she has, rather, simply presented a 
position with the understanding that some will accept it and others reject it. 
 Grisez continues his discussion of determinism by observing that the notion of 
‘sufficient reason’ underlies most deterministic arguments. A sufficient reason, he explains, 
would be one that establishes clearly why the thing has come into existence rather than not 
coming into existence and why it has come into existence exactly as it is rather than in some 
other form. Grisez contends that the theory that there must always be a sufficient reason is 
not self-evident, and that if in fact either human persons or God make free choices, the theory 
will prove to be false. Grisez proceeds by presenting the ‘proof’: ‘God does act freely – that 
is, without a sufficient reason – for example, in creating and redeeming.’ Again Grisez makes 
no attempt to convince anyone who does not share his religious presuppositions that free 
choice is a reality. What he presents as ‘proof’ that the theory that there must always be a 
sufficient reason is false, is in fact a theological statement which is grounded not in rational 




 Grisez concludes his discussion of determinism by observing that determinists 
indicate that there are numerous elements which restrict the possibilities open to us, some of 
which we are normally not even aware. While Grisez essentially agrees with the determinists 
on this point he argues that they are mistaken in surmising that these unconscious elements 
which restrict our possibilities also decide what we will choose within these restrictions. 
While there are restrictions or limitations on what we can choose, he observes, this does not 
mean that we cannot choose freely within these restrictions or limitations. Apparently, for 
Grisez, that we can freely choose within these restrictions or limitations is self-evident. I 
draw this conclusion on the basis that he in fact presents no evidence. Furthermore, he not 
only presents no evidence, he also presents no positive argument. He simply observes that 
just because we have limitations ‘this does not mean’ that we cannot choose freely within 
these limitations. Grisez, however, makes no positive argument for the opposite position, 
namely, that we can choose freely within these limitations.      
 
3.3.2. May’s Notion of Human Freedom 
Exposition 
 May begins his discussion of human freedom by noting that the truth that human 
beings can decide their own fates through their own free choices is a matter of Catholic faith. 
It is integral, May observes, to the scriptures. Like Grisez, May cites the book of Sirach: ‘It 
was he [God] who created man in the beginning, and he left him in the power of his own 
inclination.’111 This text, May also notes, was used by the Fathers of Vatican II in Gaudium et 
Spes 17. 
    The reality of human free will, which is so integral to the biblical anthropology, was 
clearly professed by Church Fathers such as Augustine and by all the great scholastics. May 
                                                          




here cites St Thomas: ‘it is only through free choice that human persons are masters of their 
own actions and in this way beings made in the image and likeness of God.’112 May goes on 
to point out that the Council of Trent also solemnly defined the truth that human beings are 
free to decide what they will do and, through their decisions, to create themselves to be the 
persons that they are. The Second Vatican Council, he further observes, emphasised that the 
capacity to freely choose ‘is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man.’113 
     May contends that ‘free choice is an existential principle or source of morality.’114 It 
is an existential principle of moral good and evil because moral good and evil rely for their 
existence on the human capacity for free choice. This is so because the things we do we do 
ourselves; they can be good or evil only if we choose in freedom to do them. A dog or a cat, 
May tells us, cannot be morally good or evil, but human beings can because they possess the 
capacity for free choice. It is by freely choosing that human beings make themselves morally 
good or morally bad persons. This is why, May explains, free choice is considered to be an 
existential principle of morality.  
 Free choice, May continues, is experienced when a person is conscious of a conflict. 
Various choices of action present themselves to a person, but they cannot all be actualized at 
the same time. One reflects upon these possible choices, but reflection cannot decide the 
matter. It cannot decide which of the possible choices guarantees unquestionably the greater 
good. It cannot do so because each possible choice, in order to be attractive and to qualify as 
a viable alternative, must guarantee involvement in some good that is simply unequal to the 
good promised by other alternatives. May provides the following example: if a person is 
considering purchasing a house and wants a house that is (a) within a particular price range, 
(b) has four bedrooms and a living room, (c) is close to church and school, and (d) has access 
to good public transportation, and if one out of four houses viewed guarantees all the above 
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advantages, while none of the other three do, then, according to May, no choice is possible or 
even necessary, as long as the person is still willing to purchase a house that satisfies these 
conditions. Of the available choices only one has all the advantages one is searching for; the 
attractiveness of the other houses – that which makes them possible choices – just disappears. 
They are no longer viable options because they offer no benefit that is not available in the 
house that has all the advantages one is searching for. However, if a person must buy a house 
and none of the houses available has all the ‘goods’ or advantages one seeks, then he or she 
will have to choose from among those that provide some of these advantages; each of these 
houses is a viable alternative because each provides some advantage unequal to the good or 
benefit provided by the other houses. Ultimately, May says, the issue is settled by the choice 
itself. By way of explanation, he offers the following quotation from Grisez: ‘One makes a 
choice when one faces practical alternatives, believes one can and must settle which to take, 
and takes one. The choice is free when choosing itself determines which alternative one 
takes. . . . Only one’s choosing determines oneself to seek fulfilment in one possibility rather 
than another. Inasmuch as one determines oneself in this way, one is of oneself.’115 
 May concludes with the following summary of what he terms ‘the experience of free 
choice.’116 First, he says, one finds oneself in a predicament where one is drawn to alternative 
possibilities of choice and there is no way to get rid of the incompatibility of the various 
alternatives of choice or to restrict the alternative to just one. One can do this thing or that 
thing, but not both; the alternatives are real, that is, they are ‘choosable’ but incompatible 
possibilities. Second, one works out that only he or she can settle the issue and decide which 
possibility is actualized. Third, one is conscious of making the choice and knows that nothing 
‘makes’ him or her make it. In other words, one is conscious that one has freedom in deciding 
the matter, in choosing among the various possible alternatives. 
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 For May, the truth that human persons can decide their own fates through their own 
free choices is a matter of Catholic faith. To demonstrate this he provides a number of 
references to scripture and the theological tradition: Sirach 15:11-20, Gaudium et Spes, St 
Augustine, St Thomas, and the Council of Trent. This, of course, amounts to nothing more 
than a statement that free choice is a reality and an argument for this position that consists of 
pointing out that others have also said that free choice is a reality. Take for example the 
quotation that May uses from St Thomas: ‘it is only through free choice that human persons 
are masters of their own actions and in this way beings made in the image and likeness of 
God.’ This single sentence reveals nothing of St Thomas’s elaborate philosophical method of 
arriving at this position. May’s use of St Thomas here is a kind of proof-texting that relies not 
on St Thomas’s method but on his reputation as a masterful theologian and philosopher. The 
same is true of May’s use of the other sources: it relies not on reasoned argument but on the 
authority of the cited texts. These texts, however, are only authoritative for religious 
believers. This approach, therefore, is inadequate in terms of dialoguing with anyone who 
might doubt the existence of human free will. 
 May proceeds by suggesting that free choice is an existential principle or source of 
morality. This is so, he contends, because moral good and evil rely for their existence on the 
human capacity for free choice. It is by freely choosing, he says, that human beings make 
themselves morally good or morally bad persons. The argument that free choice is an 
existential principle or source of morality makes perfect sense up to a point. It is obvious that 
if a person does not have freedom of choice he/she cannot be held responsible for her actions. 
It is also true that the person’s level of culpability for a wrongful act corresponds to the level 




is so integral to the notion of morality that we must attempt to prove the existence of free 
choice. May, however, simply takes the notion of free choice as a given.  
 May goes on to analyse a situation in which it is necessary for a person to make a 
choice. The example he gives is that of a person buying a house. If a person must buy a house 
and none of the houses he looks at has all the goods he is looking for, then he/she will have to 
choose from among those that provide some of the advantages; each of the houses is a viable 
alternative because each provides some advantage unequal to the good or benefit provided by 
the other houses. The issue, May contends, is settled by the choice itself. This is undoubtedly 
true: the issue is, indeed, settled by the choice itself. This, however, does not prove that the 
choice that settles the issue is one made in freedom. May attempts to reinforce his argument 
with a quotation from Grisez: ‘One makes a choice when one faces practical alternatives, 
believes one can and must settle which to take, and takes one. The choice is free when 
choosing itself determines which alternative one takes . . .’ This argument is very weak. The 
fact that ‘choosing itself determines which alternative one takes’ in no way indicates that the 
choosing is done in freedom. The choice made without freedom will equally determine which 
alternative one takes. For example, if I have the opportunity to buy house no. 1 and I choose 
in freedom to do so, I will buy house no. 1. My free choice will have determined the 
outcome. Similarly, if I have the opportunity to buy the same house and I choose to do so due 
to some unconscious motivation resulting from my genetic inheritance or my past 
experiences – thereby making my choice compelled rather than free – the result will be 
exactly the same: I will buy house no. 1. In this case my unfree choice will have determined 
the outcome. May argues that the choice to buy a particular house will be made either 
because it is the obvious choice as it has everything I am looking for, or because I freely 
choose one alternative over another. He simply ignores all sorts of possible unconscious 




 May concludes his discussion of free choice with a summary in which he breaks the 
process of freely choosing into three parts. First, he says, one finds oneself in a situation 
where one is drawn to alternative possibilities of choice and there is no way to get rid of the 
incompatibility of the various alternatives of choice or to restrict the alternative to just one. 
Second, one works out that only he or she can settle the issue and decide which possibility is 
realized. Third, one is conscious of making the choice and knows that nothing ‘makes’ him or 
her make it. In other words, one is conscious that one has freedom in deciding the matter, in 
choosing among the various possible alternatives. The first two parts of this summary I find 
unproblematic. The third part, however, is flawed. May’s observation that ‘one is conscious 
of making the choice and knows that nothing “makes” him or her make it’ has no empirical 
evidence to support it. That the person ‘knows’ that nothing makes him or her choose is by no 
means evident. If in fact the person merely believes that nothing makes him or her make the 
choice, there is nothing to suggest that this experience would be any different to that of 
‘knowing’ that nothing makes him or her make the choice. If, for the sake of argument, the 
determinists are correct and human beings are not in fact making free choices, this does not 
suggest that we do not feel and consequently believe that we are making free choices. May’s 
contention that the person ‘knows’ that he or she is making a free choice is based on 
observation of what appears to people to be what is happening when they make a choice. 
That this is in fact what is happening, however, requires a lot more evidence.        
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we have examined two distinct approaches to the theology of sin: the 
generally historicist approach of Häring and Gula, and the more classicist approach of Grisez 
and May. We have seen that both of these approaches to sin draw on the traditional notion of 




Because of the use of these criteria in both of these approaches, we went on to examine in 
some detail Häring’s, Gula’s, Grisez’s, and May’s notions of knowledge of the good and 
human freedom. I have argued that their discussions of knowledge of the good and human 
freedom contain much theological presupposition as well as some poor philosophical 
arguments. This, I conclude, renders their notions of sin incapable of dialoguing with the 
moral sceptic or determinist.  
 In the next chapter, we shall examine contemporary magisterial teaching on sin. The 
same procedure will be followed: an examination of the notion of sin, followed by an 
examination of the notions of ethical knowledge and human freedom. The same question will 
be asked in relation to this teaching, namely, how convincing is this teaching to someone who 
doesn’t hold Christian beliefs, i.e., the moral sceptic or determinist?  
     

















MAGISTERIAL TEACHING ON SIN 
   
The notion of sin is of great importance to the Church’s understanding of herself and 
the world. The Second Vatican Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World, Gaudium et Spes speaks of the negative consequences of sin for both the individual 
and society as a whole. According to this document, sin is at the very heart of many of the 
world’s problems.  
Without doubt frequent upheavals in the social order are in part the result of economic, 
political, and social tensions. But at a deeper level they come from selfishness and pride, 
two things which contaminate the atmosphere of society as well. As it is, human beings 
are prone to evil, but whenever they are confronted with an environment where the 
effects of sin are to be found, they are exposed to further inducements to sin, which can 
be overcome only by unremitting effort with the help of grace.117  
For those of us who accept the reality of sin, this passage contains a powerful message about 
the consequences of our sinfulness for the world around us, as well as a message of hope. 
Such an acceptance of the reality of sin, however, cannot be taken for granted due to 
scepticism about the possibility of an objective morality and human beings’ ability to act in 
freedom. In order to combat such scepticism the Church needs to engage with the notions of 
moral scepticism and determinism. It needs to examine not just the nature of sin, but also the 
question of its possibility. 
In this chapter we shall examine the magisterium’s teaching on sin and how effective 
it is at conversing with two philosophical schools of thought, the first that denies the 
existence of objective moral norms, and the second that denies the existence of human 
                                                          




freedom. In part one we shall examine the notion of sin contained in the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church. Drawing on a number of sources including scripture, the Church Fathers, 
and the Second Vatican Council (especially Gaudium et Spes) part three of the Catechism 
sets out systematically the Church’s teaching on sin, natural law, moral conscience, and 
human freedom. In part two we shall examine sections of Pope John Paul II’s works, Fides et 
Ratio, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, and Veritatis Splendor. Veritatis Splendor is unique 
among papal encyclicals insofar as it is the only such document that engages systematically 
with questions regarding the moral life. Fides et Ratio is concerned with the relationship 
between faith and reason, a subject of central importance to this dissertation. Finally, 
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia is an important document for understanding John Paul II’s 
theology of sin, as it is in this work that he develops the notion of social sin, a key notion in 
both the Christian hamartology and in Catholic social doctrine.    
 
1. THE THEOLOGY OF SIN IN THE CATHECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
 In part one of this chapter, we shall attempt to discern how successful the Catechism 
is in dialoguing with moral sceptics and determinists by asking how effective it is in 
grounding its notions of sin in reality. In the Introduction to this dissertation we observed that 
the concept of sin presupposes the existence of an objective moral order and the person’s 
ability to apprehend this order, as well as the person’s ability to act in freedom. Following the 
logic of this assertion, this examination of the notion of sin in the Catechism will be divided 
into four sections. Firstly we shall examine the various notions and definitions of sin 
contained in this document, and how these notions of sin rely – either explicitly or implicitly 
– on the Church’s understanding of ethical knowledge and human freedom. Secondly we 
shall examine in greater detail the notion of ethical knowledge. This section will be divided 




conscience. Thirdly we shall examine the notion of human freedom. These three sections 
shall be mainly descriptive in character, setting out in as much possible detail the 
Catechism’s moral theology. This description of the Catechism’s moral theology shall, 
however, be interjected with a number of references to Michael T. Walsh’s Commentary on 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church. This is to attempt to clarify certain ambiguities which 
occur in the text of the Catechism. Fourthly we shall critique the theology of sin contained in 
the Catechism. We shall focus on the question of how successful this document is at 
dialoguing with moral sceptics and determinists about the possibility of objective moral 
norms and human freedom.  
 
1.1. Notions and Definitions of Sin (paragraphs 1846-1864) 
In the spirit of hope which is at the heart of the Christian Gospel, the Catechism 
begins its discussion of sin by setting the notion alongside the notion of mercy. ‘The Gospel 
is the revelation in Jesus Christ of God’s mercy to sinners.’118 With a quotation from the first 
letter of John, the author of this document points to the necessity of recognising our 
sinfulness if we are to receive this mercy: ‘If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, 
and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just, and will forgive our 
sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness.’119 The Catechism points to the necessity of 
conversion, quoting John Paul II, who notes in his Dominum et Vivificantem that ‘conversion 
requires convincing of sin.’120 In this ‘convincing of sin,’ John Paul tells us, there is a two-
fold gift: the gift of the truth provided by our conscience and the gift of the assurance of our 
salvation. 
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 The Catechism goes on to provide a number of definitions of sin. Sin is defined as ‘an 
offence against reason, truth and right conscience,’ and a ‘failure in genuine love of God and 
neighbour caused by a perverse attachment to certain goods.’ Sin ‘wounds the nature of man 
and injures human solidarity.’121 It is an ‘an utterance, a deed or a desire contrary to the 
eternal law,’ a quotation from St Augustine which St Thomas analyses in the Summa 
Theologica.122 Sin is also considered to be a violation against God. It is at odds with God’s 
love for us and it hardens our affective response to it.123 By our sin we rebel against God as 
we will to become ‘like gods,’124 determining for ourselves what is good and what is evil. 
Sin, therefore, is ‘love of oneself even to contempt of God,’125 another quotation from St 
Augustine. Such vain self-inflation of one’s ego is ‘diametrically opposed to the obedience of 
Jesus, which achieves our salvation.’126 
 Again in the spirit of hope, the Catechism points to the power of Christ’s Passion to 
overcome the effects of sin. It is in the Passion, when Christ’s compassion is about to defeat 
it, that the destructiveness and the many modes of sin appear most clearly. There is the 
unbelief in and the murderous hatred of Jesus, and the arrogant dismissal and ridicule of him 
by the leaders and the people. There is Pilate’s cowardice and the soldiers’ brutality. There is 
the betrayal by Judas, the denial by Peter, and the running away by the disciples. Despite all 
of this sin, however, it is ‘at the very hour of darkness, the hour of the prince of this world’ 
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that ‘the sacrifice of Christ secretly becomes the source from which the forgiveness of our 
sins will pour forth inexhaustibly.’127 
 The Catechism observes that there are many types of sins, citing St Paul’s letter to the 
Galatians, which contrasts ‘the works of the flesh’ with the ‘fruit of the Spirit.’ The works of 
the flesh in Paul’s letter are listed as fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, 
enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension, factions, envy, drunkenness, and 
carousing.128   
 According to the Catechism there are a number of ways in which sins can be 
distinguished. Like all human acts, they can be distinguished according to their objects, or 
according to their antithetical virtues, or by surfeit or deficiency, or according to the 
commandments they contravene. Sins can also be grouped according to the following 
categories: whether they concern 1) God, 2) neighbour, or 3) oneself. Further distinctions are 
made between spiritual and carnal sins, and between sins of thought, word, deed, or omission. 
The foundations of sin, according to the Catechism, are in the person’s affective responses, in 
his free will: ‘For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, 
false witness, slander. These are what defile a man.’129 However, charity, the fountain of all 
good works, also lives within the person, and sin damages this charity.  
 Another way that sins are evaluated is according to their gravity or seriousness. The 
Catechism makes a distinction between mortal and venial sin, which, it points out, is evident 
in scripture. This distinction between mortal and venial sin became part of ecclesial tradition, 
and is, according to the Catechism, verified by human observation.  
The Catechism proceeds by explaining the difference between mortal and venial sin. 
Mortal sin, it says, ‘destroys charity in the heart of man by a grave violation of God’s law.’130 
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By favouring a lesser good, one is turned away from God, who is one’s highest goal and 
source of happiness. Venial sin, on the other hand, ‘allows charity to subsist, even though it 
offends and wounds it.’131 By its assault on charity, the fundamental truth contained within 
us, mortal sin makes necessary a new movement of divine mercy, as well as a new affective 
orientation in the sinner. Such an affective reorientation is usually achieved through the 
sacrament of confession.   
 The criteria involved in the determining of mortal sin are explained. The Catechism 
quotes John Paul II, who, in his Reconciliatio et Paenitentia defines mortal sin as follows: 
‘Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full 
knowledge and deliberate consent.’132 That which constitutes grave matter is made clear in 
the Decalogue; this accords with Jesus’ response to the rich young man: ‘Do not kill, Do not 
commit adultery, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Do not defraud, Honour your father 
and your mother.’133 The Catechism points out that some sins are more serious than others; 
for example murder is more serious than stealing. The relationship between the person 
sinning and the person sinned against has also to be taken into account. So being violent to 
one’s parents is a more serious offence than being violent towards someone we hardly know.  
 Mortal sin presupposes knowledge of the sinfulness of the act, and of how it 
contravenes God’s law. It also presupposes a consent that is deliberate enough that it amounts 
to an actual choice. In other words, for sin to be considered mortal there must be full 
knowledge and deliberate consent. Protestations of ignorance and hardened emotional 
attitudes, rather than decreasing the free nature of sin, in fact increase it. 
 The culpability for a serious infraction can be decreased or even removed by what the 
Catechism terms ‘unintentional ignorance.’134 No one, however, is considered to be lacking 
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in knowledge of the precepts of the moral law, as these laws are inscribed in every person’s 
conscience. Other factors that can decrease the voluntary nature of the infraction are feelings, 
passions, external pressures, and pathological disorders. The most serious sin is the one 
committed out of a deliberate desire to inflict harm on another person. 
 The Catechism describes the consequences for the sinner of mortal sin. Mortal sin, it 
says, is ‘a radical possibility of human freedom.’135 It results in the loss of benevolent feeling 
and the dispossession of the grace that unites us with God. If this sin is not recovered by 
God’s compassionate response to our call for forgiveness, the result is rejection from Christ’s 
kingdom and everlasting damnation. This is because our freedom has such power that it can 
make choices that have irreversible consequences. The Catechism, however, points out that 
‘although we can judge that an act is in itself a grave offence, we must entrust judgement of 
persons to the justice and mercy of God.’136 
 A person commits a venial sin when in a minor issue he or she does not follow the 
proscriptions of the moral law, or when he or she disregards the moral law in a major issue, 
but without full understanding or deliberate acquiescence. Venial sin damages benevolent 
feeling and demonstrates a perverse attachment to created goods. It restricts the soul’s 
advancement in the practice of the virtues. Such sin, according to the Catechism, deserves not 
eternal, but only temporal punishment. If venial sin, however, is committed freely and 
without repentance, this results in an increased disposition to commit mortal sin. Venial sin, 
however, does not put us in a position of outright hostility to the divine friendship and will. 
Nor does it destroy our allegiance to God. It is, with God’s grace, capable of restoration. 
 In the final paragraph of this section, the Catechism points out the seriousness of 
blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. ‘Whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has 
                                                          





forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin.’137 God’s mercy is boundless. However, if anyone, 
by failing to repent, intentionally refuses to accept this mercy, he or she refuses the 
absolution of sins and the redemption given by the Holy Spirit. Such coldness of one’s 
affective responses can result in a final refusal to repent and eternal privation.  
 
1.2. Knowledge of the Good 
 In the previous section we saw that the Catechism’s notion of sin presupposes the 
existence of an objective moral order and the person’s ability to apprehend this order. The 
person’s sin is more serious if he or she has ‘full knowledge’ of the wrongfulness of their act. 
In this section we shall examine more closely the idea that there is an objective moral order 
that human beings are capable of apprehending, by examining the notions of natural law and 
moral conscience.  
 
1.2.1. Natural Law (paragraphs 1954-1960) 
 As human beings, according to the Catechism, we take part in the wisdom and 
benevolence of our Creator. He gives us the ability to understand and master our behaviour 
and to conduct ourselves with an eye to that which is good and true. The natural law conveys 
the primordial moral apprehension that allows human beings to distinguish by their reason 
between that which is good and that which is evil. ‘The natural law is written and engraved in 
the soul of each and every man, because it is human reason ordaining him to do good and 
forbidding him to sin.’138 The divine and natural law demonstrates to human beings the way 
in which they should practice the good and achieve their ultimate fulfilment. It asserts the 
necessary commandments that guide our efforts to obey God. It rests upon a desire for and 
acquiescence to God, the foundation and arbiter of everything good, and upon our 
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understanding of our equality with others. The primary principles of the natural law are 
articulated in the Ten Commandments.  
The natural law, which exists in the hearts of all people and is founded by reason, is 
all-encompassing in its dictates. Its jurisdiction includes the entire world. It speaks to the 
dignity of the person and settles the foundation for his or her inalienable rights and duties. 
The Catechism provides a quotation from Cicero’s Republic that captures the unchanging 
aspect of the natural law and its connection with human reason: ‘For there is a true law: right 
reason. It is in conformity with nature, is diffused among all men and is immutable and 
eternal; its orders summon to duty; its prohibitions turn away from offence. . . To replace it 
with a contrary law is a sacrilege; failure to apply even one of its provisions is forbidden; no 
one can abrogate it entirely.’139   
 The way in which the natural law is applied varies greatly according to the conditions 
of life in various times and places. Even in the vast difference of cultures, however, the 
natural law abides as an order that unites human beings and places upon them shared 
principles that go beyond their unavoidable differences. It is unchangeable and everlasting, 
persisting through the differences of history, remaining under the flow of ideas and traditions 
and assisting their advancement. The precepts that convey the natural law retain their 
validity. Even when the natural law is denied in its very precepts, it cannot be obliterated or 
removed from the human heart. It always springs up again in the lives of persons and in the 
societies in which these persons live. 
 The natural law provides the firm ground on which human beings are able to construct 
the framework of ethical precepts to influence their choices. It also supplies the vital moral 
substructure for constructing the human community. It supplies the vital grounds of the civil 
                                                          




law, either by deliberation which concludes from its principles, or by positive and legal 
additions. 
 Not everyone intuits the precepts of the natural law clearly and at once. As things 
stand, sinful humanity requires God’s grace and revelation so that the truth of morality and 
religion may be known ‘by everyone with facility, with firm certainty and with no admixture 
of error.’140 The natural law supplies a substructure for revealed law and grace. 
 
1.2.2. Conscience (paragraphs 1776-1794)  
 In the section on moral conscience, the Catechism provides a quotation from 
Gaudium et Spes that connects conscience with the natural moral law: 
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but 
which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to 
avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. . . For man has in his heart a law 
inscribed by God. . . His conscience is man’s most secret core and his sanctuary. There 
he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths.141 
Moral conscience, which is the possession of all, entreats him or her at the right time to do 
that which is good and to avoid that which is evil. It also evaluates particular choices, 
affirming the good ones and rejecting the evil ones. It attests to the sovereignty of truth 
regarding the supreme Good to which we are attracted, and it openly accepts the 
commandments. If we are wise, and we listen to our conscience, we will hear the voice of 
God.  
 Conscience is an evaluation one makes by one’s reason. By such an evaluation, a 
person judges whether a tangible act that he/she either intends to perform, is presently 
performing, or has already completed is good or evil. In all that one says or does, one is 
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required to be truly guided by what one knows is just and right.142 It is by the evaluation that 
one makes, guided by one’s conscience, that one apprehends and identifies what God’s law 
dictates. Reflection and self-examination are crucial if we are to apprehend and adhere to the 
voice of our conscience, especially as the busyness and noisiness of life can very easily 
obscure this voice. ‘Return to your conscience, question it. . . Turn inward, brethren, and in 
everything you do, see God as your witness.’143  
A person’s dignity suggests and necessitates righteousness of moral conscience. 
Conscience includes an intuitive grasp of the principles of morality, the application of these 
principles in particular circumstances by a practical judgement of reasons and goods, and 
finally judgement about substantial acts that either have or have not yet been carried out. The 
truth regarding the moral good, articulated in the law of reason, is identified practically and 
substantially by the wise conscientious judgment.  
 Conscience allows a person to take responsibility for his or her actions. If one does an 
evil deed, the fair evaluation of conscience which attests to the all-embracing truth of the 
good, can exist simultaneously with the evil of his or her particular choosing. The finding of 
the conscientious judgement is left as an offer of mercy and hope. In bearing witness to the 
wrong-doing, it reminds us that we must ask for forgiveness and continue to practice and 
develop, with the aid of God’s grace, the various virtues.  
 According to the Catechism, ‘conscience must be informed and moral judgement 
enlightened.’144 A fully developed conscience is characterised by its desire for what is right 
and true. It frames its evaluations according to reason, and in compliance with the true good 
willed by God’s wisdom. We cannot do without the education of conscience, as human 
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beings are exposed to adverse pressures and tempted by sin to favour their own views to 
those of the teaching authority.145 
 To educate one’s conscience is an ever-enduring job. From the beginning of human 
life, such education stimulates in the child the practice of the inner law known by conscience. 
A good education teaches virtue, as well as curing fear, selfishness and pride, a bitterness 
stemming from guilt, and feelings of smugness originating in human frailty and 
shortcomings. An informed conscience brings freedom and a feeling of peace. 
 As we develop and educate our conscience we must use God’s word to illuminate our 
way. We must absorb it faithfully and prayerfully, and let it inform our actions. We are also 
required to inspect our conscience in the light of Christ’s Passion. We are aided by the gifts 
of the Holy Spirit and the testimony or counsel of others. Our way is further illuminated by 
the authoritative teaching of the Church. 
 When confronted with a moral decision, conscience can make a correct judgement 
that conforms to both reason and God’s law, or a mistaken judgement that deviates from 
them. Human beings are sometimes faced with events that make moral judgements less 
certain, and decision problematical. The person, however, must sincerely search for what is 
right and good, and discover God’s will as it is communicated in the divine law. To this end, 
human beings endeavour to decipher the experiential data and events that signal a changing 
society, aided by prudence, advice from capable people, and the Holy Spirit. There are, 
however, some rules that are applicable in every case. These rules are: 1) One must never do 
evil in order to achieve good; 2) The Golden Rule: ‘Whatever you wish that men would do to 
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you, do so to them;’146 3) Charity is always advanced by consideration of one’s neighbour 
and his or her conscience: ‘Thus sinning against your brethren and wounding their conscience 
. . . you sin against Christ.’147  Therefore ‘it is right not to . . . do anything that makes your 
brother stumble.’148  
A person is obliged to always act according to the determined judgement of his or her 
conscience.149 If a person purposely acts against conscience, this person condemns 
him/herself. Despite this obligation to obey conscience, it is a fact that moral conscience can 
remain in darkness and make incorrect evaluations of future or past acts. Such ignorance is 
often the responsibility of the individual concerned. Such is the case when a person ‘takes 
little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost 
blinded through the habit of committing sin.’150 In these situations, one is accountable for 
one’s wrong-doing. 
The Catechism lists a number of factors that can contribute to poor moral judgements. 
They are: 1) Lack of knowledge or understanding of Christ and the Gospel; 2) The negative 
influence of others; 3) Being imprisoned by one’s passions; 4) The disavowal of Church 
teaching and authority; and 5) A failure to be converted to the truth, and a lack of charity. If 
one’s lack of understanding in moral matters cannot be rectified or if one is not responsible 
for one’s false judgement, then one should not be held accountable for the wrong one has 
done. Despite these extenuating circumstances the evil committed is no less evil. It is still 
depraved and disordered. It is therefore vital that one strives to educate one’s moral 
conscience by seeking out and eliminating errors. 
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An upright moral conscience is one that is illuminated and guided by deep faith, as 
charity comes ‘from a pure heart and a good conscience and sincere faith.’151 This section of 
the Catechism concludes with a quotation from Gaudium et Spes which explains how that 
which is truly good can be discerned by the faculty of conscience: ‘The more a correct 
conscience prevails, the more do persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and try to 
be guided by objective standards of moral conduct.’152   
 
1.3. Human Freedom (paragraphs 1730- 1742) 
 Even if there is an objective moral order discernible by human reason, the question 
remains whether human beings are in fact free to act according to what they have discerned to 
be true and good. For this reason, the Catechism looks at the notion of human freedom. 
 The human person, created by God, is a rational being. God bestowed on the human 
being the dignity of a person who can instigate and direct his/her own actions. To support this 
notion of human freedom, the Catechism quotes Gaudium et Spes, which in turn quotes the 
Book of Sirach: ‘God willed that man should be “left in the hand of his own counsel,” so that 
he might of his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection 
by cleaving to him.’153 St Irenaeus is also quoted: ‘Man is rational and therefore like God; he 
is created with free will and is master over his acts.’154 
 The Catechism defines freedom as ‘the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not 
to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility.’155 
By free will a person carves out his or her own existence. Human freedom has a power that 
enables us to develop and grow in truth and goodness; it realizes the highest level of 
perfection when it is guided toward God, the ultimate source of our happiness. 
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If freedom does not cling once and for all to its final good which is God, it remains 
possible to choose between good and evil, and consequently to either develop and mature in 
moral virtue, or to fall short in this virtue. This freedom is characteristic of acts that are truly 
human, and is the basis upon which we hold a person accountable for his or her actions.   
As a result of an increase in the performance of good actions, a person becomes freer. 
Real freedom can only come through an allegiance to goodness and justice. By the decision 
to rebel and to do evil a person ill-uses his/her freedom and imprisons him/herself in sin.  
Freedom makes one accountable for one’s actions insofar as these actions are 
intentional. Developing one’s virtue and moral understanding, and exercising self-discipline 
increase the will’s command over its actions. However, responsibility for an action can be 
reduced and even abolished completely by lack of knowledge, oversight, coercion, 
trepidation, disposition, immoderate attachments and other social or psychological factors.156 
All actions committed with freedom and knowledge, however, are attributable to their 
initiators.  
An action can be indirectly voluntary if it is caused by carelessness or thoughtlessness 
about something one was duty-bound to know or do, as when an accident occurs due to a 
driver’s lack of knowledge of the rules of the road. 
An effect can be endured without being willed by its instrument. The Catechism gives 
the example of the extreme fatigue of a mother caring for an ill child. A negative effect is not 
attributed to a person if he or she did not intend the effect either as an end in itself or as a way 
to achieve an end, e.g., if someone dies by coming to the rescue of someone who is in danger. 
For a negative effect to be attributed to a person he/she must have been able to predict the 
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effect; it must also have been possible for him/her to avoid it. The example given is the death 
of another caused by a drunken driver. 
Freedom is practiced in human interactions and relationships. Because we are created 
in the image of God, we have the right to be acknowledged as persons who possess freedom 
and responsibility. We all ought to respect one another. Our right to exercise our freedom, 
especially with regard to morality and religion, is essential to our sense of worth, our dignity. 
This right must be acknowledged and safeguarded by civil authority as long as this does not 
interfere with the public’s safety or with the common good. 
Human freedom has its limitations and is capable of making mistakes. This truth has 
been made known in history by the fact that humankind has failed by freely sinning. By 
rejecting God’s offer of redemption, by rejecting his love, human beings have deluded 
themselves and become imprisoned in sin. This first estrangement from God led to a great 
number of others. From its very beginnings, human history tells of the wickedness and 
slavery stemming from twisted human emotions that result from the misuse of our freedom.  
 The fact that we are free does not suggest that we are justified in anything we say or 
do. It is a mistake to say that ‘the subject of this freedom’ is ‘an individual who is fully self-
sufficient and whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the enjoyment of 
earthly goods.’157 Furthermore, the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions 
required for human beings to exercise fairly and justly their freedom, are too often ignored or 
infringed. Such circumstances of darkness and violation of another’s rights are harmful to the 
moral life and cause both the strong and the weak to be seduced into sinning against charity. 
By straying from the moral law the human person infringes upon her own freedom, becomes 
a slave to sin, disturbs neighbourly companionship, and rises up against God’s word. 
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      By his glorious Passion, Christ has liberated all people. He has freed us from the sin 
that has held us in captivity. ‘For freedom Christ has set us free.’158 In Christ we are in 
solidarity with the ‘truth that makes us free.’159 God has granted to us the Holy Spirit and 
‘where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.’160 We already rejoice in the ‘liberty of the 
children of God.’161  
 Christ’s grace in no way competes for our freedom when this freedom conforms to the 
intuition of goodness and truth that God has given to human beings. Rather, as our experience 
of prayer confirms, the more we yield to the exhortations of grace, the more we develop our 
freedom and courage during life’s tribulations. Through grace the Holy Spirit instructs us in 




 In this section we shall critically examine the Catechism’s notions of sin, ethical 
knowledge, and human freedom. This critique will focus on the question of how successful 
the Catechism is in dialoguing with those who are sceptical about the possibility of objective 
moral norms and those who are sceptical about the possibility of human freedom. 
 
1.4.1. Sin 
 In paragraph 1849 sin is defined as ‘an offence against reason, truth and right 
conscience’162 and as ‘an utterance, a deed or a desire contrary to the eternal law.’163 These 
definitions strongly imply that there is a truth about morality, and that sin is in opposition to 
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that which is reasonable and true. While this is, from our perspective, true, the Catechism 
provides no rational support for sceptical readers to sustain its position. It simply pays lip-
service to a philosophical tradition, namely the natural law tradition, which has been used by 
the Church for centuries. 
 While the Catechism is right to draw on a philosophical tradition that is quite capable 
of dialoguing with modern moral sceptics, it needs to do so more explicitly. Rather than 
merely using words like ‘reason’ and ‘truth,’ and phrases like ‘right conscience’ and ‘eternal 
law,’ it needs to engage with the question of the possibility of truth and right conscience, and 
the possibility of their being an eternal law.  
 The above definitions also imply that a person has the freedom to act in a certain 
manner or not so. The word ‘offence’ in the first definition suggests culpability and implies 
that the person knows that a certain act is morally wrong but chooses to do it anyway. 
However, the question of the possibility of human freedom is never discussed. 
 This lack of engagement with vital questions pertaining to the notion of sin is evident 
in paragraph 1857 which discusses the notion of mortal sin. ‘For a sin to be mortal, three 
conditions must together be met: “Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is 
also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent.”’164 In terms of establishing the 
possibility of sin, the notions of knowledge and consent are of the utmost importance. 
Knowledge here, however, for the Catechism is simply knowledge of the Ten 
Commandments, as grave matter is specified by the Ten Commandments.165 Mortal sin, the 
Catechism continues in paragraph 1859, presupposes knowledge of the sinful character of the 
act, of its opposition to God’s law. The Catechism does not engage with the vital question of 
how human knowledge is possible. As to the question of human freedom, the Catechism here 
simply says that mortal sin ‘implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to be a personal choice. 
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Feigned ignorance or hardness of heart do not diminish, but rather increase, the voluntary 
character of a sin.’166 The question of how human freedom is possible is here neither asked 
nor answered. 
 
1.4.2. Knowledge of the Good      
 Paragraph 1956 states that ‘the natural law, present in the heart of each man and 
established by reason, is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all men.’167 
What does it mean to say that the natural law is ‘established by reason’? Don’t reasonable 
people disagree in matters pertaining to morality? The quotation from Cicero in this passage 
speaks of ‘right reason.’ Again, what is it that makes one person’s reason ‘right’ and another 
person’s reason wrong? The Catechism seems to be saying that a person’s reason is ‘right’ if 
he/she draws moral conclusions that conform to the Ten Commandments or the Church’s 
teaching. It seems to be saying, basically, if you agree with us, you are being reasonable, if 
you do not, your reason is flawed.  
Furthermore, if the natural law is present in the heart of each person, why do people 
come to different conclusions in moral matters? Paragraph 1960 attempts to answer this 
question: ‘The precepts of the natural law are not perceived by everyone clearly and 
immediately. In the present situation sinful man needs grace and revelation so moral and 
religious truths may be known “by everyone with facility, with firm certainty and with no 
admixture of error”’168 Imagine for a moment that the above question, ‘if the natural law is 
present in the heart of each person, why do people come to different conclusions in moral 
matters?’ is being asked by a moral sceptic. The Catechism’s answer to this person is, 
essentially, ‘Because you are somewhat deprived of grace and revelation, your sinfulness has 
stopped you from perceiving things clearly.’ This may indeed be true, but it is highly unlikely 
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that the sceptic in this case will accept the argument. She will require a rational proof for the 
existence of objective moral norms and the possibility of human freedom. If the Church 
wishes to combat moral scepticism, it must do so, at least in part, on the sceptic’s own terms.  
 Paragraph 1778 describes conscience as ‘a judgement of reason whereby the human 
person recognizes the moral quality of a concrete act that he is going to perform, is in the 
process of performing, or has already completed. In all that he says or does, man is obliged to 
follow what he knows to be just and right.’169 We have already seen (footnote 142) that it is 
also true that the person is obliged to follow what he sincerely believes to be right. Let us 
suppose, however, that a person can know what is just and right. The Catechism says nothing 
about how the person can know this, except to say that it is by a judgement of reason. Again, 
however, we are left with the same questions we asked in relation to the Catechism’s teaching 
on natural law: what is it that makes one person’s reason ‘right’ and another person’s reason 
wrong? Neither the cognitive process by which this reasoning occurs or its connection to 
reality, are dealt with in the Catechism. 
 Paragraph 1780 speaks of reason in relation to conscience in the same vague manner: 
‘The truth about the moral good, stated in the law of reason, is recognized practically and 
concretely by the prudent judgement of conscience.’170 The truth about the moral good is 
‘stated in the law of reason.’ The Catechism here uses a confusing phrase which it does not 
really explain. Earlier in the same paragraph the Catechism speaks of the perception of the 
principles of morality, their application in the given circumstances by practical discernment 
of reasons and goods, and judgement about concrete acts yet to be performed or already 
performed. This is perhaps what is meant by the ‘law of reason,’ although this is not entirely 
clear. However, the Catechism does not say how the principles of morality are perceived, 
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what is involved in the practical discernment of reasons and goods, or what is entailed in the 
judgement of concrete acts.  
 
1.4.3. Human Freedom  
Paragraph 1730 reads: ‘God created man a rational being, conferring on him the 
dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own actions. “God willed that man should 
be left in the hand of his own counsel, so that he might of his own accord seek his Creator 
and freely attain full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him.”’171 The Catechism makes 
the claim that as human beings we are endowed with the capacity to make free choices, 
supporting this claim with the above quotation from the book of Sirach. It also quotes 
Irenaeus: ‘Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master 
over his acts.’172 The question of whether human beings are in fact capable of free choice is 
one that philosophers have been asking for millennia and are still asking today. Despite this, 
all the Catechism does to demonstrate that human freedom is a reality is quote one line from 
the OT another from one of the Fathers of the Church.       
 The Catechism goes on to define freedom as ‘the power, rooted in reason and will, to 
act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own 
responsibility’173 The phrase ‘rooted in reason and will’ opens up a minefield of questions 
that the Catechism completely fails to engage with. Such questions include: What is the 
connection between freedom and reason? What is the will and how exactly does it function? 
These are major philosophical questions that are of great relevance to the freedom versus 
determinism debate. The Catechism, however, offers this definition of human freedom and 
simply ignores the complexity of the problem. 
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 Paragraph 1734 reads: ‘Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that 
they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance the 
mastery of the will over its acts.’174 This paragraph speaks of the two most important criteria 
for establishing moral culpability, freedom and knowledge of the good. It states that progress 
in virtue, knowledge of the good, and self-discipline enhance the mastery of the will over its 
acts, but offers no rational evidence that knowledge of the good is possible, that there indeed 
exists something which we can call ‘the good.’ Nor does it supply any rational evidence that 
self-discipline is not merely an illusion as human behaviour has been determined in advance. 
 
1.4.4. Conclusion 
 For the Christian reader, the Catechism provides a comprehensive and useful teaching 
on the notions of sin, natural law, moral conscience, and human freedom. The moral 
theologian, as one engaged in understanding his or her faith and its implications for human 
living, may believe that most or indeed all of what the Catechism teaches on these matters is 
true. If he/she is prudent, however, he/she will understand that the fact that something is true 
does not mean that it will be believed. He/she will also understand that the truth must be 
communicated in such a way that it respects people’s present beliefs and engages with rather 
than alienates them. Gaudium et Spes recognizes the importance of communicating the faith 
in such an inclusive manner: ‘theologians are now being asked, within the methods and limits 
of theological science, to develop more efficient ways of communicating doctrine to the 
people of today, for the deposit and the truths of faith are one thing, the manner of expressing 
them – provided their sense and meaning are preserved – is quite another.’ It is my view that 
the Catechism has not succeeded in communicating its moral theology to the ‘people of 
today.’  
                                                          




In the Prologue to the Catechism catechesis is defined as ‘the totality of the Church’s 
efforts to make disciples, to help men believe that Jesus is the Son of God so that believing 
they might have life in his name, and to educate and instruct them in this life, thus building 
up the body of Christ.’175 Instead of helping people to believe that Jesus is the Son of God, 
however, the Catechism assumes this belief in its readers. The reader’s acceptance of the 
authority of scripture and the Church’s theological tradition is assumed and the world-views 
and questions of the non-Christian reader are never considered. While the Catechism is a 
useful instrument in the education and instruction of Christians, it is extremely unlikely that it 
will challenge the world-view of the moral sceptic, or engender in the sceptic a moral or 
religious conversion.  
 
2. POPE JOHN PAUL II’S THEOLOGY OF SIN 
 During his pontificate, Pope John Paul II produced a number of documents in which 
he discussed the notion of sin. Of central importance on this subject is the apostolic 
exhortation, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, in which there is a chapter length discussion on the 
‘mystery of sin,’ and in which John Paul II develops his notion of social sin. Also of central 
importance to John Paul II’s understanding of sin is his 1993 encyclical, Veritatis Splendor. 
In this work he discusses central issues in fundamental moral theology, including the notions 
of sin, natural law, moral conscience, and human freedom. In this section we shall examine 
portions of these works of John Paul II, asking the same question that we asked in relation to 
the Catechism, namely: How successful is John Paul II’s moral theology in dialoguing with 
moral sceptics and determinists? 
  
 
                                                          




2.1. The Notion of Sin in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia and Veritatis Splendor 
2.1.1. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia 
 In article 16 of Reconciliatio et Paenitentia John Paul II discusses personal and social 
sin. Sin, he says, ‘is always a personal act, since it is an act of freedom on the part of an 
individual person, and not properly of a group or community.’176 This individual, he says, 
may be influenced by a number of powerful external conditions. He may also be dominated 
by dispositions, faults, and proclivities connected to his individual psychology. In many cases 
these exterior and interior factors may diminish, to a greater or lesser extent, the person’s 
freedom and consequently his accountability and culpability. It is, however, John Paul II 
proceeds, ‘a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience and reason, that the human 
person is free.’177 This truth, he says, cannot be ignored, so that we may put the blame for 
individuals’ sins on exterior factors such as social or political structures, or on other people. 
To do this would be to fail to give the person due dignity and freedom, dignity and freedom 
which is made known – albeit destructively – also in the culpability for sin perpetrated. There 
is, then, nothing as personal and irremovable in each person as praiseworthiness for virtue or 
culpability for sin. 
 John Paul II proceeds to explain the various ways that the term ‘social sin’ has been 
understood. To speak of social sin, he says, is to acknowledge that due to human fellowship 
which is as enigmatic and impalpable as it is real and substantial, every person’s sin affects 
others in some way. It is for this reason that we can speak of a communion of sin, by which a 
soul that degrades itself through sin pulls down both itself and the Church and, somehow, the 
entire world. In other words, not even the most personal and private sin concerns only the 
person perpetrating it. According to this understanding of the term, all sins can with certainty 
be regarded as social sins. 
                                                          





 Some sins, however, by their very substance represent a straight-forward assault on 
one’s neighbour and, more precisely, against one’s brother or sister. Through these sins we 
violate both God and neighbour. Such sins are normally called social sins. Understood in this 
way social sin is sin against our neighbour, and in terms of Christ’s law it is considerably 
more grave as it pertains to the second commandment, which is ‘like unto the first’178 
Similarly the designation ‘social’ pertains to all sins of injustice in interpersonal relations, 
perpetrated by a person against his/her community or, alternatively, by the community 
against him/her. Every sin that violates individual human rights, beginning with the right to 
life, including foetal life, or against a person’s physical person, is a social sin. Similarly, 
every sin against others’ freedom, especially against the ultimate freedom to believe in and 
worship God, is a social sin. Every sin against our fellow human beings’ dignity and integrity 
is also regarded as social. Sins against the common good and its demands in relation to the 
broad ranging civil rights and obligations are also deemed to be social. The designation 
‘social’ can pertain either to sins of commission or omission. John Paul II uses as an example 
political, economic, and trade union leaders, who do not work assiduously and prudently for 
the betterment and renewal of society according to the needs and possibilities of the particular 
historical moment. He also mentions workers who, by their lack of cooperation and their 
absenteeism, fail to guarantee that their businesses will continue to further the welfare of 
individual workers and their families, and also the well-being of the wider society.  
 The third meaning of the term social sin, according to John Paul II, touches on the 
relationships between diverse human communities. These relationships do not always accord 
with God’s plan; he desires a just world, and freedom and harmony between individual 
persons and groups of people. So the grappling for economic and political power between 
capitalist and working classes, whoever leads it or in a given situation attempts to give it a 
                                                          




theoretical justification, is a social evil. Similarly, unyielding conflict between blocs of 
nations, or between one nation and another, or between varying groups within the one nation 
are all social evils. In both cases it is feasible to ask whether ethical culpability for such evils, 
and therefore sin, can be assigned to any one person. John Paul II concedes that we must 
admit that situations like the ones just related, when they become generalized and arrive at 
expansive dimensions as social phenomena, almost inevitably become anonymous, just as the 
reasons for these situations are intricate and not readily known or understood. If one speaks 
of social sin here, then, the meaning of the term is analogical. However, even if we converse 
about social sins analogically, we must not minimize the accountability of the individuals 
who have committed these sins. It is intended as a petition to all consciences, an appeal to 
help each individual to solemnly and fearlessly accept his or her responsibility in order to 
change those dire conditions and unacceptable situations. 
 When the Church refers to ‘situations of sin,’ John Paul II continues, or when she 
denounces as social sins particular situations or the concerted actions of certain social groups, 
or even of entire nations and blocs of nations, she knows and declares that such cases of 
social sin are caused by the build up of a multitude of personal sins. Situations of sin are 
caused by the personal sins of those who bring about or promote or take advantage of evil. 
They are caused by those who are in a position to avert, eradicate, or at least control certain 
social evils but who do not do so due to indolence, trepidation, or by conspiring to keep 
silent, or through covert collusion or apathy. John Paul II also mentions those who hide 
behind what seems to them to be the hopelessness of bringing about change in the world, and 
those who evade the toil and renouncement required, producing superficially plausible 
reasons for this behaviour. It is with individuals, then, that true culpability for social sin rests.  
 No situation or structure or society as a whole is in itself the cause of a moral act. 




 ‘At the very heart of every situation of sin,’ John Paul II continues, ‘are always to be 
found sinful people.’179 This is so true that even when such a situation can be changed in its 
foundational and institutional features by the implementation of new laws, the change, in 
actuality, turns out to be incomplete, short-term, and in the end futile and to no avail, if those 
immediately responsible or indirectly responsible for the situation do not undergo a change of 
heart. 
 
2.1.2. Veritatis Splendor (articles 65-67) 
In Veritatis Splendor John Paul II discusses the notion of ‘fundamental option.’ He 
points out that increased concern for freedom in contemporary society has resulted in many 
students of psychology and theology undertaking a more in-depth exploration of its nature 
and of its characteristics. Freedom is not only the choice for one action over another; it is also 
a decision about oneself, a decision to live in a way that is either for or against goodness, 
truth, and God. Important are particular choices which mould one’s moral life, and which 
function as limits within which other specific commonplace decisions can be located and 
permitted to thrive. 
   John Paul II proceeds by pointing out that some authors have suggested an even more 
revolutionary reinterpretation of human moral dynamics. These authors speak of a 
‘fundamental freedom,’ more profound and distinct from freedom of choice. If human actions 
are to be correctly judged and appraised, this fundamental freedom needs to be considered. 
Fundamental option, which results from the fundamental freedom by which one determines, 
in a way that goes beyond specific decisions, who he/she is to be, is to be credited with a 
crucial role in the moral life. Particular acts which proceed from this option would make up 
only incomplete and never conclusive attempts to represent it; they would, rather, be merely 
                                                          




symptomatic or symbolic. The direct object of such acts would not be the definitive Good, 
but specific or ‘categorical’ goods. According to some theologians, none of these goods, 
which are naturally incomplete, could settle the freedom of a person in his/her wholeness, 
even though it is only by realizing these goods or declining to do so that one is capable of 
communicating one’s fundamental option. 
 Hence fundamental option is distinguished from intentional choices of a definite type 
of conduct. In some authors, John Paul II continues, such distinction is inclined to become a 
separation, as they confine the moral terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ to the transcendental realm 
which belongs to the fundamental option, and refer to as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ the choices of 
particular ‘innerworldly’ types of conduct, those, that is, that pertain to one’s relationship 
with one’s self, with others, and with the physical world. It appears, therefore, that human 
actions can be categorised into two distinct levels of morality. Firstly, there is the order of 
good and evil, which relies on the will. Secondly, there are particular types of conduct, 
which, John Paul II tells us, are deemed morally right or wrong based on a technical 
calculation of the ratio of ‘premoral’ or ‘physical’ goods and evils which in fact are caused by 
the action. This kind of argument reaches the point where a definite type of conduct, even one 
that is freely chosen, is regarded as a ‘merely physical process,’ and not according to the 
standards appropriate to a human act. John Paul II submits that such arguments eventually 
lead to the conclusion that the correctly moral evaluation of the person is to be found in 
his/her fundamental option, more or less leaving out of consideration his/her choice of 
concrete actions, of specific types of conduct.  
 John Paul II recognizes the importance of a fundamental choice ‘which qualifies the 
moral life and engages freedom on a radical level before God.’180 It is a matter, he says, of 
the acquiescence of faith ‘by which man makes a total and free self-commitment to God, 
                                                          




offering “the full submission of intellect and will to God as he reveals.” ’181 This faith, which 
operates through love, comes from the very centre of person, from his/her affective 
responses, from where it is entreated to come to fruition in charitable acts.  
However, John Paul II proceeds to say that by one’s fundamental choice, one can give 
purpose to one’s existence, and advance, by grace, towards one’s object, following the 
beckoning of God. This ability, however, is in reality practiced in the determinate choices of 
particular actions, by which a person purposely complies with the will, wisdom, and law of 
God. It therefore needs to be asserted, John Paul II continues, that the so-called fundamental 
option is always manifested in conscious and free decisions. For just this reason, it is 
invalidated when one uses one’s freedom to consciously stand against God’s wisdom and 
law, regarding morally grave matter. 
 
2.2. Knowledge of the Good 
 The notion of ‘mortal sin’ is central to John Paul II’s hamartology. As we have seen, 
he defines mortal sin as follows: ‘Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is 
also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent.’182 This section will examine the 
second of these criteria for designating particular sins as ‘mortal’: knowledge. As in our 
examination of knowledge in the section on the Catechism, we shall proceed by examining 
the notion that there is an objective moral order. This will be done by investigating John Paul 
II’s teaching on natural law. We shall also examine the further notion that human beings are 
capable of apprehending the moral order, by investigating John Paul II’s teaching on 
conscience.  
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2.2.1. Natural Law (Veritatis Splendor, articles 42-45) 
 John Paul II begins his discussion on natural law by saying that human beings’ 
freedom, which is modelled on God’s freedom, is not invalidated by acquiescence to God’s 
law; in fact it is only through this acquiescence that it remains in the truth and conforms to 
human dignity. This, he says, is clearly stated by the Council: ‘Human dignity requires man 
to act through conscious and free choice, as motivated and prompted personally from within, 
and not through blind internal impulse or merely external pressure. Man achieves such 
dignity when he frees himself from all subservience to his feelings, and in a free choice of the 
good, pursues his own end by effectively and assiduously marshalling the appropriate 
means.’183 
 In moving towards God, the One who ‘alone is good,’ one must in freedom do good 
and avoid evil. In order to achieve this, however, one must be capable of determining what is 
good and what is evil. This can happen above all due to ‘the light of natural reason, the 
reflection in man of the splendour of God’s countenance.’184 St Thomas, commenting on a 
verse from psalm 4, writes: ‘after saying: Offer right sacrifices (Ps 4:5), as if some had then 
asked him what right works were, the Psalmist adds: There are many who say: Who will 
make us see good? And in reply to the question he says: The light of your face, Lord, is 
signed upon us, thereby implying that the light of natural reason whereby we discern good 
from evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else but an imprint on us of the 
divine light.’185 It also, John Paul II continues, becomes clear why this law is called the 
natural law: it is given this name not because it speaks of the nature of irrational beings but 
because the reason which makes it known is proper to human nature. 
 John Paul II proceeds by quoting Dignitatis Humanae, which points out that the 
‘supreme rule of life is the divine law itself, the eternal, objective and universal law by which 
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God out of his wisdom and love arranges, directs and governs the whole world and the paths 
of the human community. God has enabled man to share in this divine law, and hence man is 
able under the gentle guidance of God’s providence increasingly to recognize the unchanging 
truth.’186 
 St Augustine defines God’s eternal law as ‘the reason or the will of God, who 
commands us to respect the natural order and forbids us to disturb it,’187 and St Thomas 
associates it with ‘the type of the divine wisdom as moving all things to their due end.’188 
God’s wisdom is in his beneficence; it is a ‘love which cares.’ God himself loves and is 
concerned for all created beings. However, God provides for human beings in a way that is 
different to the way that he provides for non-personal beings. He cares for persons not ‘from 
without,’ through the physical laws that govern the universe, but ‘from within,’ that is, 
through reason, which, by its inherent understanding of God’s eternal law, is therefore able to 
instruct people in relation to what route they should take in their free actions. It is in this 
manner that God calls one to become involved in one’s own providence, because he wishes to 
direct the world – both the natural and the human – through persons themselves, through their 
rational and honest care. Thus the natural law is seen as ‘the human expression of God’s 
eternal law.’ John Paul II again quotes St Thomas: ‘Among all others, the rational creature is 
subject to divine providence in the most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of 
providence, being provident both for itself and for others. Thus it has a share of the Eternal 
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This participation of the 
eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law.’189 
 Pope John Paul II points out that the Church often refers to St Thomas’s doctrine of 
natural law, and has integrated this doctrine into her own moral teachings. Thus Leo XIII, he 
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tells us, stressed the necessity of making reason and human law secondary to divine wisdom 
and law. Quoting Leo XIII, John Paul II speaks of the natural law which ‘is written and 
engraved in the heart of each and every man, since it is none other than human reason itself 
which commands us to do good and counsels us not to sin.’190 Leo XIII goes on to appeal to 
the ‘higher reason’ of the divine Lawgiver: ‘But this prescription of human reason could not 
have the force of law unless it were the voice and the interpreter of some higher reason to 
which our spirit and our freedom must be subject.’191 Indeed, John Paul II continues, the 
force of law is made up of its power to set duties, to accord rights, and to permit some 
behaviours while restricting others. He continues to cite Leo XIII: ‘Now all of this, clearly, 
could not exist in man if, as his own supreme legislator, he gave himself the rule of his own 
actions.’192 Leo XIII concludes that ‘it follows that the natural law is itself the eternal law, 
implanted in beings endowed with reason, and inclining them towards their right action and 
end: it is none other than the eternal reason of the Creator and Ruler of the universe.’193 
 The human person is capable of distinguishing between good and evil because of that 
perception of good and evil which he/she implements by his/her reason, in particular by 
his/her reason as it is illuminated by God’s Revelation and by faith, particularly through the 
law – beginning with the Decalogue – that God gave to the Jewish People. Israel was called 
to avow and to live out God’s law as a distinct inheritance and symbol of its appointment and 
of God’s Covenant, and also as a promise of divine favour. In this way Moses was able to 
address the children of Israel and ask them: ‘What great nation is that that has a god so near 
to it as the Lord our God is to us, whenever we call upon him? And what great nation is there 
that has statutes and ordinances so righteous as all this law which I set before you this 
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day?’194 John Paul II points out that in the Psalms we are met with expressions of 
glorification, thankfulness, and adoration which the Chosen People is called upon to display 
towards God’s law, together with an injunction to know it, contemplate it, and convert it into 
life. ‘Blessed is the man who walks not in the counsel of the wicked, nor stands in the way of 
sinners, nor sits in the seat of scoffers, but his delight is in the law of the Lord and on his law 
he meditates day and night.’195 ‘The law of the Lord is Perfect, reviving the soul; the 
testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple; the precepts of the Lord are right, 
rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes.’196  
The Church, John Paul II tells us, accepts with gratitude and lovingly safeguards the 
complete consignment of Revelation, regarding it with religious respect and realizing her 
duty of properly interpreting God’s law as it is illuminated by the Gospel. The Church also 
inherits as gift the New Law, the ‘fulfilment’ of the divine law in Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
This is an interior rather than an exterior law: it is ‘written not with ink but with the Spirit of 
the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts;’197 it is a law of 
perfection and freedom; ‘the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus.’198 John Paul II quotes St 
Thomas who writes that this law ‘can be called law in two ways. First, the law of the spirit is 
the Holy Spirit . . . who, dwelling in the soul, not only teaches what it is necessary to do by 
enlightening the intellect on the things to be done, but also inclines the affections to act with 
uprightness . . . Second, the law of the spirit can be called the proper effect of the Holy Spirit, 
and thus faith working through love, which teaches inwardly about the things to be done . . . 
and inclines the affections to act.’199 
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 John Paul II contends that even if theological ethics normally differentiates between 
positive or revealed law and natural law, and between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ law, we must 
remember that these and other helpful distinctions always point to that law whose architect is 
the one God and which is always intended for human beings. Throughout history, God has 
cared for the world and human beings in different ways. These ways, however, are not 
antagonistic. They should, rather, be seen as being supportive of one another and as 
integrating with one another. They have as their foundation and end the eternal, wise, and 
benevolent guidance by which God preordains that men and women will ‘be conformed to 
the image of his Son.’200 God’s plan does not endanger people’s authentic freedom; rather, 
submission to God’s plan is the only way to secure that freedom. 
 
2.2.2. Conscience (Veritatis Splendor, articles 57-61)  
 John Paul II begins his discussion on conscience by quoting the following text from 
the book of Romans, which, he says, indicates the biblical understanding of conscience, 
especially in its specific connection with the law: ‘When Gentiles who have not the law do by 
nature what the law requires, they are a law unto themselves, even though they do not have 
the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their 
conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse 
them.’201  
 According to St Paul, conscience in a way confronts the human person with the law. 
Thus it becomes a ‘witness’ for human persons, either of our own fidelity or infidelity in 
relation to the law, or of our basic moral goodness or badness. Conscience, moreover, is the 
only witness, since that which occurs in the person’s heart is obscured from the sight of those 
outside. Conscience only makes its vision discernible by the person him/herself. And, in turn, 
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only the individual, whose conscience has been activated, knows how he/she will answer 
his/her conscience. 
 John Paul II points out that the importance of this inner conversation of the person 
with him/herself can never be sufficiently recognized. It is, however, also a conversation 
between the person and God, who is the architect of the law and human beings’ original 
likeness and ultimate goal. John Paul II draws on St Bonaventure in order to bring out this 
special relationship between the human person and God. Conscience, Bonaventure says, ‘is 
like God’s herald and messenger; it does not command things on its own authority, but 
commands them as coming from God’s authority, like a herald when he proclaims the edict 
of the king. This is why conscience has binding force.’202 It can be said, therefore, that 
conscience observes the person’s own moral goodness or badness to humankind itself but, 
along with this and indeed even previously, conscience is the observation of God himself, 
whose voice and judgement infiltrate the very recesses of a person’s soul, calling him or her 
gently and firmly to obedience. ‘Moral conscience does not close man within an 
insurmountable and impenetrable solitude, but opens him to the call, to the voice of God. In 
this, and not in anything else, lies the entire mystery and the dignity of the moral conscience: 
in being the place, the sacred place where God speaks to man.’203 
 As well as acknowledging that conscience acts as a ‘witness,’ St Paul also exposes the 
manner in which conscience discharges that function. He mentions the ‘conflicting thoughts’ 
which indict or pardon the Gentiles in relation to their actions.204 The term ‘conflicting 
thoughts,’ John Paul II argues, makes clear the exact nature of conscience. Thus he defines 
conscience as ‘a moral judgement about man and his actions, a judgement either of acquittal 
or of condemnation, according as human acts are in conformity or not with the law of God 
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written on the heart.’205 In the same text, he says, St Paul clearly converses on the judgement 
of actions, the judgement of their initiators and the precise time when that judgement will be 
decisively delivered: ‘(This will take place) on that day when, according to my Gospel, God 
judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus.’ 206 
 The judgement of conscience, John Paul II tells us, is a practical judgement that helps 
a person to know what he or she must or must not do, or which evaluates an action that he or 
she has already carried out. Such judgements apply to a definite situation the rational 
assurance that one is obligated to love and do good and avoid evil. This, the first principle of 
practical reason, is part of what constitutes the natural law. In fact it makes up precisely the 
foundation of the natural law, insofar as it communicates that first insight about good and 
evil, reflecting God’s creative wisdom which, like an ‘imperishable spark,’ illuminates the 
heart of every person. However, while the natural law reveals the objective and universal 
exigencies of the moral good, conscience applies the law to a specific instance. Thus it 
becomes an interior principle for the individual, a call to do what is good in the specific 
instance. Conscience therefore states definitively one’s moral obligation in the light of the 
natural law: it is the duty to do what the individual, through the operations of his/her 
conscience, knows to be a good he/she is summoned to perform in the present time and place. 
The all-inclusiveness of the law and our responsibility to observe it, are recognized once 
reason has confirmed the law’s implementation in definite situations that are presently 
occurring. The conscientious judgement ultimately asserts whether a specific sort of conduct 
complies with the law. It expresses the standard of measurement by which is judged the 
morality of a free act, ‘applying the objective law to a particular case.’207 
 The judgement of conscience, like the natural law itself and all applied wisdom, has a 
vital character: in other words, one must comply with it. If one acts against this judgement or, 
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in a situation where one is unsure about the rightness and goodness of an intended act, still 
carries out the act, one remains convicted by his/her own conscience, the standard of 
measurement of personal morality. The eminence of this rational convention, and the force of 
its utterances and decisions, stem from the truth about moral good and evil, which it is called 
to heed and communicate. This truth is shown by the ‘divine law,’ the ‘universal and 
objective norm of morality.’208 The judgement of conscience, John Paul II tells us, does not 
establish the law but attests to the natural law’s dominion and to the practical reason in 
relation to the ultimate good, whose desirability one perceives and whose precepts one 
accepts. ‘Conscience is not an independent and exclusive capacity to decide what is good and 
what is evil. Rather there is profoundly imprinted upon it a principle of obedience vis-a-vis 
the objective norm which establishes and conditions the correspondence of its decisions with 
the commands and prohibitions which are at the basis of human behaviour.’209 
 The truth regarding the moral good, as articulated in the law of reason, is in practice 
identified by the judgement of conscience, which helps one to take responsibility for the good 
or the evil one has committed. If a person does evil, the right judgement of his/her conscience 
stays within him/her to attest to the unchanging truth of the good, as well as to the 
malevolence of his/her specific choice. But the judgement of conscience stays in him/her also 
as a vow of hope and mercy. While attesting to the evil he/she has committed, it reminds 
him/her also of his/her need, with the aid of divine grace, to seek forgiveness, to do good, and 
to develop virtue ceaselessly. 
 As a result, in the practical judgement of conscience, which places upon the person 
the duty to carry out a particular act, the connection between freedom and truth becomes 
apparent. For just this reason conscience communicates in moments of ‘judgement’ which 
demonstrate the truth about the good, and not in random ‘decisions.’ The sophistication of, 
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and the obligation presented by these judgements, and of the individual who is their subject, 
are not gauged by the freeing of conscience from objective truth, in favour of a supposed 
independence in individual choices, but, contrariwise, by a persistent quest for truth and by 
permitting oneself to be directed by that truth in all of one’s endeavours. 
 
2.3. Human Freedom (Veritatis Splendor, articles 38-41) 
 In this section we shall examine the third of John Paul II’s criteria for designating 
particular sins as ‘mortal’: deliberate consent. We shall proceed by investigating his notion of 
human freedom.  
 John Paul II begins his discussion on human freedom by citing the Second Vatican 
Council, which explains the meaning of that ‘genuine freedom’ which is ‘an outstanding 
manifestation of the divine image’210 of humankind. The Council quotes from the OT book of 
Sirach: ‘God willed to leave man in the power of his own counsel, so that he would seek his 
Creator of his own accord and would arrive at full and blessed perfection by cleaving to 
God.’211 These words, John Paul II says, are indicative of the profound depth of the sharing in 
God’s sovereignty to which the human person has been beckoned. They signify that 
humankind’s rule in a sense stretches over humankind itself. This, John Paul II tells us, is a 
theme which has often recurred in theological reflection on human freedom, and has been 
described as a type of kingship. To take just one instance, St Gregory of Nyssa writes: ‘The 
soul shows its royal and exalted character . . . in that it is free and self-governed, swayed 
autonomously by its own will. Of whom else can this be said, save a king? . . . Thus human 
nature, created to rule other creatures, was by its likeness to the King of the universe made as 
it were a living image, partaking with the Archetype both in dignity and in name.’212 
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 The exercise of power or dominion over the world represents a considerable and 
important task for the human person, one which involves his/her freedom in compliance with 
the command of the Creator: ‘Fill the earth and subdue it.’213 In light of this, a proper 
autonomy is owed to every person, and also to the community as a whole, a fact which is 
given special notice in the Council’s constitution Gaudium et Spes. This autonomy relates to 
‘earthly realities,’ which means that ‘created things have their own laws and values which are 
to be gradually discovered, utilized and ordered by man.’214 
 Not just the world, John Paul II continues, but also human beings themselves have 
been made responsible for their own care. God left the human person ‘in the power of his 
own counsel,’ so that he might pursue his maker and in freedom achieve transcendence. 
Achieving such transcendence or perfection means establishing that perfection in oneself. 
Just as humankind in ruling over the world forms it according to human intelligence and will, 
so also in carrying out morally good acts, a person fortifies, advances, and secures within 
him/herself her likeness to God.  
 The Council, however, John Paul II tells us, cautions against a false idea of the self-
governing nature of worldly realities; for example, one which would suggest that ‘created 
things are not dependent on God and that man can use them without reference to their 
Creator.’215 In relation to human persons themselves, such a conception of autonomy creates 
particularly troublesome results, and sooner or later results in atheism: ‘Without its Creator 
the creature simply disappears . . . If God is ignored the creature itself is impoverished.’216 
 On the one hand, the teaching of the Council stresses the part played by human reason 
in the locating of and application of the moral law. The moral life, according to John Paul II, 
calls for a creativity and originality which characterizes the human person, who is the origin 
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and author of his/her own considered acts. However, reason also takes its own truth and 
testimony from the eternal law, which is nothing less than God’s wisdom. Right at the centre 
of the moral life, therefore, we find the idea of a ‘rightful autonomy’ of the person, the 
subject of his or her own actions. The moral law begins in God and without exception 
discovers in him its provenance. Concurrently, by means of natural reason, which stems from 
God’s wisdom, it is correctly called human law. The natural law ‘is nothing other than the 
light of understanding infused in us by God, whereby we understand what must be done and 
what must be avoided. God gave this light and this law to man at creation.’217 The proper 
autonomy of the practical reason indicates that the human person has within him/herself 
his/her own law, a law inherited from God. In spite of this, the autonomy of reason does not 
mean that reason itself produces values and moral norms. If this autonomy suggested a 
refutation of the involvement of practical reason in the wisdom of the supreme Creator and 
Lawgiver, or if it suggested a freedom that produces moral norms, based on historical 
circumstances or the disparity between societies and cultures, this kind of supposed 
autonomy would oppose the Church’s teaching on the nature of the human person. It would 
be the end of real freedom: ‘But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not 
eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die.’218 
 Humankind’s authentic moral autonomy in no way suggests the denial of but rather 
the affirmation of the moral law, of God’s command: ‘The Lord God gave this command to 
the man . . .’219 Human freedom and God’s law come together and are called to intertwine, in 
the sense of humankind’s free acquiescence to God and of God’s wholly voluntary kindness 
towards humanity. Obedience to God is not, therefore, as some suggest, a heteronomy, as if 
the moral life were dependent on the will of some omnipotent and absolute being who is alien 
to the human person and is disdainful of humanity’s freedom. If in actuality a heteronomy of 
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morality indicated a negation of the human person’s self-determination or the inflicting of 
standards disconnected from his/her good, this would oppose the Revelation of the Covenant 
and God’s salvific action in the Incarnation. Such a heteronomy would be nothing less than a 
type of alienation; it would oppose both the divine wisdom and the dignity of the human 
person.  
 Others correctly speak of theonomy, or participated theonomy. This suggests that 
humankind’s free acquiescence to God’s law essentially implies that human reason and will 
partake in the wisdom and providence of God. By prohibiting the human person to ‘eat of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil,’ God clearly reveals that the human person does not 
originally hold such ‘knowledge’ as something that is rightly his/her own; rather he/she 
merely takes part in it illuminated by natural reason and by Divine Revelation, which make 
known to him/her the demands and the encouragement of eternal wisdom. It is therefore 
necessary that law be thought of as a manifestation of divine wisdom: by yielding to the law, 
freedom yields to the reality of creation. As a result, one is obliged to acknowledge in the 
human person’s freedom the likeness and the closeness of God, who abides in all. But one 
must also, in a similar way, recognize the splendour of the God of the universe and venerate 
the blessedness of the law of God, who is ‘infinitely transcendent: Deus semper maior.’220  
 
2.4. Critique 
In his 1998 encyclical letter, Fides et Ratio John Paul II discusses at some length the 
importance of metaphysics for theological reflection. Responding to postmodern trends in 
both philosophical and theological thought, he stresses the importance of a philosophy that 
emphasizes foundation rather than phenomenon.221 John Paul II also stresses the importance 
of using this form of philosophical reflection in moral theology: ‘In order to fulfil its mission, 
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moral theology must turn to a philosophical ethics which looks to the truth of the good, to an 
ethics which is neither subjectivist nor utilitarian. Such an ethics implies and presupposes a 
philosophical anthropology and a metaphysics of the good.’222 While he does not recommend 
‘a specific school or a particular historical current of thought,’223 John Paul II himself draws 
largely on the metaphysics of St Thomas. However, the way in which he does this is 
somewhat limited. St Thomas’s metaphysics is an ontology, and yet there is in John Paul II’s 
reflections in moral theology no discussion of the notion of ‘being.’ Because of this he 
ultimately fails to ground the notions of sin, natural law, conscience, and human freedom in 
reality. In this section I will support this contention with a critique of the sections of 
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia and Veritatis Splendor that we examined above. 
 
2.4.1. Sin and Freedom 
In article 16 of Reconciliatio et Paenitentia John Paul II says that sin is always a 
personal act, since it is an act of freedom on the part of the individual person. He observes 
that the individual in question may be ‘conditioned, incited and influenced by numerous and 
powerful external factors,’ and that he may also be ‘subjected to tendencies, defects and 
habits linked with his personal condition.’224 These external and internal factors may 
attenuate, he says, to a greater or lesser degree, the person’s freedom and therefore his 
responsibility and guilt. He continues: ‘it is a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience 
and reason, that the human person is free.’225 This last sentence is revealing in terms of John 
Paul II’s method of demonstrating the possibility and reality of freedom and sin. He simply 
asserts that freedom is a reality and that we know this through our faith, experience, and 
reason. He makes no attempt, however, to say how experience tells us that freedom is a 
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reality, or to present a rational argument that concludes that freedom is a reality. In this 
article, John Paul II is attempting to demonstrate that social sin is the accumulation of many 
personal sins. He fails to do this, however, because he fails to demonstrate the reality of 
personal sin by not providing sufficient evidence for the possibility of human freedom. 
 In his discussion of sin in Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II critiques various theories of 
fundamental option. In doing so he emphasizes the importance of individual acts carried out 
with knowledge and freedom. ‘The so-called fundamental option,’ he says, ‘is always 
brought into play through conscious and free decisions.’226 This is vital to John Paul II’s 
moral theology as he points out the dangers of neglecting the importance of individual acts 
for a theory that emphasizes instead a person’s general moral orientation. A person’s 
orientation for John Paul II can be seriously affected by the individual choices he or she 
makes. Unfortunately, however, John Paul II does not adequately demonstrate the possibility 
of such choices. As in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia so also in Veritatis Splendor the freedom 
involved in the making of these choices is not demonstrated but merely assumed.  
 In Veritatis Splendor’s discussion of human freedom, John Paul II quotes the Second 
Vatican Council, which in turn quotes the OT book of Sirach: ‘God willed to leave man in the 
power of his own counsel, so that he would seek his Creator of his own accord and would 
freely arrive at full and blessed perfection by cleaving to God.’227 He also quotes St Gregory 
of Nyssa: ‘The soul shows its royal and exalted character . . . in that it is free and self-
governed, swayed autonomously by its own will.’228 The exercise of dominion over the 
world, John Paul II tells us, represents a great and responsible task for man, one which 
involves his freedom in obedience to the Creator’s command: ‘Fill the earth and subdue it.’229  
These references to scripture and to St Gregory are all that John Paul II offers the reader of 
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this text to support his contention that human freedom is a reality. There is no recognition of 
or attempt to dialogue with hard determinism, which claims that human freedom is just an 
illusion, as every human act is predetermined.  
 John Paul II’s approach is in complete contrast to that of St Thomas, who 
demonstrates rationally and systematically the possibility of human beings not being 
constrained in their actions by necessity, but rather being able to freely choose their actions. 
By answering questions such as: ‘Does the will set itself in motion?’ and ‘Is volition moved 
of necessity by its object?’ St Thomas demonstrates that the will is self-moving, and 
consequently that the human being is capable of making free decisions.230 John Paul II, on the 
other hand, does not engage with these questions. In Fides et Ratio, as we have seen, he states 
the importance of metaphysics for moral theology. However, when it comes to demonstrating 
the possibility of human freedom, a concept of central importance in ethical reflection, he 
refrains from metaphysics and instead resorts to quoting scripture and the Church Fathers. By 
taking this approach, John Paul II fails to engage with the hard determinist. 
 
2.4.2. Natural Law 
In his discussion of natural law, John Paul II argues that human beings are capable of 
distinguishing good from evil because of ‘the light of natural reason, the reflection in man of 
the splendour of God’s countenance.’231 To support this thesis he cites Thomas Aquinas’s 
commentary on Psalm 4: ‘Who will make us see good? The light of your face, Lord, is signed 
upon us.’232 For St Thomas, this implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern 
good from evil, is nothing else but an imprint on us of the divine light. In this approach John 
Paul II gives mere lip-service to reason. The human being is capable of discerning good from 
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evil because of the light of natural reason. He does not engage with the process whereby the 
human mind comprehends truth and goodness. By simply stating that the person is capable of 
such comprehension because of the light of natural reason, John Paul II fails to engage with 
moral sceptics who regard such comprehension as impossible. 
 The same kind of lip-service to reason can be seen in article 43: ‘God provides for 
man differently from the way in which he provides for beings which are not persons. He 
cares for man not “from without,” through the laws of physical nature, but “from within,” 
through reason, which, by its natural knowledge of God’s eternal law, is consequently able to 
show man the right direction to take in his free actions.’233 If a moral sceptic were to ask us to 
demonstrate the possibility of knowing right from wrong, we must be able to give a more 
adequate response than this. We must be able to demonstrate the process whereby the human 
mind apprehends the good. We cannot merely mention reason in relation to moral 
discernment, without saying how human reason functions in this regard.  
The same approach to natural law can be seen in article 44: ‘Man is able to recognize 
good and evil thanks to that discernment of good from evil which he himself carries out by 
his reason, in particular by his reason enlightened by Divine Revelation and by faith . . .’234 In 
this sentence, reason is not merely mentioned on its own. Very importantly, from a 
theological perspective, there is the addition of the phrase ‘enlightened by Divine Revelation 
and faith.’ However, while this addition is obviously important from a purely theological 
perspective, in terms of dialoguing with moral sceptics it is of no help. The theologian who 
wishes to dialogue with the modern moral sceptic must demonstrate the rational possibility of 
moral discernment and the cognitive process whereby such discernment occurs. While not 
neglecting the purely theological aspects of moral discernment, the theologian must be 
capable of conversing with the moral sceptic on the sceptic’s own terms. 
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In articles 57 to 61 of Veritatis Splendor John Paul II discusses the notion of moral 
conscience. He defines a judgement of conscience as ‘a practical judgement, a judgement 
which makes known what man must do or not do, or which assesses an act already performed 
by him. It is a judgement which applies to a concrete situation the rational conviction that one 
must love and do good and avoid evil.’235 This, John Paul II tells us, is the first principle of 
practical reason and constitutes the very foundation of the natural law. But, he continues, 
‘whereas the natural law discloses the objective and universal demands of the moral good, 
conscience is the application of the law to a particular case; this application of the law thus 
becomes an inner dictate for the individual, a summons to do what is good in this particular 
situation.’236  
John Paul II again draws on St Thomas and his first principle of practical reason, 
‘Good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.’237 The problem with this approach is that 
it fails to take into account something even more fundamental, namely, the first conception of 
the human intellect, which, according to St Thomas, is being: ‘That which the intellect first 
conceives, as best known, and into which it resolves all its conceptions, is being.’238 This 
observation is fundamental to St Thomas’s philosophy and forms the basis of his 
epistemology: ‘Now the first idea met with in intellectual conception is that of an existent, for 
as Aristotle says in order to be known a thing must actually be. This is why existent being is 
the primary and distinctive object of intellect . . .’239 While it may be true to say that good is 
to be done and pursued, and evil avoided, this statement is only truly foundational if the 
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notion of the good is rationally grounded in reality or being. St Thomas grounds the good in 
reality by demonstrating its ‘convertibility’ with being.240     
If one wishes, then, to establish a connection between natural law and conscience, one 
must proceed in three steps. Firstly, the notion of the good must be grounded in reality or 
being. Secondly, having established the reality or being of the good, we are now in a better 
position to ground in reality the precept ‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.’ 
Thirdly, in the judgement of conscience this principle is applied in a particular situation. By 
omitting the vital first step, John Paul II fails to establish a connection between natural law 
and conscience. This is because the principle, ‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
avoided’ is not, as John Paul II suggests, the very foundation of the natural law. At an even 
more foundational level, there is the notion of being, the first conception of the human 
intellect. John Paul II does not discuss this primary notion and its relation to or convertibility 




 John Paul II insists on the importance of metaphysics for moral theological reflection. 
Yet, when it comes to grounding the notions of sin, knowledge, and human freedom in 
reality, he resorts to quoting scripture and the Church’s theological tradition instead of 
serious metaphysical reflection. There is in the works of John Paul II examined here no 
serious engagement with the philosophical questions of the possibility of human knowledge 
and freedom.241 There is no discussion of the notion of being and its primary function in 
metaphysical thought. Because of this failure to practice the kind of philosophical reflection 
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 In this chapter, I have argued that the authors of the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, in their reflections on sin, assume too much belief on the part of their readers. They 
presuppose that the reader accepts the authority of scripture and the Church’s theological 
tradition and consequently they fail to engage with the moral sceptic or determinist. I 
proceeded to argue that the works of Pope John Paul II demonstrate the same approach, 
namely, relying on scripture and tradition. I further argued that John Paul II, despite 
advocating a turn in moral theology to a philosophical ethics which looks to the truth of the 
good, ultimately fails to utilize his own choice of method, namely, that of St Thomas, to 
anywhere close to its maximum potential. Consequently, John Paul II also fails to engage 
with contemporary notions of moral scepticism and determinism. 
 In the next section of this dissertation, I shall examine Bernard Lonergan’s notion of 
sin. I shall argue that this notion of sin, grounded as it is in a critical metaphysics of being, is 
far more effective in terms of communicating with the moral sceptic and the hard determinist. 
  




   
 







PART TWO  
BERNARD LONERGAN’S CONCEPTION OF SIN 










KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM IN INSIGHT’S CONCEPTION OF SIN 
 
The notion of sin in Lonergan’s Insight is supported by a critical metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical framework. While the broader category of ethics is given 
significantly more attention in this work than the category of sin, the notions of the good and 
human freedom are explored in a depth that gives Lonergan’s notion of sin a solid 
philosophical foundation, making it capable of dialoguing with moral scepticism and 
determinism. 
Our account of Lonergan’s ethics will not be exhaustive. In order to provide a solid 
foundation for a theology of sin, it is necessary to examine both the notion of the good and 
the notion of freedom, two notions that Lonergan explored in great detail throughout his 
career. While there is much of Lonergan’s account of ethics that we must omit, there are a 
few key arguments in his Insight that are capable, I shall argue, of providing a solid rational 
foundation for both Lonergan’s notion of sin and for a theology of sin in general.    
 This chapter will be divided into three main sections. In the first we shall treat 
Lonergan’s notion of sin, particularly how his notions of knowledge and human freedom are 
central to his conception of sin. In the second we shall treat Lonergan’s notions of the good 
and moral discernment, particularly the question of the relationship between the good and 
being. Finally, in the third part we shall treat Lonergan’s notion of human freedom, 








1. THE NOTION OF SIN 
This section will be divided into three subsections. In the first we present Lonergan’s 
definition of sin. In the two subsections that follow we shall examine separately the two 
central components of this definition.   
 
1.1. A Definition  
 In Lonergan’s discussion of the notion of God, he provides the following definition of 
sin:  
By basic sin I shall mean the failure of free will to choose a morally obligatory course of 
action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible course of action.242  
He elaborates: 
Thus, basic sin is at the root of the irrational in man’s rational self-consciousness. As 
intelligently and rationally conscious, man grasps and affirms what he ought to do and 
what he ought not to do; but knowing is one thing and doing is another; if he wills, he 
does what he ought; if he wills, he diverts his attention from proposals to do what he 
ought not; but if he fails to will, then the obligatory course of action is not executed; 
again, if he fails to will, his attention remains on illicit proposals; the incompleteness of 
their intelligibility and the incoherence of their apparent reasonableness are disregarded; 
and in this contraction of consciousness, which is the basic sin, there occurs the wrong 
action . . .243 
In what follows, we shall divide Lonergan’s definition into two parts. In the next subsection 
we shall examine the question: What is it that makes a particular course of action ‘morally 
obligatory’? In the subsection that follows we shall examine the precise nature of the ‘failure 
of free will’ to choose this moral obligation.  
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1.2. The Morally Obligatory Course of Action  
 What precisely does it mean to speak of a morally obligatory course of action? What 
is it that makes one course of action morally obligatory and another morally reprehensible? 
Lonergan’s elaboration of his definition of sin, which I quoted above, provides us with a clue: 
‘As intelligently and rationally conscious, man grasps and affirms what he ought to do and 
what he ought not to do; but knowing is one thing and doing is another . . .’ This grasping and 
affirming, this ‘knowing’ is what makes a particular course of action morally obligatory. In 
this subsection we shall examine the question of what precisely it means, according to 
Lonergan, for somebody to ‘know’ something. This question is of course the central one of 
Insight and so cannot be adequately dealt with here. What we shall examine, therefore, is 
what Lonergan terms ‘the form of deductive inference.’ In this examination we shall see 
precisely, if not comprehensively, what Lonergan means by ‘grasping and affirming.’ We 
shall then proceed to ask what exactly it is that the subject grasps and affirms. Finally, we 
shall briefly examine the connection between Lonergan’s understanding of knowledge and 
his ethics.    
 
1.2.1. The Virtually Unconditioned  
In the introduction to the chapter in Insight on reflective understanding, Lonergan 
indicates his intention of attempting to determine what exactly is meant by the sufficiency of 
the evidence for a prospective judgement, or, in other words, what the nature of the evidence 
that allows for an affirmative judgement is. 
There is presupposed a question for reflection, ‘Is it so?’ There follows a judgement, ‘It 




the scales on which evidence is weighed? What weight must evidence have, if one is to 
pronounce a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’?244  
For Lonergan, this pronouncement of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ involves what he terms a ‘virtually 
unconditioned judgement.’ He begins his explanation of this term with a kind of definition: 
To grasp the evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgement is to grasp the 
prospective judgement as virtually unconditioned.245 
He continues by distinguishing between the formally and the virtually unconditioned. The 
former has no conditions, while the latter has conditions that are fulfilled. A virtually 
unconditioned judgement, then, involves three elements: a conditioned, a connection between 
the conditioned and its conditions, and the fulfilment of the conditions. A prospective 
judgement, therefore, will be virtually unconditioned if 1) it is the conditioned, 2) its 
conditions are known, and 3) the conditions are fulfilled. 
 The simple fact that a question for reflection has been presented makes the 
prospective judgement a conditioned, as it requires evidence sufficient for a reasonable 
pronouncement of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no.’ The role of reflective understanding is to meet the 
question for reflection by changing the status of the prospective judgement from that of a 
conditioned to that of a virtually unconditioned. This change occurs as reflective 
understanding grasps the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfilment.  
  Lonergan illustrates this general scheme with a basic syllogism that demonstrates the 
form of deductive inference:  
If A, then B.  
But A.  
Therefore B. 
Or, more concretely: 
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If X is material and alive, X is mortal.  
But men are material and alive. 
Therefore, men are mortal.246 
The conclusion is a conditioned, as it needs to be supported by an argument. The major 
premise connects the conditioned to its conditions by affirming, If A, then B. The minor 
premise presents the fulfilment of the conditions by affirming the prior A. The role of the 
form of deductive inference is to show a conclusion as virtually unconditioned. Reflective 
insight apprehends the pattern, and the one reflecting is rationally compelled to make a 
judgement. 
 
1.2.2. Grasping and Affirming Being 
 The question that was presupposed in Lonergan’s analysis of the form of deductive 
inference, ‘Is it so?’, stems from what he terms ‘the pure desire to know.’ In this subsection 
we shall examine the following question: What is the objective of the pure desire to know? 
We shall begin with a definition of the pure desire to know. 
By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for 
intelligence and for reflection. It is not the verbal utterance of questions. It is not the 
conceptual formulation of questions. It is not any insight or thought. It is not any 
reflective grasp or judgement. It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional 
process from sense to imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgement, 
from judgement to the complete context of correct judgements that is named knowledge. 
The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man.247 
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The objective of this pure desire to know, according to Lonergan, is being. (This is in fact 
how he defines being).248 It follows that being is 1) all that is known, and 2) all that remains 
to be known. Since a complete increment of knowledge happens only in judgement, being is 
‘what is to be known by the totality of true judgements.’249 This totality consists of the 
complete set of answers to the complete set of questions. We do not yet know what these 
answers are and the questions have yet to arise. What is important for Lonergan is not the 
complete set of answers or the complete set of questions, but the fact that ‘there exists a pure 
desire to know, an inquiring and critical spirit, that follows up questions with further 
questions, that heads for some objective which has been named being.’250  
 
1.2.3. Grasping and Affirming the Good 
  Let us return for a moment to a segment from Lonergan’s definition of sin. ‘As 
intelligently and rationally conscious,’ he says, ‘man grasps what he ought to do and what he 
ought not to do.’ In other words, as intelligent and reasonable, human beings grasp what is 
good and what is evil. The desire that motivates this judgement of good or evil is the same as 
that which motivates judgement in matters of fact, namely, the desire to know. There is, 
however, a difference between judgement in matters of fact and judgement in matters of 
action, as Lonergan explains in chapter 18: 
While speculative and factual insights are concerned to lead to knowledge of being, 
practical insights are concerned to lead to the making of being. Their objective is not 
what is but what is to be done. They reveal not the unities and relations of things as they 
are, but the unities and relations of possible courses of action.251 
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Significant in this passage is the connection between being and the good. Practical insights, 
Lonergan says, are concerned to lead to the making of being. Their objective is what is to be 
done, or, in others words, the good. We shall further examine this connection between being 
and the good in the next major section of this chapter.   
 What I have attempted to do in this subsection is to demonstrate the centrality of 
knowledge in Lonergan’s definition of sin. While sin is the failure of free will, this failure is 
only sinful because of the obligatory nature of the proposed course of action. What makes a 
particular course of action morally obligatory, as we have seen, is knowledge. This is not 
simply knowledge of moral codes or of social mores, but knowledge that stems from a 
rational judgement that a proposed course of action is either good or evil. This judgement in 
turn stems from the human person’s nature, which, as we have seen, Lonergan describes as 
‘the inquiring and critical spirit of man.’ 
 The question of whether knowledge of the good or moral discernment is possible 
needs to be examined in greater detail. We shall undertake this examination in the next major 
section of this chapter. For now, let us examine the precise nature of the failure of free will 
that Lonergan speaks of in his definition of sin.    
 
1.3.  
The Failure of Free Will 
 As we have already observed, Lonergan’s definition of sin contains the concept of 
free will and its failure to choose a morally obligatory course of action. In this subsection, we 
shall examine Lonergan’s notion of will, particularly his notion of a prior or antecedent 
willingness. We shall then proceed to examine the distinction he makes between essential and 
effective freedom. Through these examinations we shall be able to proceed to the issue at 




1.3.1. Antecedent Willingness 
 In chapter 18 of Insight, Lonergan examines the notion of will. He divides the will 
into three parts, namely, will, willingness, and willing, corresponding, respectively, to the 
Thomistic division of being into potency, form, and act. He defines will as intellectual or 
spiritual appetite. ‘As capacity for sensitive hunger stands to sensible food, so will stands to 
objects presented by intellect.’252 This is will as potency. There is also the act itself, which is 
willing. However, our primary concern here is that aspect of will that corresponds to form, 
namely, willingness. Lonergan speaks of an ‘habitual inclination’ that consists of the prior 
willingness or unwillingness with which persons are inclined to making certain decisions and 
choices. He provides a concrete illustration of this prior or antecedent willingness: 
Just as a person that has not yet learnt a subject must go through a laborious process to 
acquire mastery, yet, once mastery is acquired, can grasp readily the solution to any 
problem that arises in the field, so too a person that has not acquired willingness needs to 
be persuaded before he will will, yet, once willingness is acquired, leaps to willing 
without any need of persuasion.253 
The lack of antecedent willingness leads to what Lonergan terms ‘moral impotence.’ Before 
exploring this notion, we must examine the distinction he makes between essential and 
effective freedom.  
  
1.3.2. Essential and Effective Freedom 
 Not unusually for Lonergan, he begins his discussion of the distinction between 
essential and effective freedom with a kind of definition: 
The difference between essential and effective freedom is the difference between a 
dynamic structure and its operational range. Man is free essentially inasmuch as possible 
                                                          





courses of action are grasped by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed 
by decision. But man is free effectively to a greater or less extent inasmuch as this 
dynamic structure is open to grasping, motivating, and executing a broad or narrow 
range of otherwise possible courses of action. Thus, one may be essentially but not 
effectively free to give up smoking.254 
He proceeds to list four conditions of effective freedom: 1) external circumstance, 2) the 
subject as sensitive, 3) the subject as intelligent, and 4) the subject as antecedently willing.  
 External circumstance. Whatever one’s external circumstances are, they provide only 
a certain number of possible alternatives and only limited means for effecting the 
enlargement of this number.  
 The subject as sensitive. Lonergan speaks of the limitations that arise from one’s 
psychoneural state. In modern terms this would refer to a person’s mental health, with the 
term ‘neurosis’ being a shortened version of psychoneurosis. In such a state of neurosis, or, as 
Lonergan puts it, when perfect adjustment between the orientations of intellectual and 
psychoneural development is lacking, then ‘the sensitive subject is invaded by anxiety, by 
obsessions, and by other neurotic phenomena that restrict his capacity for effective 
deliberation and choice.’255  
 The subject as intelligent. The greater a person’s practical intelligence is developed, 
according to Lonergan, the broader is the range of possible courses of action he or she can 
grasp and consider. On the other hand, if the person’s practical intelligence is not sufficiently 
developed there will result a narrowing of the range of possible courses of action that will 
presently occur to the person.   
 The subject as antecedently willing. Lonergan explains the problems arising in moral 
decision making when antecedent willingness is lacking: 
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What one does not understand yet, one can learn; but learning takes time, and until that 
time is devoted to learning, otherwise possible courses of action are excluded. Similarly, 
when antecedent willingness is lacking, persuasion can be invoked; but persuasion takes 
time, and until that time is devoted to persuading oneself or to being persuaded by 
others, one remains closed to otherwise possible courses of action.256 
This lack of antecedent willingness, as we shall presently see, results in what Lonergan terms 
‘moral impotence.’ 
 
1.3.3. Moral Impotence  
 Again Lonergan begins with a definition: 
To assert moral impotence is to assert that man’s effective freedom is restricted, not in 
the superficial fashion that results from external circumstance or psychic abnormality, 
but in the profound fashion that follows from incomplete intellectual and volitional 
development.257 
When such development is incomplete, there are practical insights that could be attained if 
only the person would take the time to procure the necessary, preparatory insights. 
Furthermore, there are courses of action that a person would choose if he/she would just take 
the time to persuade him/herself to willingness. There is, then, a divergence between the 
effective freedom that he/she in fact possesses and the theoretical effective freedom that 
he/she would enjoy if it happened that certain conditions were fulfilled. This divergence, 
according to Lonergan, is the measure of one’s moral impotence. He describes moral 
impotence in terms of a problem in the person’s moral development:  
For complete self-development is a long and difficult process. During that process one 
has to live and make decisions in the light of one’s undeveloped intelligence and under 
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the guidance of one’s incomplete willingness. And the less developed one is, the less one 
appreciates the need for development and the less one is willing to take time out for 
one’s intellectual and moral education.258 
The person, then, is powerless to make good choices because of his/her lack of intellectual 
and volitional development. This lack of power is further manifested in his/her inability to 
see just how much he or she needs to further his or her intellectual and moral education. 
 This blindness, however, is not total. As Lonergan puts it: ‘the moral impotence of the 
essentially free subject is neither grasped with perfect clarity nor is it totally unconscious.’259 
He proceeds by providing a kind of verbal diagram in which he describes the person’s moral 
consciousness. 
For if one were to represent a man’s field of freedom as a circular area, then one would 
distinguish a luminous central region in which he was effectively free, a surrounding 
penumbra in which his uneasy conscience keeps suggesting that he could do better if 
only he would make up his mind, and finally an outer shadow to which he barely if ever 
adverts. Further, these areas are not fixed; as he develops, the penumbra penetrates into 
the shadow and the luminous area into the penumbra while, inversely, moral decline is a 
contraction of the luminous area and of the penumbra.260  
As well as the increasing tension between limitation and transcendence illustrated by this 
verbal diagram, consciousness of moral impotence can also, Lonergan tells us, provide 
ambivalent materials for reflection. If the contents of these self-realizations are interpreted 
correctly, they can help a person to discover that his life involves development and that he 
should not be disheartened by his failures. Rather, he should see them as opportunities to gain 
further insight into his personal weaknesses and as an encouragement to try harder. The same 







data, however, can also be seen as proof that it is useless to even try, that what moral codes 
ask is unachievable, and that it is better to just be happy with oneself as one is. 
 To return once again to Lonergan’s definition of sin, we saw that sin is ‘the failure of 
free will to choose a morally obligatory course of action.’ This failure to choose stems from a 
lack of what Lonergan terms ‘antecedent willingness,’ which is one of the central restrictions 
upon one’s effective freedom. The gap between the effective freedom that the person actually 
possesses and the theoretical effective freedom that he/she would enjoy if certain conditions 
were fulfilled is the measure of his/her moral impotence. 
  
1.4. Conclusion 
 While Lonergan’s notion of sin does not draw directly on scripture and the theological 
tradition, it does contain some of the elements of a classical understanding of sin. 
Specifically, the notions of knowledge and freedom are particularly important in Lonergan’s 
understanding of sin. Already we have seen that Lonergan’s notion of sin contains in-depth 
philosophical analyses of moral obligation as knowledge and the notion of moral impotence 
resulting from failure of freedom. There seems to be good potential in Lonergan’s notion of 
sin for dialoguing with the moral sceptic and determinist. Lonergan, however, does much 
more than this. In the sections that follow we shall examine his understanding of how moral 
knowledge is possible through discernment of ‘the good,’ a concept he firmly grounds in the 
notion of being. We shall also further examine his understanding of freedom. While we have 
in this section examined his distinction between essential and effective freedom, we have not 
yet examined his method of demonstrating essential freedom. We shall do this in the third 






2. THE INTRINSIC INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE GOOD  
 In the first section of this dissertation, I argued that the notions of the good in both 
magisterial teaching and theological reflection on sin were inadequate in terms of establishing 
a dialogue with the moral sceptic. Although these approaches to the notion of the good were 
predominantly metaphysical, they were so on a merely superficial level. The authors of the 
various documents examined, I argued, in their discussions of such themes as natural law and 
conscience, failed to establish a substantial link between the notion of being and that of the 
good. Consequently, they failed to establish the possibility of moral discernment or 
knowledge of the good. 
In this section we shall critically examine Lonergan’s notion of the good in Insight, 
particularly how he links it with the notion of being. We seek to determine whether Lonergan 
is more successful than the authors previously examined in his attempt to establish the 
possibility of moral discernment. We begin (1) with a very brief outline of Lonergan’s 
argument. This will provide some necessary background to the argument as well as indicating 
his general method. It will also better situate us for a more in-depth analysis of the argument. 
(2) We proceed by examining the structure of the good in Insight. (3) We then continue with 
an examination of Lonergan’s notions of potential, formal, and actual good; this is the heart 
of his argument for the intrinsic intelligibility of the good. (4) We offer a critique of said 
argument. 
 
2.1. Background and Method   
In Lonergan’s argument for the possibility of knowledge of the good or moral 
discernment, the good is identified with the intelligibility that is intrinsic to being. This 




experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation.’261 Corresponding to these elements 
of human cognition, namely experience, understanding, and judgment, are the ontological 
components of potency, form, and act.  
In chapter 18, in the subsection entitled ‘The Method of Ethics,’ Lonergan speaks of the 
‘parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics.’ 
For just as the dynamic structure of our knowing grounds a metaphysics, so the 
prolongation of that structure into human doing grounds an ethics. Just as the universe of 
proportionate being is a compound of potency, form, and act, because it is to be known 
through experience, understanding, and judgement, so the universe of man’s 
proportionate good is a compound of objects of desire, intelligible orders, and values, 
because the good that man does intelligently and rationally is a manifold in the field of 
experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen.262 
In his argument for the ontology of the good, Lonergan takes the cognitional activities of 
experiencing, understanding, and judging and the corresponding ontological components, 
potency, form, and act and ‘extends’ this heuristic structure to incorporate the good.  
 
2.2. The Structure of the Good in Insight  
 In chapter 18 of Insight, ‘The Possibility of Ethics,’ Lonergan differentiates three 
levels of the good, corresponding to the three levels of cognitional activity that he espouses 
throughout this work: the empirical, the intellectual, and the rational, or, as we have it above, 
the levels of experience, understanding, and judgment.  On a fundamental level, the good is 
conceived as the object of desire which, when acquired, feels pleasant or enjoyable or 
satisfying. However, as well as feelings of desire and pleasure, the human being, in equal 
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measure, feels aversion and suffering. On the basic level of experience, then, the good is 
paired with its antithesis, the bad. 
 Lonergan proceeds to discuss a human desire that is unique, namely, the detached, 
disinterested, unrestricted desire to know that we examined in the previous section of this 
chapter. As with other desires, our desire to know can be satisfied. Unlike other desire, 
however, it requires more than satisfaction. It is not content with the mere satisfaction of 
attaining an insight; rather, it moves beyond this satisfaction to ask whether or not the insight 
is correct. The movement from understanding, which is on the second of the three levels of 
cognitional activity in Insight, to the third level of judging whether or not one’s 
understanding is correct, brings us into the realm of objectivity, or to use specifically 
Lonerganian terms, the realm of the virtually unconditioned. The desire to know seeks not 
just insight but correct judgement. ‘It is a desire to know and its immanent criterion is the 
attainment of an unconditioned that, by the fact that it is unconditioned, is independent of the 
individual’s likes and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious thinking.’263  
Through the knowledge generated by this desire, according to Lonergan, there is 
revealed a second sense in which the good can be understood. Apart from the good that is 
mere object of desire, there is the good of order, which includes the polity, the economy, and 
the family as institution. The good of order is not the object of any one desire; rather it is 
related to individual desires as system is related to systematized, or as universal condition is 
related to particulars that are conditioned. 
   The third aspect of the good is value. The good of order is connected, not only with 
the multiple manifestations of natural longings and repulsions which it organises, but also 
with a third type of good which arises on the level of reflection and judgement, of 
deliberation and choice. The desires and aversions of the senses, like experiential data, 
                                                          




precede questions and insights, reflections and judgements. The good of order, on the other 
hand, is essentially ‘a formal intelligibility that is to be discovered only by raising questions, 
grasped only through accumulating insights, formulated only in conceptions.’264 
Nevertheless, while the good of order is located completely outside the area of the sensitive 
appetites, it is in itself subject to human devotion, or, in other words, a value. As Lonergan 
explains: 
Individualism and socialism are neither food nor drink, neither clothes nor shelter, 
neither health nor wealth. They are constructions of human intelligence, possible 
systems for ordering the satisfaction of human desires. Still, men can embrace one 
system and reject others. They can do so with all the ardour of their being, though the 
issue regard neither their own individual advantage nor that of their relatives, friends, 
acquaintances, countrymen.265 
The fact that human beings can be so devoted to such systems is, for Lonergan, not 
surprising. For human intelligence, he says, is practical as well as speculative. It is not 
satisfied to work out the unities and correlations in things as they are; it is also continually 
observing to discover the possibilities that bring to light things as they could be. The 
detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know ‘grasps intelligently and affirms 
reasonably not only the facts of the universe of being but also its practical possibilities. Such 
possibilities include intelligent transformations not only of the environment in which man 
lives but also of man’s own spontaneous living.’266 Such spontaneous living, Lonergan 
argues, displays ‘an otherwise coincidental manifold [i.e., series of events unexplainable by 
classical laws267] into which man can introduce a higher system by his own understanding of 
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himself and his own deliberate choices.’268 It is in this way that the detached and disinterested 
desire to know broadens its area of influence from cognitional activities through knowledge 
to intentional human acts. This, for Lonergan, is how ‘the empirically, intelligently, rationally 
conscious subject of self-affirmation [who affirms, “I am a knower,”269] becomes a morally 
self-conscious subject.’270 
 According to Lonergan, it is in rational, moral self-consciousness that the good as 
value comes to light. He offers the following definition of value: ‘the value is the good as the 
possible object of rational choice.’271 He proceeds to make a tri-fold division of values. (1) 
Values are true if the possible choice is rational; they are false if the possibility of the choice 
is the product of what he terms a ‘flight from self-consciousness’ – this occurs when one 
refuses insights into his or her own moral failings. They are also false if the possibility of the 
choice is the product of rationalization, when, as Lonergan puts it: ‘inconsistency between 
knowing and doing can be removed by revising one’s knowing into harmony with one’s 
doing,’272 or from moral renunciation, as when one acknowledges one’s failings but gives up 
hope in the possibility of change. (2) Lonergan distinguishes between what he terms terminal 
and originating values. Values are terminal insofar as they are objects for possible choices; 
they are originating when through our choices there occurs a transformation in our habitual 
willingness – that is, our willingness to act without the need for persuasion – and our 
effective orientation in the universe. (3) Values are actual if they have been implemented 
already; they are in process if they are in the course of being realized; finally, they are in 
prospect if they are merely being deliberated upon.  
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2.3. Potential, Formal, and Actual Good 
 Our examination of the good has thus far focused on the human good, that is, with 
objects of desire, intelligible orders, terminal and originating values. However, because of the 
close relations between metaphysics and ethics that we briefly examined in 2.1, Lonergan 
suggests that ‘it should be possible to generalize this notion and, indeed, to conceive the good 
as identical with the intelligibility that is intrinsic to being.’273 
 Lonergan’s method of generalizing the notion of the good is to speak of the good in 
terms of the three-fold division of being into potency, form, and act. So, rather than speaking 
of objects of desire, the intelligible orders within which these desires are fulfilled, and the 
terminal and originating values involved in deciding upon these orders and their components, 
Lonergan speaks instead of a potential, formal, and actual good. He identifies the potential 
good with potential intelligibility (that which is to be known by experience), the formal good 
with formal intelligibility (that which is to be known by intelligent grasp), and the actual 
good with actual intelligibilities (that which is to be known by reasonable affirmation).  
 Lonergan argues that such a generalization of the notion of the good is justifiable, as it 
is already implicit in the narrower notion, that is, in the notion of the good in purely human 
terms. Objects of desire, he says, are manifold, ‘but they are not an isolated manifold. They 
are existents and events that in their concrete possibility and in their realization are bound 
inextricably through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the 
universe of proportionate being.’274 In other words, the many objects of desire, as existing 
and occurring, are part of the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being; 
consequently they cannot be separated from every other thing that exists and occurs in our 
universe. If objects of desire, Lonergan argues, are examples of the good because of the 
pleasures they give, then the remainder of the manifold of existents and events are also good, 
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because desires are fulfilled only in the concrete universe and not in a fantasy world. In other 
words, objects of desire are produced as a result of a total manifold of existents and 
occurrences that constitute not some ideal world, but the actual world in which we live. 
  Lonergan proceeds to apply the same argument to humanly devised social orders. For 
Lonergan, the intelligible orders that human beings invent, implement, adjust, and improve, 
are merely further exploitations of pre-human intelligible orders.275 Patrick H. Byrne, in his 
paper, ‘The Goodness of Being in Lonergan’s Insight,’ explains this rather complex argument 
quite well: 
In advancing his argument, Lonergan points out that neither objects of desire nor human 
social orders (goods of order) are abstract, isolated monads. Rather, concretely and 
actually, all objects of desire and all human orders are what they are by virtue of the 
events, natural laws, and statistical frequencies that condition and underpin their 
actuality. In their actuality, they are inextricably bound up with both the human and pre-
human schemes of recurrence and conditioning events that elevate their mere intelligible 
possibilities into virtually unconditioned realities.276 
All objects of desire and all human orders, then, come about not by necessity but contingently 
through a process that Lonergan terms ‘emergent probability,’ or, to repeat a section of the 
above quotation, ‘all objects of desire and all human orders are what they are by virtue of the 
events, natural laws, and statistical frequencies that condition and underpin their actuality.’ 
As we have seen, for Lonergan, objects of desire, while manifold, are not an isolated 
manifold but are, rather, actualities and occurrences that in their actual possibility and in their 
fulfilment are inseparably bound through natural laws and statistical frequencies with the 
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complete manifold of proportionate being. Similarly, humanly devised social orders are 
inextricably bound to all human orders that emerge in the world as a result of the same 
natural laws and statistical frequencies, so that we cannot argue that some orders are good 
and others bad. As Lonergan puts it: ‘if the intelligible orders of human invention are a good 
because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, then so also are the intelligible 
orders that underlie, condition, precede, and include man’s invention.’277      
In the final part of this argument, Lonergan turns again to the notion of value. 
Intelligible orders and their contents as possible objects of rational choice, he says, are 
values. However, the universal order of emergent probability conditions and penetrates, 
corrects and develops every particular order. So, he argues, ‘rational self-consciousness 
cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject 
the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent.’278 And so, since human beings 
are involved in choosing and since every consistent choice is, at least tacitly, a choice of 
universal order, the actualization of universal order is a true value. 
Lonergan draws the reader’s attention to the fact that the third part of the argument 
includes the other two. For, he says, ‘the actual good of value presupposes the formal good of 
order, and the formal good of order presupposes the potential good of a manifold to be 
ordered.’279 Furthermore, the actualization of universal order is the actualization of all 
existents and all events. Universal order includes all intelligibilities as its component parts, 
and universal order assumes all manifolds that are ordered or to be ordered. So, Lonergan 
concludes, ‘the good is identified with the intelligibility intrinsic to being.’280 Or, in other 
words, the good is identified with what is to be known by experience, intelligent grasp, and 
reasonable affirmation. This includes potential, formal, and actual good, or the total manifold 
                                                          
277 Lonergan, Insight, 605. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid., 




of proportionate being. So the good is identified with the total universe of proportionate 
being.  
 Again, Byrne is quite helpful in breaking down this complex argument. Lonergan, he 
says, ‘is arguing that if realizing the intelligibility embodied in any reflective human choice is 
good, then the whole, actual intelligibility of proportionate being (which underlies and 
conditions the realization of that choice) is also good.’281 Byrne continues his analysis by 
suggesting that Lonergan is arguing that all human choices are in reality the choice of a ‘good 
wholeness – the wholeness of the “universal order,” the emergent probability of proportionate 
being.’282 Human consciousness is explicitly and thematically fixed on a part of the whole, 
the part revealed in one’s practical insight, practical reflection, and deliberate choosing. In 
reality, however, ‘one is choosing that part as part of a whole goodness.’283 Without this 
wholeness, the part chosen, i.e., the course of action, would not be actual, substantial 
goodness at all. 
 This argument would seem to imply that the entirety of the universal order is good, 
and so it would seem to deny the existence of evil in the world. Lonergan follows up his 
argument for the identification of the good with being by denying this implication. 
As the identification of the good with being in no manner denies or attempts to minimize 
pain or suffering, so it has not the slightest implication of a denial of unordered 
manifolds, of disorder, or of false values. For the middle term in the identification of the 
good with being is intelligibility.284 
The intelligibility of the universe, Lonergan argues, is to be grasped not by any one method 
but by a fourfold series of classical and genetic, statistical and dialectical methods. We shall 
examine briefly just one of these methods, the statistical, as it relates to the present argument, 
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in order to see just what Lonergan is getting at here. Insofar as the intelligibility of this 
universe is statistical, he argues, its goodness is contained potentially in unordered manifolds, 
formally in the effective probability of the emergence of order, and actually in the eventual 
emergence of order. I think what Lonergan is getting at here is the Thomistic notion that 
everything that has an essence is, by virtue of that fact, a good thing, and that evil of itself has 
no essence.285 This is why Lonergan places ‘unordered manifolds’ in the realm of the 
potential good. What he is saying is that the order that eventually emerges in the universe is 
actually good, and that evil results from the fact that in many areas of life order has not yet 
emerged. So, Lonergan is not denying the existence of evil in the world; rather he is 
suggesting that the nature of evil is that of privation of the good or lack of order.   
  To summarize: objects of desire, intelligible orders, and values are existents and 
events that come about through a universal process that Lonergan calls emergent probability. 
These things cannot be extricated from the universal order which conditions and underlies 
them. Consequently, every choice that human beings make is at least implicitly a choice of a 
whole goodness. To repeat a section of Lonergan’s argument: ‘rational consciousness cannot 
consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject the 
whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent.’286 The value, as the possible object 
of rational choice, cannot be isolated from the total manifold of the proportionate universe. 
The good, in other words, cannot be isolated from being, and so Lonergan concludes that ‘the 
good is identified with the intelligibility intrinsic to being.’287 Lonergan does not deny the 
existence of evil in the world; rather he suggests that the nature of evil is that of privation of 
the good or lack of order, or to use his actual terminology, evil lies in the area of ‘unordered 
manifolds, disorder, and false values.’  
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 Our critique of Lonergan’s argument will be divided into two sections. In the first, we 
shall take a closer look at Byrne’s paper, ‘The Goodness of Being in Lonergan’s Insight.’ 
This paper provides a good critical evaluation of Lonergan’s argument. Secondly, we shall 
compare Lonergan’s argument with those of the magisterium and the theologians that we 
examined in the first two chapters. 
 
2.4.1. Patrick H. Byrne’s Critique of Lonergan’s Argument 
 Byrne is critical of the structuring of Lonergan’s argument for the intrinsic 
intelligibility of the good. Because of this structure, there arise a number of problems with 
Lonergan’s argument, which we shall presently examine. He suggests that the way that 
Lonergan develops his argument does not adhere to the plan that he set out at the beginning 
of Insight. 
. . . it is clear that he intended his approach to the issues of being and intelligibility to 
provide a model for how to proceed methodically with regard to questions regarding the 
good. 
Unfortunately, in his chapter on ethics Lonergan does not actually follow this 
procedure. In fact, he completely inverts the order that he follows in his philosophy of 
being.288 
According to Byrne, despite the problems in Lonergan’s exposition, all of the elements for a 
convincing argument are contained in various passages from Insight. Therefore, rather than 
attempting to supplement Lonergan’s argument with his own ideas, he attempts instead a 
reconstruction of the argument based on Lonergan’s ideas and on Lonergan’s proposed 
methodology. 
                                                          




 The first problem that arises from the structuring of Lonergan’s argument is the way 
in which he extends the notion of the good to include humanly devised orders. This 
extension, according to Byrne, ‘is undertaken without philosophical argument or 
justification.’289 He points out that if we consider not only Kant’s but also Plato’s criticisms 
of desires in light of the good, even Lonergan’s identifying of the good with objects of desire 
is philosophically problematic.290 He asks therefore: ‘why should human orders, or even the 
objects of human desire, be called “good”?’291 The answer to this question, as we have seen, 
is that ‘all objects of desire and all human orders are what they are by virtue of the events, 
natural laws, and statistical frequencies that condition and underpin their actuality.’ This 
answer is contained in Lonergan’s exposition and indeed in Byrne’s own account of 
Lonergan’s exposition. So what, we might ask, is the problem? The problem, for Byrne, is in 
the sequence of Lonergan’s argument. The idea that the good can be identified with human 
social orders is introduced long before his argument for the ontology of the good (in chapter 
7, ‘Common Sense as Object,’ 11 chapters prior to his argument for the ontology of the 
good). Byrne’s problem, as I understand it, is that the reader must take Lonergan at his word 
that the good can be identified with human orders for too long before he or she is eventually 
offered any real philosophical support for this idea. Byrne suggests, as we have seen, that a 
restructuring of Lonergan’s argument based on sections of Insight and Lonergan’s own 
suggested methodology can solve this difficulty.  
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 The second problem is that Lonergan’s argument ‘depends upon certain unarticulated 
and unexamined assumptions about rational choice and the compound structure of human 
knowing and doing – namely, that the actualities which they realize are indeed good.’292 Or, 
to put it another way, proportionate being is good as it conditions the course of action 
designated ‘good.’ But why, Byrne asks, should a course of action arrived at in this way be 
considered good? Again, he recognises that the elements of a solution to this problem are 
contained within Insight, but again he is critical of Lonergan’s structuring of the argument. 
The main exposition of the compound structure of knowing and doing, he points out, is found 
in the section ‘The Notion of Freedom.’ The following is Lonergan’s own brief recapitulation 
of this exposition found in the subsection ‘Freedom.’  
In the coincidental manifolds of sensible presentations, practical insights grasp possible 
courses of action that are examined by reflection, decided upon by acts of willing, and 
thereby either are or are not realized in the underlying sensitive flow. In the process there 
is to be discerned the emergence of elements of higher integration. For the higher 
integration effected on the level of human living consists of sets of courses of action, and 
these actions emerge inasmuch as they are understood by intelligent consciousness, 
evaluated by rational consciousness, and willed by rational self-consciousness.293 
The problem with this exposition, according to Byrne, is that it comes after his argument for 
the ontology of the good or the intrinsic intelligibility of the good. Even then, he says, 
Lonergan does not offer sufficient detail on this structure: 
Lonergan’s actual discussions [in the section ‘The Notion of Freedom’] are not entirely 
helpful in arriving at a full understanding of this compound structure. In that section he 
does not treat these activities [experiencing, practical insight, deciding, and doing] or 
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their structural relationships with the same care and thoroughness that characterizes his 
numerous renditions of cognitional structure.294 
Byrne offers what he argues is a more lucid reconstruction of the compound structure of 
knowing and doing than Lonergan’s, but which he says ‘is at least consistent with his text and 
seems to be well supported by the data of consciousness of a subject immersed in the 
practical and ethical reflection about doing the right thing.’295 
 In conclusion, Byrne is critical of the structure of Lonergan’s argument for the 
intrinsic intelligibility of the good. He makes a number of interesting observations regarding 
the problems that arise from the sequence of Lonergan’s argument, namely certain 
presuppositions regarding the identifying of the good with human orders and certain 
‘unarticulated and unexamined assumptions’ about the compound structure of knowing and 
doing. However, while Byrne is critical of the structure of Lonergan’s argument, he is not at 
all critical of the content. The elements, he suggests, of a cogent argument for the intrinsic 
intelligibility of the good are contained within Insight; it is a matter of reconstructing the 
argument using these elements. So, while there may be some lack of clarity in Lonergan’s 
argument, due to its structuring, the argument, it seems, ultimately holds together. 
 
2.4.2. Lonergan’s Argument Compared to Contemporary Theological Discussion of the Good 
 In the first section of this dissertation, we examined the notions of the good in 
contemporary theological reflection and magisterial teaching. A recurring theme in the 
critical sections of these examinations was how the various authors failed to establish the 
synderesis as foundational to ethics because they failed to solidly ground the notion of the 
good. In fact, this theme occurs in our critique of all of the theologians examined, including 
John Paul II and the Catechism. In this section, we shall examine Lonergan’s argument for 
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the intrinsic intelligibility of the good to see whether it can provide a more solid foundation 
for the synderesis than that of the theologians we have already examined. 
 Let us begin with a reiteration of the synderesis: the good is to be done, and evil 
avoided. This precept is often considered self-evident, and on a superficial glance it does 
seem to be so. What sane person would deny that the good is to be done, and evil avoided? 
However, as we observed in the first section of this dissertation, what is not self-evident is the 
fact that the good has a foundation in reality, that, for example, it is not just a matter of the 
particular prejudices of the person or group that belongs to a particular time and culture. So 
while nobody would deny that the good is to be done, there are those who would argue that 
the good should be done, but would ask: How do we discern what is good, and is such 
discernment in fact possible? Is the good not just relative to time and place?296  
 Lonergan’s argument for the intrinsic intelligibility of the good has significant 
implications for ethics in general and for the notion of synderesis in particular. As the notion 
of ‘good’ (and its opposite ‘evil’) is central to the synderesis, a solid grounding of this notion 
in reality or being gives the synderesis a power that it lacks without this grounding.  
Let us examine the questions just posed regarding the possibility of moral 
discernment. 1) Is the good not just relative to time and place? Lonergan’s argument provides 
a direct antithesis to moral relativism by presenting a vision of the good that is universal and 
objective. It is rooted in his notion of ‘emergent probability’ which speaks of classical and 
statistical laws that are independent of time, place, and culture. 2) Is moral discernment 
possible, and if so, how is it possible? In Lonergan’s treatment of the good in Insight, he not 
only provides an argument for the ontology of the good, he also gives an account of the 
cognitive processes by which human beings discern the good. In the previous subsection 
(2.5.1) we briefly examined the ‘compound structure of knowing and doing’ in which 
                                                          
296 Such questions pertain to what is called ‘moral relativism,’ which is a form of moral scepticism. We shall 




Lonergan explains how human beings arrive at moral action through grasping possible 
courses of action contained in the coincidental manifold of sensible presentations, reflectively 
examining these possible courses of action, and eventually deciding upon these actions 
through the use of their will. While Byrne has argued that Lonergan’s account of this 
structure is not as detailed and nuanced as his numerous accounts of cognitional structure, 
still at least Lonergan provides some approximation of the process whereby human beings 
discern the good that does not depend on the religious notion of conscience, and is therefore 
capable of convincing the moral sceptic.    
 We may return for a moment to the synderesis: the good is to be done, and evil 
avoided. Lonergan has provided us with a solid grounding of the good in reality or being, 
thus answering the vital question: Is the good not just relative to time and place? Lonergan 
has also provided an answer to those who would ask how discernment of the good is possible. 
Thus far, however, we have only dealt with the first part of the synderesis, ‘the good is to be 
done.’ There remains to be dealt with the second part, ‘evil is to be avoided.’ How can 
Lonergan’s treatment of the notion of the good help us in this regard? 
 An immediate difficulty that comes to mind is Lonergan’s (and Aquinas’s) notion that 
evil of itself has no essence. How do we avoid something that has no substantial reality? The 
answer to this question lies in Lonergan’s understanding of sin. We shall briefly examine 
three ways of sinning which we mentioned earlier in this chapter (2.2), namely, the flight 
from self-consciousness, rationalization, and moral renunciation. 
 The Flight from Self-consciousness. The flight from self-consciousness occurs when 
one refuses insights into his or her own moral failings. Such a refusal of insights is evil in the 
sense that Lonergan understands it, as it does not consist in anything substantial; rather the 
refusal results in a lack of self-knowledge which in turn results in immoral behaviour. 




darker side head on. The evil to be avoided, in other words, is the refusal to face the light. 
The solution is to avoid our own avoidance.   
 Rationalization. This occurs, as we have seen, when, as Lonergan puts it: 
Inconsistency between knowing and doing is removed by revising one’s knowing into 
harmony with one’s doing. Such rationalization is related to the flight from self-
consciousness insofar as it is a refusal of insight into the true nature of a possible course of 
action for the purpose of behaving badly with a clear conscience. This again conforms to 
Lonergan’s understanding of evil as having no essence. The solution, again implicit in 
Lonergan, is to avoid rationalization, to avoid our own avoidance of truths that do not suit our 
personal desires for superficial fulfilment.     
 Moral Renunciation. This occurs, as we have seen, when one acknowledges one’s 
failings but gives up hope that one can ever change. Again, moral renunciation constitutes a 
refusal of insight and therefore conforms to Lonergan’s understanding of evil as lacking 
essence. And again the solution is to avoid this avoidance of insight by accepting the 
possibility of change even if this change seems impossible.  
 In conclusion, Lonergan’s treatment of the good in Insight provides us with a solid 
foundation for the synderesis, by presenting a cogent argument for the ontology of the good 
as well as an account of the cognitive processes by which human beings discern the good. He 
also provides an account of the nature of evil, the various forms it can take in people’s 
consciousness, and, implicitly, the ways that we may avoid these evils. Lonergan presents a 
notion of the good that, in contrast to magisterial and theological reflection on sin, not only 
alludes to metaphysics but utilizes this metaphysics to solidly ground the notion of the good 
in reality. Because of its scientific and philosophical nature, this approach to the notion of the 




 We have argued that Lonergan’s approach to the notion of the good in Insight 
establishes the possibility of an objective moral order and the human being’s capacity to 
apprehend this order. The question remains: Even if human beings are capable of moral 
discernment, are they in fact free to carry out the action that they have deemed ‘good’ or 
‘right’?  
  
3. LONERGAN’S NOTION OF HUMAN FREEDOM IN INSIGHT 
 In the first two chapters of this dissertation, we examined the notion of human 
freedom in both magisterial teaching and fundamental moral theology. I argued that the fact 
of human freedom was often presupposed rather than deduced systematically, and that the 
arguments for human freedom usually relied heavily on scripture and theological tradition. I 
also argued that this method of argumentation was ineffective in terms of dialoguing with 
determinism. 
 In this section, we shall examine Lonergan’s notion of human freedom in Insight. 
Firstly, we shall examine Lonergan’s notion of ‘statistical residues.’ The implication of the 
existence of statistical residues is that events cannot be deduced systematically using a 
deductive method. In other words, the existence of statistical residues suggests that hard 
determinism is wrong. Secondly, we shall examine three of Lonergan’s arguments for the 
contingency of the will. Through these examinations we seek to ascertain whether he is any 
more successful in propounding a notion of human freedom that is more effective in terms of 
dialoguing with determinism.  
 
3.1. Statistical Residues 
 In Insight’s account of human freedom, Lonergan examines the significance of what 




which deals with the rules that govern scientific inquiry. In dealing with the question of the 
relationship between abstract systems of classical laws and the particular cases to which these 
laws can be applied, he asks whether the manifold of particular cases can be cast into an 
ordered sequence. The implication of an affirmative answer is that knowledge of a few 
carefully chosen particular cases would be enough to turn mastery of classical laws into a 
scientific understanding of the universe. The implication of a negative answer, however, is 
that classical laws can be implemented only in a limited range of particular cases, so that new 
methods will be required if we are to attain understanding of the concrete universe as a 
whole. 
 Lonergan explains that schemes of recurrence such as our planetary system, which 
displays such an ordered sequence of particular cases, are many in both number and kind. 
However, he argues, each scheme of recurrence presupposes that materials are suitably 
grouped together, a grouping together not brought about by that scheme, and that each 
scheme subsists only as long as external disrupting influences do not occur. The periodicity 
of the planetary system, he argues, does not explain its origin; nor can it guarantee its 
survival. Furthermore, there does not appear to exist a universal scheme that regulates the 
coming into being and continuance of the schemes that we know. Lonergan concludes, 
therefore, that the manifold of particular cases cannot be cast into an ordered sequence. He 
summarizes his argument as follows: 
There does not exist a single ordered sequence that embraces the totality of particular 
cases through which abstract system might be applied to the concrete universe. In other 
words, though all events are linked to one another by law, still the laws reveal only the 
abstract component in concrete relations; the further concrete component, though 
mastered by insight into particular cases, is involved in the empirical residue from which 




a residue, left over after classical method has been applied, and it calls for the 
implementation of statistical method.297 
The significance of statistical residues in general is that they indicate the necessity of 
employing not just classical but also statistical method in our efforts to understand the 
concrete universe in its entirety.  
In the chapter on ethics, under the heading, ‘The Notion of Freedom,’ Lonergan 
demonstrates the relevance of the existence of statistical residues to the notion of human 
freedom. He begins with a summary of the argument he presented earlier. 
While any physical event, Z, is implicit in a spatially and temporally scattered set of 
antecedents, P,Q,R, . . . , none the less this implication does not admit systematic 
formulation. For the implication is constituted by the combination of a major and a 
minor premise; and while the major premise resides in laws and systematic unifications 
of laws, the minor premise lies in the concrete pattern of a diverging series of conditions 
that cannot be determined systematically.298   
The objective significance of statistical laws, according to Lonergan, is that in general 
physical events cannot be predicted by using a deductive method. However, he continues, the 
 existence of statistical residues brings with it the possibility of higher integrations. The 
sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology can operate independently because 
on each earlier level of systematization there exist statistical residues that constitute the 
merely coincidental manifolds to be systematically organized on the next level. It follows that 
higher laws and higher schemes of recurrence cannot be deduced from lower laws and lower 
schemes of recurrence, as the higher is employed in regulating what the lower leaves as 
merely coincidental. Lonergan explains this in chapter 14, ‘Elements of Metaphysics’: 
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Chemical elements and compounds are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental 
manifolds of subatomic events; organisms are higher integrations of otherwise 
coincidental manifolds of chemical processes; sensitive consciousness is a higher 
integration of otherwise coincidental manifolds of changes in neural tissues; and 
accumulating insights are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of 
images or of data.299 
So, chemical laws cannot be deduced from physical laws, nor biological laws from chemical 
or physical laws, nor psychological laws from biological or chemical or physical laws, 
because each of these areas of scientific enquiry is separate from the others. They are separate 
because each successive area of enquiry deals with purely coincidental phenomena that 
cannot be explained in terms of the lower laws or schemes of recurrence. Furthermore, 
Lonergan continues, since statistical residues exist on every level, it follows that events on 
any given level cannot be deduced systematically by uniting all the laws and all the schemes 
of recurrence of that and of all previous levels.  
 The significance of the canon of statistical residues is not that it indicates that our 
choices are free. Rather ‘its significance lies in the fact that it makes possible an account of 
the autonomy of the successive departments of science, that this autonomy excludes a 
determinism of the higher by the lower, and that the canon of statistical residues itself 
excludes a deductive determinism either in the lower or the higher.’300 Lonergan proceeds to 
make the following statement, which has important implications for this dissertation: 
‘Undoubtedly, these exclusions make it far easier to dispose of arguments against the 
possibility of freedom, and they narrow down the field in which impediments to freedom can 
be found.’301 In other words, the autonomy of the various sciences excludes the possibility of 
an exclusively deductive method of predicting events, including human actions. The broader 
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approach suggested by Lonergan is capable of combating deterministic arguments against the 
possibility of human freedom. We shall test this assertion in the final section of this 
dissertation when we examine a deterministic argument and how we might use categories 
from Lonergan to respond to this argument.  
 A comprehensive account of freedom, Lonergan tells us, must take into account more 
than just the above-mentioned exclusions, as they are, he says, ‘only exclusions.’ It also 
involves a positive account of freedom that examines the notion of will. In the following 
subsections, then, we shall examine three of Lonergan’s arguments for the freedom of the 
will. 
 
3.2. The Contingence of Acts of the Will 
 It is possible, Lonergan claims, for practical reflection to arrive with certainty at the 
conclusion that a recommended course of action is imperative, that I either decide in favour 
of the recommendation or, alternatively, that I relinquish consistency between my knowing 
and my doing. In these situations it seems that ‘the emergence of an obligation is the 
emergence of a rational necessity in rational consciousness.’302 I cannot stop questions for 
reflection from emerging; however, once they emerge, I cannot put to one side the insistence 
of my rationality that I acquiesce only if I grasp the virtually unconditioned. Furthermore, 
once I determine that I should act in a fixed manner, that to do otherwise would be 
unreasonable, then my reasonableness is beholden to the act by ‘a link of necessity.’303 This, 
according to Lonergan, is what is meant by the term ‘obligation.’ 
It remains, however, that we can fail to carry out our known obligations, that, as 
Lonergan puts it, ‘the iron link of necessity can prove to be a wisp of straw.’304 How, he asks, 
can this be? How is it that what seems to be necessity turns out to be contingence? The 
                                                          






answer resides in ‘the enlarging transformation of consciousness.’305 The rationality that lays 
a duty or obligation is not conditioned internally by an act of will. The rationality that 
executes a duty is conditioned internally by the occurrence of a reasonable act of will. In 
other words, the rational subject as putting a duty upon himself is merely a knower; he is 
rational insofar as he does not permit other desire to get in the way of the unfolding of the 
detached and disinterested desire to know. The rational subject as executing a duty, however, 
is not just a knower but also a doer; his rationality lies not merely in excluding interference 
with cognitional process but also in ‘extending the rationality of his knowing into the field of 
doing.’306 Such extension, however, does not come about simply because one knows one’s 
duties or obligations. Rather, it happens just insofar as one wills to fulfil one’s obligation. 
How exactly, then, does necessity turn out to be contingence? Clearly the necessity 
itself has not changed, but there has occurred a change in the context, as now rational 
consciousness is being changed into rational self-consciousness. That which in the context of 
rational consciousness is a rational necessity becomes, in the context of rational self-
consciousness, a rational exigence. This brings us to the crux of Lonergan’s argument for the 
contingence of the act of will. In the following two sentences he sums up quite neatly the 
relationship between knowledge and action, particularly the argument that the former does 
not necessitate the latter:   
If a proposed action is obligatory, then one cannot be a rational knower and deny the 
obligation, and one cannot be a rational doer and not fulfil the obligation. But one can be 
a rational knower without an act of willing, and one cannot be a rational doer without an 
act of willing.307  
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It is, he says, ‘the addition of the further constitutive requirement of an act of will’308 that 
indicates the movement from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness, and 
changes what is rational necessity in the area of knowledge into rational exigence in the 
larger area of both knowledge and action. 
 
3.3. The Contingence of Actuality 
 Actuality, according to Lonergan, is known principally by comprehending the 
virtually unconditioned, that is, ‘the conditioned that happens to have its conditions 
fulfilled.’309 Because it is unconditioned, he tells us, it has a high rating in the area of 
intelligibility. Still, he continues, it is only coincidental that it has its conditions fulfilled, and 
so it is merely a coincidence that it is an unconditioned. Although, he says, it is 
unconditioned, it is also contingent. And this contingence appears in 1) in its being, 2) in its 
being known, and 3) in its being willed. 
1) It is evident in its being. 
For actuality as act is existence or occurrence, and actuality as of the actuated supposes 
at least existence and also at times occurrence. But there is no systematic deduction of 
existence or occurrence. The most that understanding can do is set up ideal frequencies 
from which actual frequencies of existence and occurrence do not diverge 
systematically. But actual frequencies can and do diverge non-systematically from the 
ideal, and so in every instance actuality is just what happens to be.310  
Actuality cannot, then, be systematically deduced. The implications of this for ethics, is that 
the actuality that comes about through human action cannot be systematically deduced. 
Furthermore, human actions themselves, as actually occurring events, cannot be deduced 
systematically. 
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2) Again, Lonergan continues, contingence is evident in actuality as known. Actuality 
is known by comprehending the virtually unconditioned, and the virtually unconditioned can 
be comprehended only if realization of its conditions happens to be given. And the realization 
is never more than what happens, for it resides in the appearance of relevant data, and the 
appearance of data, like all appearance or occurrence, is contingent. For it is merely 
coincidental that I exist, or that I experience the world in a particular manner, etc. 
3) Lonergan concludes by arguing that the possible courses of action created by 
human intelligence, impelled by reason, and carried out by willing, are contingent in their 
actuality. For the insights, he says, ‘that reveal possible courses of action also reveal that they 
are not necessities but mere possibilities in need of reflective evaluation. Reflective 
evaluation in turn brings to light not what must be so but merely what for such and such 
reasons may be chosen or rejected.’311 Finally, even when reflective evaluation reveals that 
only one course of action is the reasonable thing to do, there still is required, Lonergan 
argues, ‘the reasonableness of actual willing.’312 However, he continues, ‘the reasonableness 
of human acts of will is not a natural endowment but an ever uncertain personal 
achievement.’313 There is, then, a third and final contingence to the actuality of courses of 
action. This brings us to the crux of Lonergan’s argument. In particular, he says,  
one should note the fallacy in every argument from determinate knowing to determinate 
willing. For every argument of that type must postulate a conformity between knowing 
and willing. But such conformity exists only when in fact willing is actually reasonable. 
Hence, to deduce the determinate act of will one must postulate the conformity; and to 
verify the postulate one must already have the determinate willing that one is out to 
demonstrate.314 
                                                          







However, this determinate willing is, as we have just seen, ‘not a natural endowment but an 
ever uncertain personal achievement.’ The fallacy in the argument from determinate knowing 
to determinate willing can be noticed simply by observing that we, as human beings, do not 
always do what we know we should; that when we do what we know we should, we feel it as 
a success, or as a growth in personal development.     
 
3.4. The Spiritual Nature of the Act of Will 
 In 3.2 we looked at the contingence of the act of will. Specifically, we examined 
Lonergan’s question, ‘How does necessity turn out to be contingence?’ We concluded that it 
is the act of will that constitutes the movement from what is merely rational necessity on the 
level of knowing, to rational exigence on the level of both knowing and doing. In this 
subsection, we shall examine further the nature of the act of will. 
Intelligibility, Lonergan tells us, is intrinsic to being. It is either spiritual, i.e., an 
intelligibility that is also intelligent, or material, that is, an intelligibility that is not also 
intelligent. This differentiation between the spiritual and the material highlights the fact that 
‘practical insight, reflection, and decision are a legislative function; instead of being subject 
to laws, as are physical and chemical events, they are what make the laws of the distinctively 
human level of operations.’315 While material reality is subordinate to law and so intelligible, 
spiritual reality possesses intelligibility, not through subordination to law, but by its innate 
intelligence. Furthermore, Lonergan argues, spiritual reality is revealed through the higher 
organization or order it places on lower levels of being. However, this organization or order 
is not imposed upon spiritual reality; it is ‘generated by practical insights, rational reflection, 
and decision.’316 
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 Lonergan continues by pointing out the ambiguity of the notion of law. There are, he 
says, the laws of matter and the laws of spirit. The former are investigated by empirical 
scientists, and when one says that spirit is legislative, one means that spirit sets in motion 
intelligible orders that correspond to the intelligibilities studied by scientists. On the other 
hand, he argues, ‘the laws of spirit are the principles and norms that govern spirit in the 
exercise of its legislative function; and they differ radically from the laws of matter, not only 
in their higher point of application, but also in their nature and content.’317 The laws of 
matter, he continues, are abstract and can be concretely employed only by adding further 
results obtained from a non-systematic manifold. The laws of spirit, on the other hand, dwell 
in the vital structure of its cognitional and volitional activities; their concrete employment is 
implemented through spirit’s own activities within this vital structure. 
 It follows, Lonergan says, that there is a profound difference between the contingence 
of the act of willing and the general contingence of existence and occurrence in the remainder 
of the realm of proportionate being. The latter contingence, he says, ‘falls short of strict 
intelligible necessity, not because it is free, but because it is involved in the non-systematic 
character of material multiplicity, continuity, and frequency.’318 The contingency of an act of 
the will, on the other hand, not only does not result from the non-systematic, it in fact issues 
in the enforcement of further intelligible order upon manifolds that are otherwise merely 
coincidental. Furthermore, this enforcement of further intelligible order stems from 
intelligence, rational reflection, and ethically guided will. Still, this enforcement of 
intelligible order is contingent, as even when there is but one possibility, with the result that 
rational consciousness has no options, still this sole possibility is not of necessity actualized. 
This brings us to the following argument from experience, another central point in 
Lonergan’s argument for the contingency of the act of will.    






To claim that the sole reasonable course of action is realized necessarily is to claim that 
willing is necessarily consistent with knowing. But that claim is preposterous, for it 
contradicts the common experience of a divergence between what one does and what 
one knows one ought to do.319  
Furthermore, he continues, this claim is preposterous not only in fact but also in principle, as 
consistency between knowing and deciding ensues from deciding reasonably, and what 
ensues from deciding reasonably cannot be elevated into a universal principle that establishes 
all decisions as necessarily reasonable. 
 In summary: we have located four distinct arguments for the possibility of human 
freedom. Firstly, there is the existence of statistical residues, which, according to Lonergan, 
excludes the possibility of a deductive determining of events. Secondly, there is the argument 
for the contingence of the act of will, in which Lonergan asserts that what is rational 
necessity in the realm of knowing (rational consciousness), becomes rational exigence in the 
realm of both knowing and doing (rational self-consciousness). Thirdly, there is the argument 
for the contingence of actuality. Here Lonergan argues that the contingence of actuality is 
evident 1) in its being, as the somewhat random nature of existence and occurrence means 
that actuality is ‘just what happens to be;’ 2) in its being known, as actuality is known by 
grasping the virtually unconditioned, a conditioned that merely happens to have its conditions 
fulfilled; and 3) in its being willed. Here Lonergan argues that knowing cannot necessitate 
willing as this implies a conformity between knowing and willing that can only be 
demonstrated by a reasonable act of willing, and that such a reasonable act of willing, 
because it is not a natural occurrence, is not necessary but contingent. Fourthly, we examined 
the spiritual nature of human freedom, specifically, how practical insight, reflection, and 
                                                          








Our critique of Lonergan’s notion of freedom will be divided into two parts. In the 
first we shall examine Lonergan’s position on willing the end, a position based on his 
controversial reading of St Thomas. We shall ask whether this position, which stems from his 
book Grace and Freedom (originally his doctoral dissertation), is compatible with the 
arguments he espouses in Insight. In the second part we shall compare Lonergan’s notion of 
freedom with those of the magisterium and the theologians examined in the first section of 
this dissertation. 
 
3.5.1. Lonergan on Willing the End and Choosing the Means 
 In his book Grace and Freedom (1971), Lonergan examines the development of St 
Thomas’s theory of the freedom of the will. One aspect of this development that he examines 
is the role played by the idea of freedom as noncoercion. In essence this idea states that the 
will can be both necessitated and free. This freedom stems from the fact that the will is in no 
way coerced. According to Lonergan, while elements of this idea appear in St Thomas’s 
earlier work, he rejects the idea in his later work. The following quotation from Grace and 
Freedom provides a clear statement of Lonergan’s position: 
More complex is the role played by the idea of freedom as non-coercion. This relic of 
the pre-philosophic period of medieval thought appears in the Commentary on the 
Sentences, but there any tendency to assert that the will is necessitated but not coerced 
and therefore free is rejected. On the other hand, in the De Veritate, the De Potentia and 




necessary acts free: of necessity yet freely God wills his own excellence, the Holy Spirit 
proceeds, the human will tends to beatitude, the demonic will is fixed in evil, and 
perhaps the sinner is impotent to avoid further sin. This lapse in the face of contrary 
theory was repudiated with extreme vehemence in the later De Malo as heretical, 
destructive of all merit and demerit, subversive of all morality, alien to all scientific and 
philosophical thought, and the product of either wantonness or incompetence. The 
Church agrees that it is an heretical view, and the historian cannot but regard the relevant 
passages in the De Veritate, the De Potentia and the Pars Prima as a momentary 
aberration.320  
In a paper published in the Gregorianum in 1990,321 and later in his book Lonergan and 
Thomas on the Will (1993), Terry Tekippe disputes Lonergan’s reading of St Thomas. 
According to Tekippe’s reading, there is in the works of St Thomas a consistent position on 
the freedom of the will, which he summarizes as follows: 
Thomas distinguished between a willing of the end and the choosing of means to that 
end. In willing the end, the will is free in that it is not coerced; or, more positively, in 
that it responds to the good (or happiness) by a spontaneous inclination, and is in no way 
violently forced by factors outside itself. The means to the end, however, are multiple, 
and so the will’s choice is contingent; hence means are willed with a freedom of 
choice.322 
It is hardly surprising that we here have two very different interpretations of St Thomas, as it 
is well known that interpretations of St Thomas are almost as numerous as are interpreters of 
St Thomas. We are not concerned here, however, with the correctness of interpretations. 
Rather, the question we shall ask is as follows: What exactly is Lonergan’s position regarding 
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willing the end, and is this position logically consistent with his arguments for the freedom of 
the will in Insight?  
According to Tekippe, Lonergan’s position regarding willing the end is as follows:  
Rather than concluding that willing the end is now contingent and free, he supposes that 
it is necessitated, and so not free. In the earlier work, then, Thomas held that willing the 
end was free, though necessitated, because non-coerced; now he sees the difficulty of 
that position, rejects the sufficiency of non-coercion and concludes, since willing the end 
is necessary, that it is not free.323 
Tekippe suggests that Lonergan presents this argument in Grace and Freedom, where he 
discusses a text in which Thomas speaks of the mind ‘moved but not moving.’ Lonergan 
interprets this to mean, according to Tekippe, that in willing the end, God alone is active, 
while the will is passive, and that therefore any freedom proceeds from God, not from the 
will. Tekippe suggests that Lonergan’s interpretation of Thomas’s later thought in Grace and 
Freedom may not be overly clear, but that in a book review written shortly afterwards, 
Lonergan leaves no doubt as to his position: ‘It is true that in later Thomist doctrine not only 
is such passivity incompatible with freedom, but also that the act of willing an end is not 
free.’324 So, according to Lonergan the later Thomas says that willing the end is necessitated, 
and so not free. 
 Lonergan’s position on willing the end is now quite clear. He suggests that in willing 
the end the will is necessitated, and therefore not free. This brings us to the second part of our 
question: Is this position logically consistent with his arguments for the freedom of the will in 
Insight? The first thing to note is that in Insight Lonergan does not directly engage with the 
Thomistic distinction between willing the end and choosing the means. In the above 
examination of Lonergan’s notion of freedom we observed that he speaks of the will 
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accepting or rejecting the ‘possible course of action.’ Furthermore, we observed that this 
accepting or rejecting of the possible course of action, even when the possibility is unique, is 
contingent, and therefore free. 
But the contingence of the act of will, so far from resulting from the non-systematic, 
arises in the imposition of further intelligible order upon otherwise coincidental 
manifolds. . . . None the less, that imposition of intelligible order is contingent. For, on 
the one hand, even when possibility is unique, so that rational consciousness has no 
alternative, still the unique possibility is not realized necessarily.325  
Lonergan, then, in his account of the freedom of the will, is concerned with the ‘unique’ 
possible course of action that may be either accepted or rejected. He is concerned, that is, 
with choosing the means to the end rather than with willing the end itself. In speaking 
extensively on ‘the good,’ he does of course speak of the end. In the section on freedom, 
however, his concern is exclusively with the means to procuring the good. 
According to Lonergan’s doctrine of freedom, – as we extrapolate it from his two 
books, Grace and Freedom and Insight – particularly his positions on willing the end and 
choosing the means, the end (the good) is willed necessarily. The means to the good, 
however, i.e., the possible course of action that will bring about the good, is contingent and 
can therefore be rejected. These two positions are it seems, compatible; there is no inherent 
contradiction in the suggestion that a person may be free to choose the means to the good 
and, at the same time, not free to will the end. Lonergan’s position on freedom in Insight, 
then, appears to be consistent with his earlier work, Grace and Freedom. It is unfortunate, 
however, that Lonergan does not in Insight’s chapter on ethics engage with St Thomas’s 
distinction between willing the end and choosing the means. Such an engagement would be 
important for two reasons: Firstly, it would attempt to answer a fundamental question relating 
                                                          




to ethics, namely, whether human beings necessarily will the good or whether such willing of 
the good is contingent. This seems to me to be a very important question to be left out of such 
a substantial chapter on ethics by a Thomist philosopher. Secondly, it would establish a closer 
connection between the two main notions dealt with in this chapter, the notion of the good 
and the notion of freedom.  
In conclusion, Lonergan’s lack of engagement in Insight with St Thomas’s distinction 
between willing the end and choosing the means leaves unclear certain aspects of the 
relationship between the two main components in his chapter on ethics, the good and 
freedom. It also leaves unanswered the important and fundamental ethical question of 
whether human beings necessarily will the good. Despite this critique, however, Lonergan’s 
account of the freedom of the will contains some convincing arguments that when it comes to 
choosing the means to bring about the good, the will is not necessitated and is therefore free. 
These purely philosophical arguments are capable of dialoguing with the various notions of 
determinism which claim that such freedom is illusory.    
 
3.5.2. Lonergan’s Argument Compared to Contemporary Theological Discourse on Freedom 
 In this subsection, we shall contrast Lonergan’s arguments supporting the notion of 
freedom with some of those that we examined in the first section of this dissertation, namely, 
John Paul II, Richard Gula, and Germain Grisez. This selection is based on the fact that these 
three theologians explicitly engage with the notion of determinism. 
 In chapter one, we examined the arguments supporting the notion of freedom of 
Richard Gula. I contended that his arguments were weak for the following three reasons: 1. 
He suggests that genetic inheritance does not determine definitively what we do or who we 
become, but that freedom acts within the already existing restrictions of genetic inheritance 




of human freedom. Freedom, rather, is merely assumed. 2. Furthermore, he goes on to state 
that ‘the behavioural sciences have clearly shown that our freedom is limited,’ that ‘our 
actions fall somewhere on the continuum between absolute freedom and absolute 
determinism.’326 This statement is unsupported by argument or even reference to the 
particular behavioural scientists implicated in his assertion. 3. The closest that Gula comes to 
a real argument for human freedom is his suggestion that if human beings did not possess 
some level of freedom, we would not experience feelings of unease or indecision about the 
choices we make. I contended, however, that it could just as easily be argued that the 
psychological experience of trying to make the right choice regarding an action would be 
identical whether or not freedom was an objective reality or merely an intellectual belief.  
In contrast to Gula’s arguments, Lonergan’s arguments supporting the notion of 
freedom are based on prolonged and systematic rational reflection. They are based on 
scientific analyses of the laws by which events in the universe occur, and of the cognitive 
processes by which human beings make decisions. For example, by demonstrating the 
existence of statistical residues, Lonergan precludes the possibility that events, including 
human actions, can be determined by classical laws. Rather, such events occur according to 
what Lonergan terms ‘emergent probability.’327 This means that statistical as well as classical 
laws must be taken into account when attempting to understand events occurring in the 
universe. In other words, events cannot be determined systematically; they cannot, that is, be 
determined in a manner that would enable us to say that because A occurs it necessarily 
follows that B will occur. This is merely a very brief summary of an argument we examined 
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in greater detail earlier in this chapter, and even that examination was limited. My point is 
that this particular argument against determinism, in contrast to Gula’s, is strong and 
convincing because it is a proper, sustained rational argument based on scientific analyses of 
the structure of the universe, as opposed to Gula’s arguments, which are based on 
unsupported statements and undeveloped arguments.  
Grisez’s discussion of determinism, like Gula’s, may be divided into three parts. 1. He 
argues that in attempting to prove their position, determinists appeal to our reason and 
attempt to demonstrate that we ought to accept their position. However, Grisez argues, 
implicit in this ‘ought’ is an appeal to freedom. Determinists entreat us to be faithful to the 
search for truth, but such faithfulness is impossible if we are unable to make free choices. 
Any attempt, therefore, to show that the experiences of choice and moral guilt are imaginary 
is ultimately self-defeating. Against this argument, I asserted that the suggestion that 
determinists claim that we ‘ought’ to accept their position is an unwarranted assumption on 
Grisez’s part, and that it could just as easily be argued that the determinist presents his 
argument with the full understanding that it will be accepted or rejected depending on the 
hearer’s heredity, past experiences, etc. 2. Grisez goes on to argue that the notion of 
‘sufficient reason’ underlies most deterministic arguments. He contends that the theory that 
there must always be a sufficient reason is not self-evident, and that if in fact either human 
persons or God make free choices, the theory will prove to be false. Grisez argues that this is 
the case by simply observing that ‘God does act freely – that is, without a sufficient reason – 
for example, in creating and redeeming.’328 3. Grisez contends that while there are restrictions 
or limitations on what we can choose, this does not mean that we cannot choose freely within 
these restrictions or limitations. However, he presents no evidence or even argument to 
support this contention. 
                                                          




 In contrast to Grisez’s arguments, which, like Gula’s, are based on unsupported 
statements and undeveloped arguments, Lonergan presents an argument for the freedom of 
the will which is based on sustained, logical argument. If a proposed course of action, he 
says, is obligatory, then a person cannot be a rational knower if he denies the obligation. 
Furthermore, he observes, a person cannot be a rational doer and not fulfil the obligation. 
However, he concludes, a person can be a rational knower without an act of willing, but he 
cannot be a rational doer without an act of willing. So, for Lonergan, it is the act of will that 
changes what is rational necessity in the field of knowing into rational exigence in the larger 
field of both knowing and doing. In other words, actions are not determined by the subject’s 
knowledge of the nature of the proposed act, but by the decision of the subject’s will. Again 
this is merely a brief summary of Lonergan’s argument for the contingence of the act of will. 
The full argument is much more comprehensive and is supported by a metaphysical and 
epistemological framework supplied by Lonergan in Insight as a whole. 
John Paul II argues that sin is always a personal act, since it is an act of freedom on 
the part of the individual person. He observes that the individual in question may be 
‘conditioned, incited and influenced by numerous and powerful external factors,’ and that he 
may also be ‘subjected to tendencies, defects and habits linked with his personal 
condition.’329 These external and internal factors may attenuate, he says, to a greater or lesser 
degree, the person’s freedom and therefore his responsibility and guilt. However, John Paul II 
contends that ‘it is a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience and reason, that the 
human person is free.’330 John Paul II simply asserts that freedom is a reality and that we 
know this through our faith, experience, and reason. He makes no attempt, however, to say 
how experience tells us that freedom is a reality, or to present a rational argument that 
concludes that freedom is a reality.  
                                                          





 In contrast to John Paul II’s arguments, Lonergan presents an argument for the 
contingency of the act of will that tells us how experience shows us that freedom is a reality. 
He suggests that even when there is only one possibility of action, so that the rational person 
has no alternative, it does not follow that this course of action will be realized necessarily. To 
suggest that this is so, according to Lonergan, is to claim that willing is necessarily consistent 
with knowing. This claim, he says, is preposterous because it contradicts the common 
experience of a divergence between what one does and what one knows one ought to do.  
In conclusion, Gula’s, Grisez’s, and John Paul II’s arguments for the existence of 
human freedom are based on theological presupposition and/or undeveloped rational 
arguments. In contrast, Lonergan’s arguments are based on sustained philosophical 
engagement and scientific analyses of the laws by which events in the universe occur, and of 
the cognitional processes by which human beings make their choices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter we have examined the notion of sin in Lonergan’s Insight, and how it 
is supported by a solid metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical framework. I argued that 
Lonergan’s notions of ethical knowledge and human freedom are more effective than those of 
the magisterium and contemporary theologians in terms of dialoguing with the moral sceptic 
and determinist because of the scientific nature of his discourse. Specifically, I argued that 
Lonergan provides a much more solid basis for the synderesis by grounding his notion of the 
good in being or reality. This grounding of the good in being also provides a much more solid 
basis for dialogue with the moral sceptic. In our analysis of Lonergan’s notion of freedom, I 
argued that magisterial and theological reflection on freedom was based on scriptural 
presupposition and undeveloped philosophical arguments. In contrast to this, Lonergan’s 




makes Lonergan’s notion of freedom much more capable of dialoguing with the modern 
determinist.  
While Lonergan’s notion of sin has much potential for dialoguing with the moral 
sceptic and determinist, a theology of sin must also be rooted in scripture and the theological 
tradition. Indeed, the notion of sin is central to both the Old and New Testament’s 
understanding of human beings’ failure to relate properly to God and neighbour. A theology 
of sin that would be capable of contributing to this Christian self-understanding, while at the 
same time broadening the discussion to include non-Christians, would draw upon scripture 
and the theological tradition as well as the philosophical insights of a thinker such as 
Lonergan. For this reason, in the final chapter of this dissertation I shall attempt a synthesis 
that combines theological approaches to sin with Lonergan’s more philosophical approach.  
 Before attempting this synthesis however, we must examine the notion of sin in 
Lonergan’s other major work, Method in Theology.  
















KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM IN METHOD IN THEOLOGY’S ACCOUNT OF SIN 
  
It is necessary to examine the notions of sin, ethical knowledge, and human freedom 
in Method in Theology, not just because this is one of the two (along with Insight) most 
important texts in the Lonergan corpus, but also because Lonergan’s thought underwent a 
significant development in all of these areas from the publication of Insight in 1957 to that of 
Method in Theology in 1972.  
The questions addressed in this chapter will be the same as those of the last. Is 
Lonergan’s notion of the good capable of effectively dialoguing with moral scepticism? Is his 
notion of freedom capable of effectively dialoguing with determinism?  
 This chapter will be divided into three main sections. In the first we shall examine the 
definition of sin in Method in Theology. In our examination of this definition, we shall follow 
the same procedure that we followed in our examination of Insight’s definition of sin. We 
shall, that is, explore this definition by dividing it into its component parts and analysing each 
of them separately. We shall focus again on the importance of knowledge and freedom in 
Method in Theology’s account of sin. In the second part we shall critically examine 
Lonergan’s notions of value and value judgements. We shall ask whether these notions are 
sufficiently critical, especially when compared to Lonergan’s approach to the same problems 
in his earlier work, Insight. Finally, in the third section we shall critically examine 
Lonergan’s notion of freedom in Method in Theology.    
 
1. THE NOTION OF SIN 
 Sin, as in Insight, is not a major category in Method in Theology. In this work, 




Lonergan here provides a definition of sin which, while brief, is built upon an ethical 
framework that includes the notions of objective value judgements and human freedom. In 
this section, we shall examine Method in Theology’s definition of sin by analysing its 
component parts in the light of this ethical framework. In the final part of this section, we 
shall examine the importance of knowledge and freedom in Method in Theology’s conception 
of sin.  
 
1.1. A Definition 
 Lonergan provides a very brief definition of sin in Method in Theology in his 
discussion of the Church and the Christian message. I shall quote the entire passage in which 
this definition is given in order to put it in context. The actual definition I shall indicate with 
italics.   
The Church is a redemptive process. The Christian message, incarnate in Christ scourged 
and crucified, dead and risen, tells not only of God’s love but also of man’s sin. Sin is 
alienation from man’s authentic being, which is self-transcendence, and sin justifies 
itself by ideology. As alienation and ideology are destructive of community, so the self-
sacrificing love that is Christian charity reconciles alienated man to his true being, and 
undoes the mischief initiated by alienation and consolidated by ideology.331 
Sin, then, in the language of Method in Theology, is ‘alienation from man’s authentic being, 
which is self-transcendence.’ This definition of sin contains three terms that we shall examine 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of Method in Theology’s account of sin. The terms 
are alienation, authenticity, and self-transcendence. While these terms in themselves are not 
exclusive to Lonergan, he explains in other parts of Method in Theology precisely what he 
                                                          




means by these terms. An examination of Lonergan’s understanding of these terms will 
enrich our understanding of his notion of sin. 
 
1.2. Alienation 
 In order to understand precisely what Lonergan means by alienation, it is necessary to 
briefly examine his cognitional theory.  
 In his account of transcendental method, Lonergan describes a basic pattern of 
cognitional operations. These operations are seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, 
inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and 
weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, and writing.332 
Lonergan later denotes these various operations by the principle occurrence on each of the 
four levels on which these operations occur. So he speaks of the operations as experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and deciding. In his account of transcendental method, he describes 
the movement through each of these four levels as ‘the native spontaneities and inevitabilities 
of our consciousness.’333 
Spontaneously we move from experiencing to the effort to understand; and the 
spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; on the contrary, it is constitutive of our 
conscious intelligence, just as the absence of the effort to understand is constitutive of 
stupidity. Spontaneously we move from understanding with its manifold and conflicting 
expressions to critical reflection; again, the spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it is 
constitutive of our critical rationality, of the demand within us for sufficient reason, a 
demand that operates prior to any formulation of a principle of sufficient reason; and it is 
the neglect or absence of this demand that constitutes silliness. Spontaneously we move 
from judgements of fact or possibility to judgements of value and to the deliberateness of 
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decision and commitment; and that spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it constitutes 
us as conscientious, as responsible persons, and its absence would leave us 
psychopaths.334 
This account of cognitional structure should be fairly familiar to us now through our study of 
the notions of sin and ethics in Insight. There is, however, one major difference between 
Insight’s and Method in Theology’s cognitional theory: the familiar three-level structure in 
Insight which speaks of the empirical, intellectual, and rational patterns of cognitional 
activity has been replaced in Method in Theology by a four-level structure which speaks of 
the empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible patterns of cognitional activity.  
The basic form of alienation, for Lonergan, reflects this four-level structure: 
Alienation is disregard of the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be 
reasonable, Be responsible. The idea that a person should be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, 
and responsible seems fairly self-evident, and one might wonder why Lonergan would bother 
to make such an obvious suggestion. However, Lonergan presents these precepts as if they 
are more than mere suggestions, but as if they are absolutes. This is because, for Lonergan, to 
be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible constitutes the very structure of our 
cognitional activity. The spontaneous move from experience to the effort to understand, as 
we have seen, is ‘constitutive of our conscious intelligence.’ The move from understanding to 
critical reflection is ‘constitutive of our critical rationality.’ Finally, the move from factual 
judgements to judgements of value ‘constitutes us as conscientious, as responsible persons.’ 
In other words, being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible is not just the proper 
thing to do; it constitutes our basic humanity. This is what Lonergan means by ‘the native 
spontaneities and inevitabilities of our consciousness.’  





One might ask why the precepts are necessary if attention, intelligence, 
reasonableness, and responsibility are so constitutive of our humanity. This is where 
Lonergan’s notion of alienation comes in. Human beings are capable of alienating themselves 
from their authentic being by disregarding the transcendental precepts. Lonergan suggests a 
number of consequences that will result from such a disregard of these precepts. 
In various detailed manners, method will bid us be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, 
responsible. . . . But the normative force of its imperatives will reside, not just in its 
claims to authority, not just in the probability that what succeeded in the past will 
succeed in the future, but at root in the native spontaneities and inevitabilities of our 
consciousness which assembles its own constituent parts and unites them in a rounded 
whole in a manner we cannot set aside without, as it were, amputating our own moral 
personality, our own reasonableness, our own intelligence, our own sensitivity.335  
In other words, the failure to observe the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, 
Be reasonable, Be responsible will cut us off from our authentic selves in a number of 
different ways. In effect, the disregard of these precepts amounts to a neglect of the very 
things that constitute our basic humanity: our sensitivity, our intelligence, our rationality, and 
our moral sense.  
 
1.3. Authenticity and Self-transcendence 
 The next two terms in Method in Theology’s definition of sin, authenticity and self-
transcendence, we shall examine together, as their meanings in Method in Theology are 
closely interconnected. Indeed, this interconnectedness is revealed in the very first sentence 
of Lonergan’s account of self-transcendence: ‘Man achieves authenticity in self-
transcendence.’336 
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Lonergan proceeds with an analysis of how human beings transcend themselves by 
asking questions. 
Human beings can live in a world and have a horizon only insofar as they are not 
locked up in themselves. The first step towards freeing oneself, according to Lonergan, is the 
sensitive nature we have in common with the higher animals. However, while these animals 
are restricted to a habitat, human beings live in a universe. ‘Beyond sensitivity,’ Lonergan 
says, ‘man asks questions, and his questioning is unrestricted.’337  
 Initially, there are questions for intelligence: What? Why? How? What for? The 
answers to these questions bring unity and relatedness, classification and construction, 
serialization and generalization. From the limited area of the material universe that we can 
access through our immediate experience, we proceed to build a world-view and begin to 
explore the questions of what we can be and what we can do in this world.  
 Following questions for intelligence, there are questions for reflection by which we go 
beyond mere imagination and guess-work, beyond the hypothetical, the theoretical, and the 
systematic to ask: Could this really be so? Could that really be? By these questions 
self-transcendence takes on a new meaning. Not only does it go beyond the subject but 
also it seeks what is independent of the subject. For a judgement that this or that is so 
reports, not what appears to be, not what I imagine, not what I think, not what I wish, not 
what I would be inclined to say, not what seems to me, but what is so.338 
However, the self-transcendence that one achieves by judging ‘what is so’ is not the ultimate 
human achievement. Such self-transcendence is, Lonergan says, ‘only cognitive. It is in the 
order not of doing but only of knowing.’339 On the final level of questions for deliberation, 
human beings achieve a moral self-transcendence. 







When we ask whether this or that is worth while, whether it is not just apparently good 
but truly good, then we are inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort or ill 
ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, not about individual or group advantage, but about 
objective value.340 
Because we are capable of asking and answering these questions and living by the answers, 
we can achieve in our lives a moral self-transcendence. Such moral self-transcendence is the 
possibility of benevolence, of honest cooperation and true compassion, of complete liberation 
from the dwelling of an animal, and of becoming a person in human society. 
 Let us return for a moment to our definition: ‘Sin is alienation from man’s authentic 
being, which is self-transcendence.’ First of all we have seen that alienation is disregard of 
the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. In 
this subsection we have seen that authenticity which is self-transcendence is achieved insofar 
as we share a common sensitive nature with the higher animals, and insofar as we proceed 
from observing the data of sense to ask questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation, 
or, in other words to observe the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be 
reasonable, Be responsible. Insofar as we fail to be attentive to the data of sense, and insofar 
as we fail to ask questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation, we alienate ourselves 
from our authentic being which is self-transcendence. This alienation, this failure to transcend 
ourselves, Lonergan equates with sin.  
 
1.4. Knowledge and Human Freedom in Method in Theology’s Conception of Sin 
 We have analysed in a general way Lonergan’s definition of sin as we find it in his 
Method in Theology. We must now look to the specific question of the role of knowledge and 
freedom in this conception of sin.  





 In his account of self-transcendence, Lonergan makes a clear distinction between a 
self-transcendence which is ‘only cognitive’ and a moral self-transcendence. The difference 
between the two, as we have seen, is that cognitive self-transcendence ‘is in the order not of 
doing but only of knowing.’ In his discussion of value-judgements, Lonergan elaborates 
further on the difference between a self-transcendence that involves only knowing and one 
that involves both knowing and doing. He also associates the failure to transcend oneself 
morally with sin.  
True judgements of value go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence341 without 
reaching the fulness of moral self-transcendence. That fulness is not merely knowing but 
also doing, and man can know what is right without doing it. Still, if he knows and does 
not perform, either he must be humble enough to acknowledge himself to be a sinner, or 
else he will start destroying his moral being by rationalizing, by making out that what 
truly is good really is not good at all.342 
The most important phrase from this quotation for our purpose is the following one: ‘man can 
know what is right without doing it.’ We have already come across this idea in our chapter on 
Insight where Lonergan speaks of the transition from rational consciousness to rational self-
consciousness. Perhaps a brief recapitulation of Lonergan’s argument would not be amiss 
here. We saw that what in the context of rational consciousness is rational necessity is in the 
context of rational self-consciousness rational exigence. If a proposed course of action, 
Lonergan argues, is obligatory, ‘then one cannot be a rational knower and deny the 
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obligation, and one cannot be a rational doer and not fulfil the obligation. But one can be a 
rational knower without an act of willing, and one cannot be a rational doer without an act of 
willing.’343 It is, Lonergan says, ‘the addition of the further constitutive requirement of an act 
of will’344 that indicates the movement from rational consciousness to rational self-
consciousness, and changes what is rational necessity in the field of knowing, into rational 
exigence in the larger field of both knowing and doing. Of course in Method in Theology 
Lonergan does not say all this; he simply states that ‘man can know what is right without 
doing it.’ I think, however, that while the language is different, and that while Lonergan’s 
approach to these matters is also different, there is contained in both works the same general 
idea, namely that sin occurs when a person knows that something is right but fails to do it, or 
when a person knows that something is wrong and does it anyway.  
Let us return for a moment to the above quotation from Lonergan’s discussion of 
value-judgements, and let us repeat just a small section of it: ‘Man can know what is right 
without doing it. Still, if he knows and does not perform . . . he must be humble enough to 
acknowledge himself to be sinner.’ This statement seems fairly unambiguous: sin occurs 
when one knows but fails to perform. This understanding of sin would seem to imply that 
knowledge and freedom are necessary prerequisites for sinning. Still, the fact that one fails to 
perform despite his or her knowledge does not necessarily mean that he or she has a choice in 
the matter. The failure to perform is just a fact and Lonergan says nothing here of why the 
person has failed to perform. It is necessary to read free will into this statement. It is not as 
unambiguous as Insight’s definition of sin which describes sin as ‘the failure of free will to 
choose a morally obligatory course of action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible 
course of action.’345 Here the reader is left in no doubt about Lonergan’s position on human 
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free will. In Method in Theology’s account of sin, however, the fact of the human person’s 
freedom is not defined clearly but merely implied.  
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 As in Insight, Lonergan, in Method in Theology, presents the reader with a notion of 
sin that fails to draw on scripture and the theological tradition yet retains some of the 
essential elements of a classical, theological understanding of sin, namely the importance of 
knowledge and freedom. The fact of Lonergan’s failure to draw on scripture and the 
theological tradition is perhaps more surprising in a book that contains the word ‘theology’ in 
its title. However, in the introduction to this book, Lonergan explains this lack of engagement 
with the theological tradition: ‘Let me beg them [his readers] not to be scandalized because I 
quote Scripture, the ecumenical councils, papal encyclicals, other theologians so rarely and 
sparingly. I am writing not theology but method in theology. I am concerned not with the 
objects that theologians expound but with the operations that theologians perform.’346 For the 
purposes of a balanced theology of sin, however, it is necessary to incorporate scriptural and 
magisterial elements of this doctrine with a more philosophical approach like Lonergan’s. 
This, as I have already indicated, I shall attempt in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
 In the sections that follow we shall further examine the notions of ethical knowledge 
and human freedom as they relate to sin. In the next section we shall critically examine 
Lonergan’s approach to value judgements. Again we shall examine the question of 
Lonergan’s ability to dialogue with moral scepticism. In the third section we shall examine 
Method in Theology’s approach to human freedom and its ability to dialogue with 
determinism.  
 
                                                          




2. THE OBJECTIVITY OF JUDGEMENTS OF VALUE 
 It is well known that Lonergan’s thought on value and the good underwent a 
significant development from the publication of Insight in 1957 to that of Method in Theology 
in 1972. In a paper entitled, ‘Insight Revisited,’ Lonergan outlines this development in his  
thought: 
In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct 
notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is this truly or 
only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is 
known in judgements of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good 
conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one’s decisions.347 
The various implications of this development in Lonergan’s thought have been examined by 
a number of different commentators over the years.348 In one of the earliest of such 
examinations, Frederick Crowe traces the development of Lonergan’s thought in the works 
he wrote between the publication of Insight and Method in Theology.349 Crowe also asks 
critical questions relating to the development of Lonergan’s thought in this area, some of 
which we shall examine when we come to critically examine Method in Theology’s account 
of the good.   
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 In the first two parts of this section, we shall outline Lonergan’s notion of the good as 
it is presented in Method in Theology. We shall focus generally on the notions of value and 
value judgements, and specifically on the question of the objectivity of judgements of value. 
In the third and fourth parts of this section, we shall critically examine the problem of 
objectivity in Lonergan’s value judgements, and how he uses various notions of conversion 
as criteria for grounding value judgements.   
 
2.1 The Notion of Value 
 Method in Theology’s discussion of the notion of value begins by asserting that ‘value 
is a transcendental notion.’350 In chapter 1 of this book, Lonergan explains what he means by 
the term ‘transcendental’ by comparing it to the ‘categorical.’  
Categories are determinations. They have a limited denotation. They vary with cultural 
variations. . . . In contrast, the transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, 
unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural change. While categories are needed to 
put determinate questions and give determinate answers, the transcendentals are 
contained in questions prior to the answers. . . . So if we objectify the content of 
intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we 
objectify the content of reasonable intending, we form the transcendental concepts of the 
true and the real. If we objectify the content of responsible intending, we get the 
transcendental concept of value, of the truly good.351 
In the same way that the intelligible is what is intended in questions for intelligence, and truth 
and being are what are intended in questions for reflection, value is what is intended in 
questions for deliberation. This intending is not the same as knowing. When one asks what, 
or why, or how, or what for, one does not know the answers, but is already intending or 
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anticipating what would be known if one knew the answers. When one asks whether this or 
that is true, one does not know yet whether or not either is true, but is already intending what 
would be known if one knew the answers. When one inquires, then, whether something is 
truly and not just seemingly good, whether that is worthwhile or not, one does not yet know 
value but is intending value. 
 The transcendental notions, for Lonergan, are ‘the dynamism of conscious 
intentionality.’352 They bring the subject up through the various levels of consciousness, from 
experiential to intellectual to rational to existential. With respect to objects, the 
transcendentals are the intermediaries between ignorance and knowledge. For example: the 
notion of the intelligible causes the subject to ask, ‘What does this mean?’, and the answer 
will make him knowledgeable. And the notions of the true and the real make him or her ask 
‘Is this true?’, and the answer will again make him or her knowledgeable. The 
transcendentals ‘refer to objects immediately and directly, while answers refer to objects only 
mediately, only because they are answers to the questions that intend the objects.’353 For 
example: the notion of the intelligible refers directly to a given object by asking, ‘What does 
this (the given object) mean?’ The answer to this question, however, mediates between the 
object and the question. In other words, the answer is always an answer to a question that 
directly refers to an object; it is not an answer to the object itself.  
As well as promoting the subject to full consciousness and directing him to his goals, 
the transcendental notions also supply the criteria by which one can tell whether the goals are 
being achieved. The desire to understand is satisfied when understanding is achieved but it is 
dissatisfied when complete attainment of understanding is lacking. So this desire is the source 
of ever further questions. The desire for truth urges rationality to give consent when evidence 
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is sufficient but refuses consent and insists upon doubt whenever evidence is insufficient.354 
Finally, the desire for value ‘rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience 
and saddens failures with an unhappy conscience.’355 
 Self-transcendence is the accomplishment of what Lonergan terms ‘conscious 
intentionality.’ Such conscious intentionality involves four steps: firstly, the subject attends to 
the data of sense and of consciousness; secondly, inquiry and understanding result in a grasp 
of a theoretical or possible world mediated by meaning; thirdly, through reflection and 
judgement we reach an absolute. Through such reflection and judgement ‘we acknowledge 
what is really so, what is independent of us and our thinking.’356 Fourthly, by deliberating, 
evaluating, deciding, and acting ‘we can know and do, not just what pleases us, but what truly 
is good, worth while.’357 
 For Lonergan, the transcendental notions, while broader than any category, are not 
abstract. They are, rather, ‘utterly concrete.’358 
For the concrete is the real not under this or that aspect but under its every aspect in its 
every instance. But the transcendental notions are the fount not only of initial questions 
but also of further questions. Moreover, though the further questions come only one at a 
time, still they keep coming. There are ever further questions for intelligence pushing up 
towards a fuller understanding and ever further doubts urging us to a fuller truth.359 
In the same way, when we speak of the good we do not refer to some abstraction. Only that 
which is concrete is good. Just as the transcendental notions of the intelligible, the true, and 
the real seek complete intelligibility, truth, and reality, so, Lonergan says, ‘the transcendental 
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notion of the good heads for a goodness that is beyond criticism.’360 He proceeds to describe 
how the notion of the good manifests itself in human consciousness. 
For that notion is our raising questions for deliberation. It is our being stopped with the 
disenchantment that asks whether what we are doing is worth while. That 
disenchantment brings to light the limitation in every finite achievement, the stain in 
every flawed perfection, the irony of soaring ambition and faltering performance. It 
plunges us into the height and depth of love, but it also keeps us aware of how much our 
loving falls short of its aim. In brief, the transcendental notion of the good so invites, 
presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a goodness completely 
beyond it powers of criticism.361 
So, the transcendental notion of the good causes us to ask questions for deliberation and it 
also causes us to keep asking them. Through these questions for deliberation we seek to 
discern value. In the next subsection we shall examine the general nature of these 
discernments or judgements of value, with the specific question in mind: Are these 
judgements of value objective?  
 
2.2. Judgements of Value 
 Lonergan begins his discussion of value judgements by asserting that they may be 
either simple or comparative. They confirm or dispute that something is truly good or only 
seems to be so, or they compare separate instances of the truly good to confirm or dispute that 
one has more importance or urgency than the other. 
 He proceeds to explain the criterion involved in the objective judgement of value.  






Such judgements are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not 
proceed from a self-transcending subject. Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its 
criterion in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject’s being.362  
Lonergan goes on to draw a distinction between the criterion and the meaning of the 
judgement of value. He explains the meaning of such judgements as follows: 
To say that an affirmative judgement of value is true is to say what objectively is or 
would be good or better. To say that an affirmative judgement of value is false is to say 
what objectively is not or would not be good or better.363 
These two quotations are vital for our purposes. In them Lonergan does two things: firstly, he 
strongly affirms the reality of objective judgements of value; secondly, he provides the 
criterion that makes such judgements true or false. Lonergan proceeds to compare 
judgements of value with judgements of fact. They are different in content because one can 
approve of (judgement of value) what does not exist (for example a plan that has not yet been 
implemented) but one cannot affirm (judgement of fact) what does not exist. Similarly, one 
can disapprove of (negative judgement of value) what exists, but cannot deny the reality of 
(negative judgement of fact) what exists. They are not, however, different in structure as in 
both judgements of fact and judgements of value we can distinguish between criterion and 
meaning. In both of these kinds of judgement, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the 
subject. However, the self-transcendence involved in judgements of fact and the self-
transcendence involved in judgements of value differ in meaning. In the former, the self-
transcendence is ‘only cognitive,’364 while in the latter the subject is moving toward moral 
self-transcendence. The meaning in both kinds of judgement is or purports to be independent 
of the one making the judgement. Factual judgements claim knowledge of a reality apart 
from the thinking of the one judging. In other words, factual judgements claim to state not 
                                                          






just personal opinion but actual facts about the universe. Similarly, judgements of value claim 
to know what is or is not truly good or really better.  
True judgements of value, as we saw in 1.4, go beyond merely intentional self-
transcendence (see footnote 341) without reaching the fullness of moral self-transcendence. 
That fullness is not just knowing but also doing, and a person is capable of knowing what is 
right and not doing it. However, by the judgement of value, one ‘moves beyond pure and 
simple knowing.’365 By such judgements one makes oneself capable of moral self-
transcendence or true loving. 
 Midway between factual judgments and judgements of value there are apprehensions 
of value. These apprehensions, according to Lonergan, are ‘given in feelings.’366 The 
apprehension of value occurs in what Lonergan (drawing on Dietrich von Hildebrand) terms 
an ‘intentional response.’367 He explains this term in his analysis of the role of feelings in 
value judgements:  
Intentional responses . . . answer to what is intended, apprehended, represented. The 
feeling relates us, not just to a cause or an end, but to an object. Such feeling gives 
intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our 
knowing and deciding would be paper thin.368  
Such intentional responses meet either the ontic value of a person, that is, the person’s 
intrinsic worth, or the qualitative value of beauty, understanding, truth, noble deeds, virtuous 
acts, or great achievements. As human beings, according to Lonergan, we are constituted in 
such a way that we not only ask questions that lead to self-transcendence; we not only 
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acknowledge correct answers that make up intentional self-transcendence (see footnote 341), 
but we ‘also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or 
the actuality of moral self-transcendence.’369 
   
2.3. The Problem of Objectivity 
 As we saw in the last chapter, Lonergan’s notions of the good and value in Insight are 
set upon a metaphysical structure built with almost 600 pages of reflections on the nature of, 
and the possibility of knowledge. The change of direction in Lonergan’s approach to these 
notions, from Insight’s approach which is primarily intellectualist (where activities such as 
deliberation, deciding, choosing, and willing are regarded as an ‘extensions’ of intellectual 
activity) to Method in Theology’s approach which puts responsibility on a new level of 
cognitional activity, opens up the question of the objectivity of value judgements as they are 
presented in the latter work. Frederick Crowe examines this question in a paper presented at 
the first annual Lonergan Workshop in 1974. He asks: ‘How escape the vicious circle of 
judging our judgement of the values we choose as good for us? How do we go beyond the 
good for me or the good for us, to what is truly good, to what transcends the self?’370  
In attempting to answer this question, Crowe takes us in a number of different 
directions. Firstly, he suggests that we look to Cardinal Newman’s view, developed by 
Lonergan, on ‘the true way of learning.’ This, Crowe says, deals more directly with escaping 
from the vicious circle that seems to enclose our cognitional efforts. However, he suggests, it 
should also work well as a means of escaping from the vicious circle that seems to imprison 
us in our attempts to provide a solid foundation for our judgements of value. In Newman’s 
Grammar of Assent, he critiques Descartes’ way of moving forward in knowledge. Whereas 
Descartes begins with a universal doubt, Newman begins with a universal credulity, with the 
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expectation of eliminating error in due course as the truth evolves and engages the mind. 
Crowe provides the following quotation from Newman’s Grammar of Assent to illustrate his 
general approach: 
Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing 
everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt everything. 
The former, indeed, seems the true way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and 
discard what is contradictory to itself: and error having always some portion of truth in 
it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may expect, that when there is 
an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error 
falling off from the mind, and the truth developing and occupying it.371 
In Insight, Lonergan develops this procedure in what he calls the ‘self-correcting process of 
human learning.’ The following quotation, again provided by Crowe, will illustrate 
Lonergan’s approach: 
So it is the process of learning that breaks the vicious circle. Judgement on the 
correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large number of correct 
insights. But the prior insights are not correct because we judge them to be correct. They 
occur within a self-correcting process in which the shortcomings of each insight provoke 
further questions to yield complementary insights. Moreover, this self-correcting process 
tends to a limit. We become familiar with concrete situations . . . and we can recognize 
when . . . that self-correcting process reaches its limit in familiarity with concrete 
situation and in easy mastery of it.372 
Crowe strongly emphasises the importance of understanding Lonergan’s idea of the self-
correcting process if we are to understand both Insight and Method in Theology. While 
Lonergan uses it mostly in the areas of concrete judgements of fact, of the critique of beliefs, 
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and of the hermeneutic circle, it seems, in Crowe’s view, to have a much wider application. 
Furthermore, it ‘seems to have as competitor only a fixed and indubitable starting-point, a 
premise which is somehow self-validating and really involved in a vicious circle.’373  
In Method in Theology, this self-correcting process of learning is most comprehensively 
and most clearly set out in the chapter on dialectic. We have seen already that the criterion of 
objectivity in value judgements in Method in Theology is the authenticity of the one judging, 
and that ‘man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence.’ There is another aspect to this 
authenticity and self-transcendence in Lonergan’s theory, namely, conversion. While one 
achieves authenticity in self-transcendence, he or she also achieves self-transcendence 
through conversion. In Lonergan’s discussion of dialectic, he makes conversion the criterion 
by which true judgements of value are worked out in dialogue with one’s intellectual, ethical, 
and religious opponents. 
There are fundamental conflicts stemming from an explicit or implicit cognitional 
theory, an ethical stance, a religious outlook. They profoundly modify one’s mentality. 
They are to be overcome only through an intellectual, moral, religious conversion. The 
function of dialectic will be to bring such conflicts to light, and to provide a technique 
that objectifies subjective differences and promotes conversion.374 
In the following subsection, we shall examine Lonergan’s three-fold distinction between 
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. We shall then proceed to examine the role of 
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2.4. Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements 
2.4.1. Intellectual, Moral, and Religious Conversion 
 Lonergan defines intellectual conversion as ‘a radical clarification and, consequently, 
the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, 
objectivity, and human knowledge.’375 This myth suggests that knowing is like looking and 
that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there. It further 
suggests that the real is that which is out there now to be looked at. This myth, according to 
Lonergan, fails to take into account the distinction between the world of immediate sense 
experience and the world mediated by meaning. The world of immediacy, of the senses, is 
only a very small part of the world mediated by meaning. The world mediated by meaning is 
a world that is known not merely by the sense experience of a single person, but by the outer 
and inner experience of the cultural community, and ‘by the continuously checked and 
rechecked judgements of the community.’376 Knowing, then, is more than just seeing. It is, 
rather, experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing.  
The criteria of objectivity are not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the 
compounded criteria of experiencing, of understanding, of judging, and of believing. The 
reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated 
by understanding, posited by judgement and belief. 
Intellectual conversion, then, is a move away from any of the various philosophical forms 
that this myth takes,377 towards what Lonergan terms a ‘critical realism’ that widens the 
criteria of objectivity to include various forms of experiencing, as well as understanding, 
judgement, and belief.   
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 Moral Conversion ‘changes the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from 
satisfaction to values.’378 Children and adolescents are persuaded or compelled to do the right 
thing. However, as our knowledge of the world increases, and as our responses to human 
values become stronger and more sophisticated, those guiding us leave us more and more to 
ourselves in order that ‘our freedom may exercise its ever advancing thrust toward 
authenticity.’379 So, Lonergan continues, ‘we move toward the existential moment when we 
discover for ourselves that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected 
objects, and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself.’380 
Moral conversion involves choosing the truly good; even choosing value over satisfaction 
when the two conflict. But such conversion, Lonergan says, ‘falls short of moral 
perfection.’381 Deciding to do what is right is one thing, while doing it is another. One must 
continue to develop one’s knowledge of human reality and potentiality as they are in the 
existing situation. One must be willing to learn from others, ‘for moral knowledge is the 
proper possession only of morally good men and, until one has merited that title, one has still 
to advance and learn.’382  
 Lonergan describes religious conversion as ‘being grasped by ultimate concern.’383 It 
is ‘other-worldly falling in love.’384 It is ‘total and permanent self-surrender without 
conditions, qualifications, reservations.’385 It is, however, such a surrender, not as a single 
act, but as a ‘dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts.’386 For Christians, 
religious conversion is God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us 
(Rm. 5:5). It is God’s gift of grace. Lonergan proceeds to draw the reader’s attention to the 
                                                          












traditional distinction between operative and cooperative grace, and identifies religious 
conversion with the former: 
Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement 
beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh 
becoming effective in good works through human freedom. Operative grace is religious 
conversion.387  
Cooperative grace, Lonergan describes as the effectiveness of conversion, the steady 
movement toward a complete transformation of the entirety of one’s living and feeling, as 
well as one’s thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions. 
 
2.4.2. Conversion and Value Judgements 
 Dialectic, the fourth of Lonergan’s ‘functional specialties,’ deals with conflicts. It is 
structured on two levels. On the upper level are the operators, and on the lower there are the 
materials to be operated on. The operators are the following two precepts: develop positions; 
reverse counter-positions. Lonergan defines the positions as ‘statements compatible with 
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.’388 Such positions are developed by being 
combined with fresh information and further discoveries. Counter-positions, on the other 
hand, are statements that are incompatible with intellectual, or moral, or religious conversion. 
They are reversed by the removal of the incompatible elements.   
 In chapter 10 of Method in Theology, under the heading ‘Dialectic as Method,’ 
Lonergan provides a brief explanation of how dialectic functions. The following quotation 
should serve as a useful summary. 
Our fourth functional specialty moves beyond the realm of ordinary empirical science. It 
meets persons. It acknowledges the values they represent. It deprecates their short-
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comings. It scrutinizes their intellectual, moral, and religious assumptions. It picks out 
significant figures, compares their basic views, discerns processes of development and 
aberration. As the investigation expands, there are brought to light origins and turning-
points, the flowering and the decadence of religious philosophy, ethics, spirituality.389 
Positions and counter-positions are to be understood concretely as opposed moments in 
ongoing process. They must be understood in their proper dialectical character. Lonergan 
proceeds to explain how human authenticity does not guarantee truth and that there is a need 
for an on-going conversion: 
Human authenticity is not some pure quality, some serene freedom from all oversights, 
all misunderstanding, all mistakes, all sins. Rather it consists in a withdrawal from 
unauthenticity, and the withdrawal is never a permanent achievement. It is ever 
precarious, ever to be achieved afresh, ever in great part a matter of uncovering still 
more oversights, acknowledging still further failures to understand, correcting still more 
mistakes, repenting more and more deeply hidden sins.390 
Human development, Lonergan tells us, comes about primarily through resolving conflicts. In 
the area of intentional consciousness, the basic conflicts are delineated by the opposition of 
positions and counter-positions.    
 Lonergan proceeds by explaining the importance of overcoming one’s own conflicts 
if we are to properly understand our dialogue partners: 
Now it is only through the movement towards cognitional and moral self-transcendence, 
in which the theologian overcomes his own conflicts, that he can hope to discern the 
ambivalence at work in others and the measure in which they resolved their problems. 
Only through such discernment can he hope to appreciate all that has been intelligent, 
true, and good in the past even in the lives and the thought of opponents. Only through 
                                                          





such discernment can he come to acknowledge all that was misinformed, misunderstood, 
mistaken, evil even in those with whom he is allied.391 
He goes on to explain that this action is reciprocal. Just as it is one’s own self-transcendence 
that allows one to truly know others and to fairly judge them, so, inversely, it is through our 
understanding and recognition of others that we come to know ourselves and to increase and 
cultivate our apprehension of values.  
  
2.5. Critique 
 In this section we shall critically examine Lonergan’s use of intellectual, moral, and 
religious conversion as criteria for grounding judgements of value. 
 
2.5.1. Intellectual Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements 
 Let us begin with a reiteration of Lonergan’s definition of intellectual conversion: 
‘Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an 
exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human 
knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there 
to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be 
looked at.’ Lonergan identifies three forms of this myth; namely, naive realism, empiricism, 
and idealism (see footnote 377). Lonergan’s own view he calls ‘critical realism.’ He makes 
intellectual conversion one of the criteria for discerning the truth of value judgements. In 
order to reach the truth we must, he tells us, ‘develop positions,’ that is, ‘statements 
compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion,’ and ‘reverse counterpositions,’ 
that is, ‘statements that are incompatible with intellectual or moral or religious conversion.’ 
                                                          




Positions are developed by being combined with fresh information and further discoveries, 
while the counterpositions are reversed by the removal of the incompatible elements.  
This procedure may work if our aim is to reach the truth of a particular judgement of 
value. Let us say, for argument’s sake, that we hold a certain moral view, and that the view 
we hold is the truth because we have undergone an intellectual and moral and religious 
conversion. Now, because of a diametrically opposed intellectual and spiritual horizon, our 
opponent cannot share our view. If we can foster a conversion or conversions in this person, 
to make her or his world-view conform more or less to ours, we may be in a better position to 
convince this person that our view on this particular matter is true. However, as Lonergan 
himself points out, the fact that we have undergone such conversions does not guarantee that 
our judgements will be correct, or that we will be immune to all mistakes and to all sins. So, 
even if we have undergone the three conversions which Lonergan speaks of, the intellectual 
ground upon which we stand is not a completely solid basis upon which to argue our position. 
 I shall not elaborate further on this argument because I said in the preceding 
paragraph that this procedure may work if our aim is to reach the truth of a particular 
judgement of value. But this is not our aim here. Our question is one of foundations; we are 
attempting to discern the possibility of true judgements of value, not whether this or that 
judgement is true or false, but whether it is meaningful to speak of true judgements of value. 
In such an endeavour Lonergan’s grounding of value judgements in intellectual conversion is 
not, in my view, useful. Lonergan’s dialectical procedure, particularly his grounding of value 
judgements in intellectual conversion, will not work for the foundational question of the 
possibility of true judgements of value. If we assume that judgements of value can be 
objective, dialectic may be an adequate procedure for determining the truth of particular 
judgements of value in discussion with those who hold opposing views. However, in terms of 




must first place judgements of value within an epistemological framework. While Insight 
establishes such an epistemological foundation for value judgements, Method in Theology 
does not. This is unfortunate, as the moral sceptic will not argue with us over the truth or 
falsity of a particular value judgement; we will have to first convince him or her that such 
truth or falsity in relation to value judgements is possible.  
 
2.5.2. Moral Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements 
 Lonergan says of moral conversion that it ‘changes the criterion of one’s decisions 
and choices from satisfaction to values,’ and that it involves choosing the truly good. Again 
we must distinguish between a procedure for arriving at true judgements of value and the 
foundational question of the possibility of true value judgements. With regard to the former it 
makes sense that if one is to arrive at a true judgement of value, the criterion of one’s 
decisions and choices should be values and not satisfaction. If the criterion is that of 
satisfaction, this will lead to a biased assessment and evaluation of the situation, and 
ultimately to a judgement that will lead to personal satisfaction and may or may not be a true 
judgment of value.  
Again, I shall not develop this argument any further as we are concerned not with 
procedure but with foundations. With regard to the foundational question, Lonergan’s use of 
moral conversion as criterion of the truth of value judgements is again of no use to us. Moral 
conversion is from satisfaction to values. The use of values as the criterion of truth in value 
judgements amounts to a circular argument that makes choosing value or the truly good the 
criterion for establishing the possibility of value or the truly good. In order to make values a 
criterion of the truth of judgements of value we must first establish the possibility of values. 





2.5.3. Religious Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements 
In a paper given at the Lonergan Congress of 1970, David Tracy examines Lonergan’s 
foundational theology. In this paper, Tracy asks the following question of Lonergan’s notion 
of religious conversion as it relates to theology in general:  
Is the ‘religious’ ‘conversion’ mediated here dogmatically or critically? . . . Is it 
mediated by dialectical reflection upon the results of earlier historical theology – thereby 
assuming (as a dogmatic affirmation) the truth-value of the data (presumably religious) 
interpreted and critically investigated by the historian? Or is it, too, to be critically 
mediated, thus transcendentally justifying the use of religious – in fact of a specific 
religious – God-language?392 
Tracy proceeds to draw out the implications of a dogmatically rather than critically mediated 
religious conversion.  
If the former alone be the case then Lonergan’s enterprise may be dialectically 
foundational for a collaborative methodological theological enterprise for all those 
theologians (of whatever tradition) who accept an authoritative (and, in that sense, 
dogmatic) grounding for all genuine theological work. But it will not be for those (viz., 
in the Liberal, Modernist or neo-Liberal traditions) who demand a critical dialectical 
mediation of religious and theological meaning and language.393 
The various traditions that Tracy here either alludes to or mentions explicitly are different 
Christian and theological traditions. But the question, I think, may be transposed to include 
non-Christian traditions, particularly the tradition of philosophical scepticism, or, more 
specifically, moral scepticism, which will certainly demand a critical mediation of religious 
and theological meaning and language. Put simply, Tracy’s question, as we adapt it for our 
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discussion, would read as follows: Is Lonergan’s notion of dialectic, which grounds value 
judgements in religious conversion, sufficiently critical to be capable of dialoguing with 
moral scepticism? 
 Let us examine the data. Lonergan provides a number of definitions of religious 
conversion, some of which are explicitly Christian, and some of which are not. The explicitly 
Christian definitions are as follows: Religious conversion is ‘God’s love flooding our hearts 
through the Holy Spirit given to us.’ Religious conversion is also described as ‘the gift of 
grace.’394 The first reference is to Romans 5:5, the second to the notion of grace, a 
scripturally and dogmatically founded Christian doctrine. It is obvious that these notions of 
religious conversion are not capable of dialoguing with the moral or religious sceptic. Like 
the various theological approaches that we examined in the first section of this dissertation, 
this grounding of value judgements relies too heavily on theological presupposition. To be 
fair to Lonergan, he does preface these definitions of religious conversion with the words, 
‘For Christians it is,’ which indicates an understanding that this kind of language will not be 
convincing to the non-Christian.  
Lonergan uses three less explicitly Christian phrases to define religious conversion: 
Religious conversion is ‘being grasped by ultimate concern;’ it is ‘other-worldly falling in 
love;’ it is ‘total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, 
reservations.’ We shall examine each of these phrases separately in order to see whether or 
not they will be more effective in dialoguing with the moral or religious sceptic. 
 The phrase, ‘being grasped by ultimate concern,’ Lonergan borrows from Paul Tillich. 
Let us examine this phrase in its original context, which is Tillich’s definition of religion in 
his discussion of the encounter between the various world religions:  
                                                          




Religion is the state of being grasped by ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all 
other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the 
meaning of our life. Therefore this concern is unconditionally serious and shows a 
willingness to sacrifice any finite concern which is in conflict with it. The predominant 
religious name for the content of such concern is God – a god or gods.395  
This is Tillich’s definition of religion as it relates to specifically theistic religions. He 
continues to draw out the meaning of ‘ultimate concern’ for nontheistic religions and what he 
terms ‘quasi-religions.’ 
In nontheistic religions divine qualities are ascribed to a sacred object or an all-
pervading power or a highest principle such as the Brahma or the One. In secular quasi-
religions the ultimate concern is directed towards objects like nation, science, a 
particular form or stage of society, or a highest ideal of humanity, which are then 
considered divine.396 
The original context of Tillich’s phrase, ‘being grasped by ultimate concern,’ is explicitly 
religious. It is a definition of religion within a discussion of religions. Even where he 
discusses so-called secular quasi-religions, he considers the ultimate concern, whether it be 
nation or science or a highest ideal of humanity, to be deified. The question which concerns 
me is as follows: What meaning can the phrase ‘being grasped by ultimate concern,’ have to 
the sceptic who denies the possibility of any kind of divinity? Or, to return to Lonergan: 
What meaning can religious conversion, understood as being grasped by ultimate concern, 
have to such a religious sceptic? I contend that while Tillich’s phrase ‘being grasped by 
ultimate concern,’ when taken out of its original context, is not explicitly Christian or 
religious, becomes, when returned to its original context, very religious. Even in the case of 
the ‘quasi’ religions, where the concern is with entities that we would not normally consider 
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religious, the term ‘ultimate’ suggests a sense of meaning in life that is not necessarily shared 
by everyone. For this reason, Lonergan’s use of this term to ground value judgements in 
religious conversion is, I contend, dogmatic rather than critical, and so not very useful in 
terms of dialoguing with the moral or religious sceptic.  
 The next phrase that Lonergan uses to define religious conversion is ‘other-worldly 
falling in love.’ Again this is not explicitly Christian or explicitly religious. But it certainly 
implies some form of religion. For the Christian, the use of the phrase ‘other-worldly’ poses 
no problem. The other world here referred to is the world that transcends the spatio-temporal 
realm that all creatures inhabit, the world which is inhabited by God, the object that we fall in 
love with. Other religions too have various notions of a world that transcends space and time. 
While it may not be unheard of for someone to hold a belief in such an infinite realm of 
existence without holding what we would call religious beliefs, the phrase, ‘other-worldly,’ 
has strong religious overtones. This phrase, while it does not refer to any particular religion 
or to religions in general, strongly implies a religious mentality. For this reason, it will not be 
convincing to the moral or religious sceptic. 
 The final phrase that Lonergan uses to define religious conversion is ‘total and 
permanent self-surrender, without conditions, qualifications, reservations.’ My question is: 
Self-surrender to what? If we read on, the answer is plain: it is self-surrender to God. 
But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state that is prior to and 
principle of subsequent acts. It is revealed in retrospect as an under-tow of existential 
consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as perhaps an increasing 
simplicity and passivity in prayer.397 
As is indicated by my italics, the language here is undeniably religious and so incapable of 
effectively dialoguing with the moral or religious sceptic. 
                                                          





 In this section we have examined Lonergan’s notions of value and value judgements. 
We have seen that he places a lot of emphasis on the objectivity of such judgements of value 
by using phrases such as ‘true judgements of value’ and ‘truly good.’ We proceeded to 
examine the problem of objectivity in Method in Theology’s account of value and value 
judgements by examining Frederick Crowe’s question: ‘How escape the vicious circle of 
judging our judgement of the values we choose as good for us?’ Crowe directed our attention 
to Lonergan’s self-correcting process of learning and we went on to examine this process in 
Lonergan’s account of dialectic. We saw that in this account Lonergan uses intellectual, 
moral, and religious conversion as criteria for discerning the truth of value judgements. We 
concluded that this procedure is ineffective in terms of dialoguing with the moral or religious 
sceptic for a number of different reasons: Method in Theology’s failure to establish a firm 
epistemological grounding for value judgements; the circular nature of an argument that 
offers values as a criterion of truth in a discussion on the possibility of values; the religious 
language, explicit or implicit, in Lonergan’s definitions of religious conversion. 
 Because of what I have argued are Method in Theology’s failures with regard to 
effectively dialoguing with moral scepticism, we shall revert to Insight in our attempts to 
construct a synthetic account of sin that is capable of such dialogue. Before doing this, 
however, it remains to examine Lonergan’s notion of freedom in Method in Theology and the 
question of whether it is capable of effectively dialoguing with determinism.    








3. THE NOTION OF HUMAN FREEDOM 
 Lonergan’s notion of human freedom in Method in Theology is closely related to his 
notion of authenticity, which we examined in the first section of this chapter (1.3). In Method 
in Theology’s chapter on dialectic, Lonergan speaks of freedom exercising its ‘ever 
advancing thrust towards authenticity.’398 In this section, we shall examine this conception of 
freedom. Our critique will focus on the question of its ability to effectively dialogue with 
determinism.  
 
3.1. Human Freedom and Authenticity 
 According to Lonergan, ‘we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject 
terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action 
and proceeding to execute it.’399 Insofar as that thrust of the self regularly chooses, not what 
merely seems to be good, but what is truly good, the self achieves moral self-transcendence 
and exists authentically. Contrarily, insofar as one’s decisions are primarily motivated, not by 
the values at stake, but by the measure of the satisfactions and discomforts involved, one fails 
to self-transcend, to achieve authentic human existence.  
 Lonergan calls this thrust towards authenticity an exercise of vertical freedom. He 
distinguishes between horizontal and vertical liberty.  
Horizontal liberty is the exercise of liberty within a determinate horizon and from the 
basis of a corresponding existential stance. Vertical liberty is the exercise of liberty that 
selects that stance and the corresponding horizon.400  
Such vertical liberty may be either implicit or explicit. Implicit vertical liberty occurs insofar 
as we respond to the motives that direct us to ever greater authenticity, or insofar as we 
ignore these motives and fall into a decreasingly less authentic selfhood. This vertical liberty 
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may also be explicit. In this case one responds to the transcendental notion of value by 
deciding what kind of person one should aim to be, and what kinds of activities one should 
engage in, in the service of one’s fellow human beings.   
    Lonergan further elaborates on the relationship between freedom and authenticity in 
his discussion of how the fourth level of intentional consciousness goes beyond, while at the 
same time retaining, the other three. He describes this fourth level as ‘the level of freedom 
and responsibility, or moral self-transcendence . . . of self-direction and self-control.’401 It 
fulfils or fails to fulfil its responsibility insofar as we are attentive or inattentive in 
experiencing, intelligent or unintelligent in our investigations, reasonable or unreasonable in 
our judgements. From this understanding of how freedom and responsibility function 
cognitively, we can, according to Lonergan, dispose of the notion of will as arbitrary power, 
choosing indifferently between good and evil. Arbitrariness, he says, is just another name for 
unauthenticity. ‘To think of will as arbitrary power is to assume that authenticity never exists 
or occurs.’402  
The emergence of the fourth level of consciousness, according to Lonergan, is a 
gradual process that takes place between the ages of three and six.  
Then the child’s earlier affective symbiosis with the mother is complemented by 
relations with the father who recognizes in the child a potential person, tells him or her 
what he or she may and may not do, sets before him or her a model of human conduct, 
and promises to good  behaviour the later rewards of the self-determining adult. So the 
child gradually enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by values and, by 
the age of seven years, is thought to have attained the use of reason.403 
This, however, is only the beginning of human authenticity.  
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One has to have found out for oneself that one has to decide for oneself what one is to 
make of oneself; one has to have proved oneself equal to that moment of existential 
decision; and one has to have kept on proving it in all subsequent decisions, if one is to 
be an authentic human person.404 
Again we see here the connection between freedom and authenticity: one becomes an 
authentic person by realizing that one must choose in freedom what kind of person one will 
become, and one must continue to make the right choices.  
 Such an exercise of vertical freedom involves a movement from one horizon to 
another. There may, Lonergan says, be a sequence of such vertical exercises of freedom, 
where in each case the new horizon, while having more depth and breadth and richness, none 
the less is consistent with the old and is formed out of its potentialities. But it is also possible, 
Lonergan says, ‘that the movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of 
the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep 
revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth.’405 This about-face and new beginning is 
what Lonergan means by conversion.  
As we have seen, Lonergan speaks of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. As it 
is moral conversion that deals most directly with choices made in freedom, we shall briefly 
examine this notion again. As this will involve some repetition, I shall simply quote 
Lonergan’s account of moral conversion verbatim, emphasising the notions of freedom and 
authenticity. 
Moral conversion changes the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from satisfaction 
to values. As children or minors we are persuaded, cajoled, ordered, compelled to do 
what is right. As our knowledge of human reality increases, as our responses to human 
values are strengthened and refined, our mentors more and more leave us to ourselves so 
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that our freedom may exercise its ever advancing thrust towards authenticity. So we 
move to the existential moment when we discover for ourselves that our choosing affects 
ourselves no less that the chosen or rejected objects, and that it is up to each of us to 
decide for himself what he is to make of himself. Then is the time for the exercise of 
vertical freedom and then moral conversion consists of opting for the truly good, even 
for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict.406  
The notion of moral conversion involves the subject choosing in freedom the type of person 
he or she is to become. We become either authentic or unauthentic persons insofar as we 




 In this section, we shall analyse each of the above points in order to judge whether or 
not they have any value in terms of a dialogue with determinism. 
 For Lonergan, as we have seen, ‘we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the 
subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of 
action and proceeding to execute it.’ Insofar as that thrust of the self chooses not what merely 
seems to be good, but what is truly good, one achieves moral self-transcendence and exists 
authentically. It is true that we experience ourselves ‘terminating the process of deliberation,’ 
as Lonergan puts it, or making a decision and then proceeding to execute it. This experience, 
however, does not constitute evidence that what we experience is in fact free. By making 
positive decisions, according to Lonergan, we achieve moral self-transcendence and exist 
authentically. From a purely philosophical standpoint, this is uncertain. Self-transcendence 
and authenticity can only be convincingly argued if the possibility of free decisions has been 
                                                          




demonstrated. While Lonergan links decisions made in freedom with self-transcendence and 
authenticity, he does not demonstrate the possibility of such free decisions. Such possibility 
is, it seems, presupposed. 
 Lonergan further elaborates on this active thrust of the subject making a decision by 
distinguishing between horizontal and vertical liberty, and then making a further distinction 
between implicit and explicit vertical liberty. These distinctions describe different types of 
freedom. Lonergan speaks of horizons and existential stances: ‘Horizontal liberty is the 
exercise of liberty within a determinate horizon and from the basis of a corresponding 
existential stance.’ The bare fact of freedom, the possibility of freedom, is here presupposed; 
there is no argument presented to demonstrate it. Implicit vertical liberty occurs in responding 
to motives that lead one to ever fuller authenticity. Lonergan does not engage with the 
question of whether such responses are determined by psychological, sociological, or 
historical factors. Explicit vertical liberty occurs as one responds to the transcendental notion 
of value by determining what it would be worthwhile for one to make of oneself. Again, such 
responses could, arguably, be determined by psychological, sociological, or historical factors. 
This leaves the question of the possibility of freedom still to be settled.     
 Lonergan proceeds to speak of the fourth level of intentional consciousness as the 
level of freedom and responsibility, self-direction and self-control. It fulfils or fails to fulfil 
its responsibility insofar as we are attentive or inattentive in experiencing, intelligent or 
unintelligent in our investigations, reasonable or unreasonable in our judgements. The 
emergence of this fourth level of consciousness occurs in childhood and culminates in an 
existential moment in which a person decides what kind of person he or she is going to be, 
and continues to live up to this decision in the subsequent decisions he or she makes. 
Freedom, responsibility, self-direction, self-control are all realities that need to be 




fulfilled insofar as we are attentive in our experiencing, intelligent in our investigations, and 
reasonable in our judgements does not constitute a convincing argument for the possibility of 
freedom. As I have already argued, the notion that one reaches an existential moment when 
one decides what one is going to make of oneself is not convincing in terms of demonstrating 
the possibility of the freedom of such a decision, as such a moment could be determined by 
psychological, sociological, or historical factors. The same argument applies to all subsequent 
decisions.  
 Lonergan’s notion of moral conversion, which, as I have said, deals most directly with 
decisions made in freedom, adds no new element to his notion of freedom. The same 
arguments are presented and the same language used: we change the criterion of our 
decisions from satisfaction to values as our freedom exercises its ever advancing thrust 
towards authenticity. While there can be no doubt that historically certain people have 
changed the criterion of their decisions from satisfaction to values, thereby undergoing what 
Lonergan would call a moral conversion, there is no evidence in Lonergan’s presentation of 
moral conversion that demonstrates that this ‘existential’ moment has not been predetermined 
by one or a host of different factors.  
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 Lonergan’s notion of freedom in Method in Theology will not be convincing to the 
determinist. Because of the nature of this work – it is a treatise on theological method, 
written, presumably, for theologians – it is understandable that it contains much 
presupposition regarding things that Christians in general, and theologians in particular, 
accept as true, such as human freedom. In contrast, Insight is a purely philosophical work, 
written, not only for theologians, but for anyone interested in the cognitive processes 




directly with the general question of the possibility of ethics, and the particular questions of 
the possibility of objective moral knowledge, and of human freedom. It should not be 
surprising, then, that Lonergan’s earlier work on human freedom contains arguments that are 
far more effective in terms of dialoguing with determinism. For this reason, we shall again 
revert to Insight in our attempt to construct a synthetic account of sin that is capable of such 
effective dialogue.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Although Lonergan’s approach to sin in Method in Theology fails to take into account 
scriptural and traditional theological insights, it retains some of the essential elements of a 
classical, theological understanding of sin, namely, the importance of knowledge and 
freedom. However, in terms of constructing an effective dialogue with moral sceptics and 
determinists, I have argued that Lonergan’s notions of the good, value judgements, and 
human freedom are inadequate. I contended that there are problems with Lonergan’s 
grounding of value judgements in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion; namely, 
Method in Theology’s failure to provide a firm epistemological foundation for value 
judgements and dialectic; the circular nature of an argument that offers values as a criterion 
of truth in a discussion on the possibility of values; and the religious language, explicit or 
implicit, in Lonergan’s definitions of religious conversion. I also argued that Lonergan’s 
notion of freedom in Method in Theology is inadequate in terms of constructing an effective 
dialogue with determinists as, like the theology we examined in the first section of this 
dissertation, it contains too much presupposition regarding the fact or the reality of freedom. 
While Lonergan’s discussion of the nature of freedom is interesting, it lacks the critical 




These inadequacies in Method in Theology, I further argued, are due to the fact that 
Lonergan’s intended audience for this work is more specific than that of Insight. While 
Insight is aimed at whoever might be interested in epistemology, regardless of their faith 
presuppositions, Method in Theology’s intended reader is the theologian. Without this 
observation it could be construed that I am arguing that Lonergan lost all of his critical 
powers sometime between the publication of Insight and the writing of Method in Theology. I 
am, of course, not suggesting this. Method in Theology is a seminal work by a brilliant and 
respected philosopher and theologian. Its notions of the good and freedom have much merit 
and have been the subject of critical scrutiny by many scholars, none of which has dismissed 
Method in Theology as an inferior work to Insight.407 Furthermore, Lonergan’s notions of 
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion have received much attention and have been 
found to be very useful by many authors working in various areas of theology including 
religious education and moral theology.408 What I am suggesting, then, is not that Insight’s 
notions of the good and freedom are better than those of Method in Theology, but that 
because of the different intended readers of the two works, and the consequent lack of 
presupposition in the former, Insight will be more effective in terms of dialoguing with the 
moral sceptic and determinist. For this reason, in the next chapter, I shall draw upon the 
arguments for the good and human freedom presented in Insight to construct a theology of sin 
that is capable of such effective dialogue.      
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A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO SIN 
 
 The notion of sin in its fullest sense presupposes knowledge and freedom. This fact is 
reflected in the use the Church makes of the classical criteria for discerning whether sin is 
mortal or venial: grave matter, full knowledge, and deliberate consent. However, in order to 
develop a theology of sin that is capable of communicating to the moral sceptic and 
determinist, it is vital that we critically examine the following three notions: 1. There is an 
objective moral order, 2. Human beings are capable of discerning this order, and 3. Human 
beings are free to act morally. In the first section of this dissertation I argued that 
contemporary Church teaching and theological reflection on these themes fails to provide a 
solid rational basis for the notions of moral knowledge and human freedom. In section two 
we examined the work of Bernard Lonergan and I argued that his book, Insight is capable of 
providing this more secure rational foundation. However, I also noted that Lonergan fails to 
consider (at least explicitly) scripture and the Catholic theological tradition. I suggested, 
therefore, that a synthesis is needed in order to provide a balanced theology of sin that is both 
faithful to traditional theological method and also capable of communicating with the moral 
sceptic and determinist. 
 In this chapter I shall attempt to provide such a balanced theology of sin by using St 
Thomas’s dialectical method. In the first section we shall recap briefly on the notion of sin in 
Church teaching and contemporary theological reflection and its dependence on the notions 
of moral knowledge and human freedom. We shall then proceed to ask two questions, the 
first relating to concerns of moral sceptics, and the second to concerns of determinists. These 
questions are: 1. Is there an objective moral order which is discernible by human beings? and 




We shall consider these questions first from the point of view of the moral sceptic or 
determinist. Secondly, we shall look at the antithesis to these points of view in the theological 
tradition. Finally, we shall draw on Lonergan to respond to the various objections of the 
moral sceptic or determinist.  
 
1. KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM IN THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON SIN 
 In this section, we shall briefly recap on the notions of sin in the Church teaching and 
theological reflection that we examined in the first section of this dissertation, focusing on 
how these notions of sin rely on the anterior notions of knowledge and freedom. 
The Catechism defines sin as ‘an offence against reason, truth and right conscience,’ 
and as a ‘failure in genuine love of God and neighbour caused by a perverse attachment to 
certain goods.’ Sin ‘wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity.’ It has been 
defined as ‘an utterance, a deed or a desire contrary to the eternal law.’409 
 Mortal sin, in the Catechism, is defined as follows: ‘mortal sin destroys charity in the 
heart of man by a grave violation of God’s law,’410 and turns human beings away from their 
ultimate end and beatitude. By attacking charity, the vital principle within us, mortal sin 
makes necessary a new action of God’s mercy and a conversion of heart. 
 There are three criteria for discerning whether or not a sin is mortal or venial: ‘Mortal 
sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and 
deliberate consent.’411 Mortal sin presupposes knowledge of the sinful nature of the act, and 
of its opposition to God’s law. It also implies a consent that is sufficiently deliberate that it 
may be said to constitute a personal choice. 
 Bernard Häring defines mortal sin in terms of fundamental option, which is ‘the 
activation of a deep knowledge of self and of basic freedom by which a person commits 
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himself.’412 He speaks of the fundamental option against God and the good. Human beings, 
he says, can, with adequate freedom, choose false gods over the true God. Such a 
fundamental option corresponds to the theological concept of mortal sin. Sin, in its most 
malevolent sense, is turning away from God; it terminates the fundamental option for the 
good self-commitment to serving God and loving neighbour. Mortal sin is ‘a refusal of God’s 
friendship, opposition to the covenant, and total alienation of the person from God, from 
himself and from the community. It is a fundamental option against God and, explicitly or 
implicitly, a conscious idolatrous option for one’s own egotism or idols.’413 
 Richard Gula provides a definition of sin that captures well its reliance on the notions 
of knowledge and freedom: ‘mortal sin, as an expression of the person from deep levels of 
knowledge and freedom, is a conscious decision to act in a way which fashions a style of life 
that turns us away from relating to God, others, and the world in a positive and life-giving 
way.’414 
 Germain Grisez defines mortal sin as ‘a sin which is incompatible with divine life.’415 
He discusses the criteria for discerning whether a sin is mortal or venial. Sufficient reflection 
involves knowing that the act is gravely wrong. Reflection sufficient for mortal sin exists if 
two conditions are met: first, if one disregards one’s conscience, and second, if one’s 
conscience tells one that the matter is either grave or may be grave. Full consent, for Grisez, 
is a definite choice. Even when one knows that an act would be gravely wrong, one has not 
sinned until a positive decision has been made.  
 William May provides a succinct definition of sin, which, like Gula’s, captures well 
its reliance on the notions of knowledge and freedom. Sin, he says, is ‘a morally evil act, i.e., 
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a freely chosen act known to be contrary to the eternal law as this is made manifest in our 
conscience.’416 
 It is clear that the notion of sin, whether it is conceived in terms of fundamental 
option, or in terms of individual acts, includes the notions of knowledge and freedom. But 
how are we to communicate such an understanding of sin to the moral sceptic and 
determinist? We shall attempt to do so by drawing on Lonergan’s notions of sin, knowledge, 
and freedom to complement Church teaching and theological reflection on sin by answering, 
on their own (i.e., philosophical) terms, the concerns of moral sceptics and determinists.  
 As we saw in chapter three, Lonergan’s notion of sin in Insight, like the ones we have 
just examined, rely on the anterior notions of knowledge and freedom. Let us recall Insight’s 
definition of sin: 
By basic sin I shall mean the failure of free will to choose a morally obligatory course of 
action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible course of action. 
In our analysis of this definition we saw that what makes a course of action morally 
obligatory or morally reprehensible is grasping and affirming what one ought to do or what 
one ought not to do. In other words, what makes a particular course of action either morally 
obligatory or reprehensible is knowledge. Furthermore, in Lonergan’s analysis of sin, one 
sins when one freely chooses to reject the morally obligatory course of action or to accept the 
morally reprehensible one. We also saw that this notion of sin is supported by a critical 
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical framework.   
As I have indicated in the introduction to this chapter, I shall attempt a synthetic 
account of sin by utilizing St Thomas’s dialectical method to answer the following questions: 
1. Is there an objective moral order which is discernible by human beings? and 2. Are human 
beings free to act morally? Our attempt to answer these questions will involve an examination 
                                                          




of philosophical speculation on these issues, Church teaching, and Lonergan’s notion of sin 
and the anterior notions of knowledge and freedom. 
  
2. IS THERE AN OBJECTIVE MORAL ORDER WHICH IS DISCERNIBLE BY HUMAN 
BEINGS? 
 We begin by examining sections from two seminal texts in the area of moral 
scepticism, J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) and A. J. Ayer’s 
Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Both of these texts explicitly deny the possibility of 
objective truth in ethics. We shall proceed by examining the antithesis to these positions in 
the theological tradition, namely, the tradition’s affirmation of the possibility of ethical 
knowledge. Finally we shall draw on ideas from Lonergan’s Insight to respond to some of the 
objections of the above moral sceptics. 
  
2.1. Propositum: Moral Scepticism 
 The term ‘moral scepticism’ covers a multitude of different approaches to the 
question of the possibility of objective moral truth. A systematic elaboration of all of these 
approaches is beyond the scope of this work. For the purposes of this dissertation, then, I 
have selected two seminal texts in this area, J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong and A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. While both of these texts deny the 
possibility of objective truth in ethics, they do so in very different ways. So, while our 
treatment of moral scepticism is by no means exhaustive, it will provide us with an analysis 
of two very important approaches to moral scepticism, ‘error theory,’ which denies that there 
are objective values, and ‘emotivism,’ which denies that ethical propositions have any 





2.1.1. J. L. Mackie’s ‘Error Theory’  
 According to Mackie, ‘there are no objective values.’417 He offers three arguments to 
support this thesis, which we shall presently summarize. 
 The first argument Mackie makes to support his thesis is what he calls the argument 
from relativity. This argument, according to Mackie, is based on the well-known fact that 
different societies, conditioned as they are by the prevailing culture, show a diversity of 
moral codes. He also points out that there can be differences in moral beliefs between 
different groups and classes within a complex community. Mackie argues that radical 
differences between the moral judgements of various societies make it difficult to regard 
these judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. However, he says, it is not simply the 
fact that disagreements occur that tells against the objectivity of values. He points out that 
while disagreement exists on issues within the various sciences, this does not suggest that 
there are no objective issues for scientists to disagree about. However, such scientific 
disagreement results from speculative deductions or explanatory theories based on 
insufficient evidence. It is hardly plausible, Mackie suggests, to interpret moral disagreement 
in the same way. Instead he offers the following explanation for moral disagreement. 
Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to and participation 
in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is 
that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life 
rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of 
monogamy.418 
Mackie concludes that the argument from relativity has some power simply because the 
diversity of moral codes is more convincingly explained by the theory that they are a 
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reflection of the particular ways of life of those practicing these codes, than by the theory that 
they somehow express apprehensions or perceptions of objective values. 
 The second argument Mackie calls the argument from queerness. This argument has 
two parts, the first metaphysical, the second epistemological. Mackie argues that ‘if there 
were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange 
sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.’419 Correspondingly, he goes on to 
argue, ‘if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral 
perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything 
else.’420 Mackie observes that these points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of non-
natural qualities421 and by intuitionists who speak of a faculty which they call moral intuition. 
According to Mackie, the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of 
values is in the end committed. The suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral 
problems solved simply by sitting down and having an ethical intuition is, Mackie argues, a 
travesty of actual moral reasoning. But, however complex the real process of ethical 
reasoning is, if it is to produce ‘authoritatively prescriptive conclusions,’422 it must involve 
either premises or forms of argument or both. Mackie sums up his argument neatly in the 
following sentence: 
When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative 
prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premises or of the cogency of this 
distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory 
perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or 
inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, 
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will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is 
one to which the clear-headed objectivist is compelled to resort.423 
According to Mackie, to assert that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive 
entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is not, as a 
logical positivist would suggest, meaningless, but false. Hence Mackie’s is an ‘error theory.’ 
 Mackie suggests that another way of demonstrating the ‘queerness’ of these supposed 
objective values is to ask, about anything that is said to have some objective moral quality, 
how this quality is linked with its natural features. How do we connect the natural fact that an 
act is an event of intentional cruelty – for example, inflicting pain just for sport – and the 
moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be, Mackie argues, a logical or semantic necessity. 
Neither is it the fact that the two features occur simultaneously. The wrongness, he says, must 
somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient.’ In other words, it is wrong because it is an act 
of intentional cruelty. But, Mackie asks, ‘just what in the world is signified by this 
“because”?’424 And how can we know the relation that it signifies? Does this ‘wrongness’ not 
simply consist in the fact that such actions are socially condemned, by us as well as others, 
perhaps through our having developed attitudes to certain actions through social 
conditioning? It is not, Mackie continues, even enough to posit a faculty that enables one to 
‘see’ the wrongness. Rather, something must be posited that can see simultaneously the 
inherent features that make up the cruelty, and also the wrongness, and the strange 
consequential connection between the two. Alternatively, the required intuition might be the 
apprehension that wrongness is a property of a higher order, a property which belongs to 
certain natural properties. But what, Mackie asks, is entailed in this belonging of properties to 
other properties? And furthermore, how can we discern it? Mackie suggests that the situation 
would make more sense if we could replace the moral quality with some kind of subjective 
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response which would be causally related to the identification of the natural features on 
which the alleged quality is said to be supervenient or consequential. 
 In the third argument Mackie attempts to explain how the false belief in objective 
values ‘has become established and is so resistant to criticisms.’425 From a subjectivist 
viewpoint, he argues, those values which are generally considered to be objective, will in fact 
be based on the particular attitudes of the person, even though he considers himself to be 
recognizing and responding to objective values. Mackie attempts to explain this with 
reference to what Hume calls the mind’s ‘propensity to spread itself on external objects.’426 
The supposed objectivity of moral qualities arises from ‘the projection or objectification of 
moral attitudes.’427 Mackie draws an analogy with the ‘pathetic fallacy,’ the propensity to 
read our feelings into their objects. If a fungus, he says, gives rise to feelings of disgust, we 
may tend to attribute to the fungus itself a non-natural property of repulsiveness. In moral 
contexts, however, there is something other than this tendency operating. Moral attitudes, 
Mackie contends, are at least partly social in origin. That is, patterns of behaviour which are 
socially established, and, he adds, socially necessary, put pressure on individuals, and each 
individual is inclined to internalize these pressures and to begin to expect these patterns of 
behaviour of herself and of others. The attitudes projected and objectified into moral values 
do in fact have an external source, but not the one given to them by the belief in their 
categorical authority. Moreover, Mackie continues, people are motivated to objectify 
morality. Morality regulates interpersonal relations and controls some of the ways in which 
people act towards one another, ways that often oppose our own contrary inclinations. We 
therefore want our moral judgements to be decisive for others as well as for ourselves. 
Objective validity, Mackie contends, would give such moral judgements the decisiveness or 
authority needed. 
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2.1.2. The ‘Emotivism’ of A. J. Ayer 
 We begin our summary of Ayer’s moral scepticism with his contention that ‘a 
synthetic proposition [a statement whose predicate is not included in the subject] is 
significant only if it is empirically verifiable.’428 Working from this principle, Ayer analyses 
the nature of ethical statements in order to judge whether such statements can be said to be 
empirically verifiable and therefore significant. He contends that ‘in our language, sentences 
which contain normative ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences which express 
psychological propositions, or indeed empirical propositions of any kind.’429 In other words, 
statements that contain judgements of value that are held to be applicable to all, in fact have 
no objective validity. His argument can be divided into two parts.  
 The first argument proceeds as follows. If we concede that normative ethical concepts 
cannot be reduced to empirical concepts, we leave the way clear for the ‘absolutist’ view of 
ethics – this is the view that value statements are not, as ordinary empirical propositions, 
controlled by observation, but by a mysterious faculty known as ‘intellectual intuition.’ 
However, this theory, according to Ayer, ‘makes statements of value unverifiable.’430 For, he 
says, it is well known that what appears to be intuitively certain to one person may seem 
doubtful, or even false, to another. So unless we can provide some criterion by which one can 
choose between conflicting intuitions, simply appealing to intuition is valueless in terms of 
testing a proposition’s validity. In the case of moral judgements, Ayer argues, no such 
criterion can be provided. Some moralists, he points out, claim to settle the matter simply by 
asserting that they ‘know’ that their particular moral views are the correct ones. Such an 
assertion, he argues, is of purely psychological interest, and is completely incapable of 
proving the validity of any moral judgement. Moralists of the opposite view may make the 
identical claim that their particular moral judgements are correct, and ‘as far as subjective 
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certainty goes, there will be nothing to choose between them.’431 When these opposing views 
arise in connection with ordinary empirical propositions, we may attempt to resolve this 
opposition by adverting to, or actually conducting, some relevant empirical test. But, Ayer 
argues, ‘with regard to ethical statements, there is, on the “absolutist” or “intuitionist” theory, 
no relevant empirical test.’432 He concludes, therefore, that on this hypothesis moral 
statements are deemed to be unverifiable.  
 The second argument: Fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable because they 
are ‘mere pseudo-concepts.’433 The fact that a proposition contains an ethical symbol adds 
nothing to its factual content. So if we say to a person, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that 
money,’ we are not asserting anything more than if we had simply said, ‘You stole that 
money.’ By adding that the action is wrong we are not making any further assertion about it. 
We are simply indicating our moral disapproval of it. It is as if we had said, ‘You stole that 
money,’ in a distinct tone of horror, or written it adding special exclamation marks. Neither 
the tone nor the exclamation marks adds anything to the literal sense of the proposition. It 
simply demonstrates that its expression is accompanied by particular sentiments in the 
speaker. 
 If we now generalize our previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ we 
create a sentence that has no factual meaning; it expresses no proposition which we can say is 
either true or false. It is as if we wrote ‘Stealing money!!,’ where the shape and thickness of 
the exclamation marks demonstrates that a particular type of moral disapproval is the feeling 
that is being conveyed. It is clear, according to Ayer, that ‘there is nothing said here which 
can be true or false.’434 Another person may disagree with us about the wrongness of stealing, 
in that he/she may not feel the same about stealing as we do, and he/she may argue with us 
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about our moral sentiments. But he/she cannot, strictly speaking, contradict us. This is 
because in stating that a particular type of action is right or wrong, we are not making any 
factual assertion, not even an assertion about our own state of mind. We are simply 
conveying particular moral feelings. And the one who seems to be contradicting us is in fact 
merely expressing his/her moral sentiments. So, Ayer concludes, ‘there is plainly no sense in 
asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition.’435 
 What has just been said regarding the symbol ‘wrong’ applies to all normative ethical 
symbols. Sometimes these symbols occur in sentences that document ordinary empirical facts 
as well as conveying moral feeling about these facts. They may also occur in sentences which 
simply convey moral sentiments regarding a particular type of action or situation, without 
making an assertion of fact. However, in all cases in which a person would usually be said to 
be making an ethical judgement, ‘the function of the relevant ethical word is purely 
“emotive.”’436 Its function is to express sentiments about particular objects, not to assert 
anything about them. 
 
2.2. Sed Contra: The Theological Tradition’s Affirmation of 
the Possibility of Moral Discernment 
 The Catholic theological tradition affirms the possibility of moral discernment in its 
teaching on natural law and conscience. In contrast to both Mackie’s and Ayer’s theories, the 
Catholic doctrines of natural law and conscience assert that there is an objective moral order, 
a truth about morality which is discernible by the human person. In this section, we shall 
examine the Church’s teaching on natural law and conscience and how it contradicts both 
Mackie’s and Ayer’s theories.    
 
                                                          





2.2.1. Natural Law  
 In its discussion of natural law, the Catechism uses the terms ‘true’ and ‘good.’ It is 
these terms that provide the basis for the objectivity of morality. 
Man participates in the wisdom and goodness of the Creator who gives him mastery over 
his acts and the ability to govern himself with a view to the true and the good. The 
natural law expresses the original moral sense which enables man to discern by reason 
the good and the evil, the truth and the lie.437 
In his encyclical, Veritatis Splendor John Paul II uses similar terminology: 
In his journey towards God, the One who ‘alone is good,’ man must freely do good and 
avoid evil. But in order to accomplish this he must be able to distinguish good from evil. 
And this takes place above all thanks to the light of natural reason, the reflection in man 
of the splendour of God’s countenance.438 
These texts are in direct opposition to Mackie’s theory, according to which there are no 
objective values. The terms ‘true’ and ‘good’ when used in an ethical context, will hold little 
or no meaning for Mackie. They certainly will not serve as means to providing an objective 
grounding to morality. In contrast the terms ‘true’ and ‘good’ form the very foundation of the 
Church’s teaching on natural law. Because these terms hold such meaning for the Church it 
confidently asserts the objectivity of values. This assertion is grounded in the fact that there is 
a discernible truth regarding the way in which people live their lives. This truth is that some 
actions are incompatible with productive, happy, and healthy living for both the person acting 
and for those around her, and are therefore deemed ‘evil,’ and that others are compatible with 
such living and are therefore deemed ‘good.’  
 The Catechism proceeds to explain how the natural law is expressed in ethical 
precepts that provide human beings with a sense of meaning and direction in their lives: 
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The ‘divine and natural’ law shows man the way to follow so as to practise the good and 
attain his end. The natural law states the first and essential precepts which govern the 
moral life. It hinges upon the desire for God and submission to him, who is the source 
and judge of all that is good, as well as upon the sense that the other is one’s equal. Its 
principle precepts are expressed in the Decalogue.439 
John Paul II provides a similar statement of the importance of ethical precepts in giving a 
person meaning and direction: 
Man is able to recognise good and evil thanks to that discernment of good from evil 
which he himself carries out by his reason, in particular by his reason enlightened by 
Divine Revelation and by faith, through the law which God gave to the Chosen People, 
beginning with the commandments on Sinai. Israel was called to accept and to live out 
God’s law as a particular gift and sign of its election and of the divine Covenant, and 
also as a pledge of God’s blessing.440 
These texts are in stark contrast to Ayer’s theory that ethical statements have no meaning. 
Ethical statements, for the Church, have profound meaning as they provide a sense of purpose 
to people’s lives. Of course the kind of meaning that Ayer is speaking of and the kind that the 
Church is speaking of are very different. Ayer is speaking of meaning in the sense that a 
proposition can be said to be empirically verifiable. The Church, on the other hand, is 
speaking of meaning in terms of what gives a statement or precept value in terms of a 
person’s relationship with God and with his/her fellow human beings. However, if Ayer is 
correct and ethical statements have no meaning in his sense of the term, it is difficult to see 
how they could be meaningful in the Church’s sense. The Church’s teaching on the profound 
meaning of ethical precepts necessarily presupposes that these precepts are meaningful in the 
more scientific sense of the term.  
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So, the Church’s teaching on ethics is in direct opposition to Mackie’s and Ayer’s, as 
it positively affirms both the profound, and, implicitly, the scientific meaning of the terms 
‘true’ and ‘good.’ 
 
2.2.2. Conscience 
 The Church’s teaching on conscience also reflects the importance of the terms ‘true’ 
and ‘good’ in establishing a foundation for morality, and the importance of ethical precepts in 
providing a person with a sense of meaning and direction. There is also a further dimension 
to this teaching, namely conscience itself, that faculty which assists human beings in 
discerning good and evil, truth and falsehood. The following texts from the Catechism and 
Veritatis Splendor respectively illustrate these three elements in the Church’s teaching on 
conscience: 
Moral conscience, present at the heart of the person, enjoins him at the appropriate 
moment to do good and to avoid evil. It also judges particular choices, approving those 
that are good and denouncing those that are evil. It bears witness to the authority of truth 
in reference to the supreme Good to which the human person is drawn, and it welcomes 
the commandments. When he listens to his conscience, the prudent man can hear God 
speaking.441 
 
The judgement of conscience is a practical judgement, a judgement which makes known 
what man must do or not do, or which assesses an act already performed by him. It is a 
judgement which applies to a concrete situation the rational conviction that one must 
love and do good and avoid evil. The first principle of practical reason is part of the 
natural law; indeed it constitutes the very foundation of the natural law, inasmuch as it 
                                                          




expresses that primordial insight about good and evil, that reflection of God’s creative 
wisdom which, like an imperishable spark (scintilla animae), shines in the heart of every 
man.442 
Again, these texts are in direct opposition to both Mackie’s and Ayer’s theories. The terms 
‘true’ and ‘good’ establish a metaphysical foundation for ethics, thus opposing Mackie’s 
theory that there can be no such foundation. Moreover, we have already seen how the ethical 
precepts expressed in the Decalogue provide people with a deep sense of meaning and 
direction in their lives, and how this is in direct opposition to Ayer’s theory that such ethical 
precepts contain no scientific meaning whatsoever. Furthermore, the teaching on the faculty 
of conscience itself provides an even deeper sense of meaning. By listening to one’s 
conscience, one is in direct relationship to God; he or she can ‘hear God speaking.’  
The positing of a faculty such as conscience is directly opposed to Ayer’s theory for 
another reason. The notion of conscience would presumably fall into Ayer’s category of 
‘intellectual intuition.’ This notion for Ayer, as we have seen, makes ethical statements 
unverifiable, as what may seem certain to one person may appear doubtful or even false to 
another. For Ayer, then, the faculty of conscience would prove to be unreliable in terms of 
grounding an ethics. For the Church, however, it is vital, as, while the terms ‘true’ and ‘good’ 
provide the metaphysical grounding for ethics, conscience provides an epistemological one, 
as it is an informed conscience that allows the person to discern or know the true and the 
good. 
 Magisterial teaching on natural law and conscience, by unequivocally asserting the 
objectivity of values and the possibility of moral discernment, directly opposes the theories of 
Mackie and Ayer. However, as I argued in the first section of this dissertation, this teaching is 
not sufficiently developed philosophically, and is therefore not capable of adequately 
                                                          




dialoguing with the moral sceptic. For this reason we turn once again to Lonergan to respond 
to the philosophical theories of Mackie and Ayer. 
 
2.3. Responsio: Drawing on Lonergan to Answer the  
Objections of Moral Sceptics 
 In this section we shall attempt to respond to the objections of Mackie and Ayer by 
drawing on ideas from Lonergan’s Insight.  
Mackie’s argument is primarily metaphysical: there are no objective values, because 
if there were they would have to be entities or qualities or relations completely different from 
anything else in the universe. While there is an epistemological aspect to Mackie’s argument 
– namely, his argument against any kind of intuitionism – this argument is built directly upon 
the metaphysical one. Basically, then, Mackie’s argument can be summed up in the simple 
sentence that he begins his book with: ‘there are no objective values.’ To oppose this 
argument we shall draw upon Lonergan’s metaphysical argument for the intrinsic 
intelligibility of the good.  
Ayer’s argument is primarily epistemological: ethical statements are unverifiable; in 
other words, we cannot know if they are true or not. Against this argument we present 
Lonergan’s notion of the virtually unconditioned judgment. Such judgements include 
judgements of value and are understood to be not just meaningful but also verifiable and 
objectively true.    
 
2.3.1. Lonergan’s ‘Intrinsic Intelligibility’ Argument vs. Mackie’s Denial of Objective 
Values 
Lonergan speaks of the good in terms of the three-fold division of being into potency, 




terms of objects of desire, the intelligible orders within which these desires are fulfilled, and 
the terminal and originating values involved in deciding upon these orders and their 
components, and how he generalizes this method to speak instead of potential, formal, and 
actual good. He identifies the potential good with potential intelligibility (that which is to be 
known by experience), the formal good with formal intelligibility (that which is to be known 
by intelligent grasp), and the actual good with actual intelligibilities (that which is to be 
known by reasonable affirmation).  
 Lonergan argues that such a generalization of the notion of the good is justifiable, as it 
is already implicit in the narrower notion, that is, in the notion of the good in purely human 
terms. Objects of desire, he says, are manifold, ‘but they are not an isolated manifold. They 
are existents and events that in their concrete possibility and in their realization are bound 
inextricably through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the 
universe of proportionate being.’443 In other words, the many objects of desire, as existing 
and occurring, are part of the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being; 
consequently they cannot be separated from every other thing that exists and occurs in our 
universe. If objects of desire, Lonergan argues, are examples of the good because of the 
pleasures they give, then the remainder of the manifold of existents and events are also good, 
because desires are fulfilled only in the concrete universe and not in a fantasy world. In other 
words, objects of desire are produced as a result of a total manifold of existents and 
occurrences that constitute not some ideal world, but the actual world in which we live. 
  Lonergan proceeds to apply the same argument to humanly devised social orders. For 
Lonergan, the intelligible orders that human beings invent, implement, adjust, and improve, 
are merely further exploitations of pre-human intelligible orders.  
                                                          




All objects of desire and all human orders, then, come about not by necessity but 
contingently through a process that Lonergan terms ‘emergent probability.’ In other words, 
‘all objects of desire and all human orders are what they are by virtue of the events, natural 
laws, and statistical frequencies that condition and underpin their actuality.’444 For Lonergan, 
objects of desire, while manifold, are not an isolated manifold but are, rather, actualities and 
occurrences that in their actual possibility and in their fulfilment are inseparably bound 
through natural laws and statistical frequencies with the complete manifold of proportionate 
being. Similarly, humanly devised social orders are inextricably bound to all human orders 
that emerge in the world as a result of the same natural laws and statistical frequencies, so we 
cannot argue that some orders are good and others bad. As Lonergan puts it: ‘if the 
intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the 
satisfaction of desires, then so also are the intelligible orders that underlie, condition, precede, 
and include man’s invention.’445      
Intelligible orders and their contents as possible objects of rational choice, Lonergan 
says, are values. However, the universal order of emergent probability conditions and 
penetrates, corrects and develops every particular order. So, he argues, ‘rational self-
consciousness cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the 
part and reject the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent.’446 And so, since 
human beings are involved in choosing and since every consistent choice is, at least tacitly, a 
choice of universal order, the actualization of universal order is a true value. 
Lonergan draws the reader’s attention to the fact that the third part of the argument 
includes the other two. For, he says, ‘the actual good of value presupposes the formal good of 
order, and the formal good of order presupposes the potential good of a manifold to be 
                                                          






ordered.’447 Furthermore, the actualization of universal order is the actualization of all 
existents and all events. Universal order includes all intelligibilities as its component parts, 
and universal order assumes all manifolds that are ordered or to be ordered. So, Lonergan 
concludes, ‘the good is identified with the intelligibility intrinsic to being.’448 Or, in other 
words, the good is identified with what is to be known by experience, intelligent grasp, and 
reasonable affirmation. This includes potential, formal, and actual good, or the total manifold 
of proportionate being. So the good is identified with the total universe of proportionate 
being.  
According to Mackie, there are no objective values. He argues that ‘if there were 
objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, 
utterly different from anything else in the universe.’449 Correspondingly, he continues, an 
awareness of such objective values would necessitate some special faculty of moral 
perception or intuition, completely different from our regular modes of knowing everything 
else.   
In Lonergan’s Insight the objectivity of values stems from his notion of the good. The 
good, like being, is that which is to be known through experience, intelligent grasp, and 
reasonable affirmation, as well as the further cognitive activities of deliberation and decision, 
choice and will.450  
The objectivity of values in Insight stems from the ontological grounding of the 
notion of the good. But how do Lonergan’s notions of being and the good stand up against 
Mackie’s critique that if there were objective values they would be entities or qualities or 
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe? Certainly 
the notion of being can seem extremely abstract, a generalization removed from any concrete 
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reality. However, in turning to the subject in the search for the meaning of objectivity, 
Lonergan provides us with a notion of being which is grounded in an understanding of the 
self-evident cognitional activities of human beings. Being, in Insight, is the objective of the 
pure desire to know. The fact that human beings desire to know is indisputable. What 
Lonergan does in Insight is to postulate this desire first and then ask the question, What is the 
objective of the pure desire to know? The answer he comes up with is being.  
As the objective of the pure desire to know, being is intimately connected with human 
cognitional activity. This grounding of the notion of being in the activity of the subject gives 
it a concreteness which is lacking in a notion of being that does not have this grounding. To 
speak of being without speaking of particular beings is to abstract, and some abstraction may 
be necessary in dealing with foundational issues in ethics or indeed in other foundational 
areas. But to speak of being without speaking of particular beings, or without connecting the 
notion to human cognitional activity is just too much abstraction. We are left with a notion 
that seems to have no connection to anything and can appear therefore to be unreal. Lonergan 
avoids this excessive abstraction by turning to the subject.  
Lonergan’s notion of the good, as we have seen, is intimately connected with his 
notion of being. The good is identified with the intelligibility intrinsic to being. In other 
words, the good is that which is to be known through experience, intelligent grasp, and 
reasonable affirmation. Like his notion of being, Lonergan’s notion of the good is intimately 
connected with the cognitional activities of the human subject, giving it a concreteness that it 
would lack without such a connection. 
 In answer, then, to Mackie’s thesis that there are no objective values as they would 
have to be entities or qualities or relations of a strange sort, utterly different from anything 
else in the universe, we offer Lonergan’s notion of objective value which stems from his 




as the objective of the pure desire to know, there is nothing ‘strange’ about Lonergan’s 
notions of being and the good. If, with Lonergan, we assume that there is a pure desire to 
know – which, it seems, is fairly self-evident – it is natural to assume that there is an object or 
objective towards which this desire strives. This objective is being or the good. As to the 
question that Mackie raises regarding our awareness of objective values – that this awareness 
would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different 
from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else – we may answer that Lonergan’s way of 
knowing value is essentially the same as his way of knowing everything else in the universe, 
namely, through experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation.   
 
2.3.2. Lonergan’s ‘Virtually Unconditioned’ vs. Ayer’s Unverifiability Theory 
 In the introduction to the chapter in Insight on reflective understanding, Lonergan 
indicates his intention of attempting to determine what exactly is meant by the sufficiency of 
the evidence for a prospective judgement, or, in other words: What is the nature of the 
evidence that allows for an affirmative judgement? 
There is presupposed a question for reflection, ‘Is it so?’ There follows a judgement, ‘It 
is so.’ Between the two there is a marshalling and weighing of evidence. But what are 
the scales on which evidence is weighed? What weight must evidence have, if one is to 
pronounce a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’?451  
For Lonergan, this pronouncement of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ involves what he terms a ‘virtually 
unconditioned judgement’: ‘To grasp the evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgement 
is to grasp the prospective judgement as virtually unconditioned.’452 He distinguishes 
between the formally and the virtually unconditioned. The former has no conditions, while 
the latter has conditions that are fulfilled. A virtually unconditioned judgement, then, 
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involves three elements: a conditioned, a connection between the conditioned and its 
conditions, and the fulfilment of the conditions. A prospective judgement, therefore, will be 
virtually unconditioned if 1) it is the conditioned, 2) its conditions are known, and 3) the 
conditions are fulfilled. 
 The simple fact that a question for reflection has been presented makes the 
prospective judgement a conditioned, as it requires evidence sufficient for a reasonable 
pronouncement of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no.’ The role of reflective understanding is to meet the 
question for reflection by changing the status of the prospective judgement from that of a 
conditioned to that of a virtually unconditioned. This change occurs as reflective 
understanding grasps the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfilment.  
  Lonergan illustrates this general scheme with a basic syllogism that demonstrates the 
form of deductive inference:  
If A, then B.  
But A.  
Therefore B. 
Or, more concretely: 
If X is material and alive, X is mortal.  
But men are material and alive. 
Therefore, men are mortal.453 
The conclusion is a conditioned, as it needs to be supported by an argument. The major 
premise connects the conditioned to its conditions by affirming, If A, then B. The minor 
premise presents the fulfilment of the conditions by affirming the prior A. The role of the 
form of deductive inference is to show a conclusion as virtually unconditioned. Reflective 
                                                          




insight apprehends the pattern, and the one reflecting is rationally compelled to make a 
judgement. 
 The question that was presupposed in Lonergan’s analysis of the form of deductive 
inference, ‘Is it so?’, stems from what he terms ‘the pure desire to know.’ But just what is the 
objective of the pure desire to know? It is, of course, as we saw in the last subsection, being. 
Before further analysing this notion of being as the objective of the pure desire to know, let 
us look at Lonergan’s definition of the pure desire to know itself. 
By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for 
intelligence and for reflection. It is not the verbal utterance of questions. It is not the 
conceptual formulation of questions. It is not any insight or thought. It is not any 
reflective grasp or judgement. It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional 
process from sense to imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgement, 
from judgement to the complete context of correct judgements that is named knowledge. 
The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man.454 
The objective of this pure desire to know, according to Lonergan, is being.455 It follows that 
being is 1) all that is known, and 2) all that remains to be known. Since a complete increment 
of knowledge happens only in judgement, being is ‘what is to be known by the totality of true 
judgements.’456 This totality consists of the complete set of answers to the complete set of 
questions. We do not yet know what these answers are and the questions have yet to arise. 
What is important for Lonergan is not the complete set of answers or the complete set of 
questions, but the fact that ‘there exists a pure desire to know, an inquiring and critical spirit, 
that follows up questions with further questions, that heads for some objective which has 
been named being.’457  
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  In his definition of sin in Insight, Lonergan states that ‘as intelligently and rationally 
conscious, man grasps what he ought to do and what he ought not to do.’ In other words, as 
intelligent and reasonable, human beings grasp what is good and what is evil. The desire that 
motivates this judgement of good or evil is the same as that which motivates judgement in 
matters of fact, namely, the desire to know. There is, however, a difference between 
judgement in matters of fact and judgement in matters of action, as Lonergan explains in 
chapter 18: 
While speculative and factual insights are concerned to lead to knowledge of being, 
practical insights are concerned to lead to the making of being. Their objective is not 
what is but what is to be done. They reveal not the unities and relations of things as they 
are, but the unities and relations of possible courses of action.458 
Significant in this passage is the connection between being and the good. Practical insights, 
Lonergan says, are concerned to lead to the making of being. Their objective is what is to be 
done, or, in others words, the good. The virtually unconditioned judgement, then, includes 
judgements not only on what is ‘so’ but also on what is to be done. The practical, ethical 
judgement, in other words, is, in Lonergan’s Insight, a virtually unconditioned judgement. 
 How can Lonergan’s notion of a virtually unconditioned judgement answer Ayer’s 
objections to the objectivity of ethical judgements? Let us attempt to respond to Ayer’s two 
main arguments by drawing on Lonergan. 
 Firstly, Ayer contends that ethical judgements cannot be validated on the basis of 
intellectual intuition. Rather, such judgements would need to be empirically verifiable. The 
question we need to ask, then, is as follows: Does the virtually unconditioned judgement 
contain this empirical criterion? Let us examine the notion again in light of this question. The 
virtually unconditioned judgement takes the form of a deductive inference. This involves an 
                                                          




empirical analysis of the evidence resulting in a conclusion or judgement deduced from the 
evidence. But what, we may ask, is the nature of the evidence examined in this way in the 
case of ethical judgements? According to Lonergan, judgements of value are concerned to 
lead to the making of being. They are concerned with the unities and relations, not of things 
as they are, but with the unities and relations of possible courses of action. The procedure, 
however, for reaching a judgement of value is the same as that for reaching a judgement of 
fact. In each case the judgement will be a virtually unconditioned one. The evidence will be 
examined empirically and a conclusion or judgement will be deduced from the evidence. 
Lonergan’s procedure for reaching ethical judgements is completely scientific. It involves not 
‘intellectual intuition’ but intellectual judgement deduced from empirically analysed data. 
 Ayer’s second argument is that fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable 
because they are mere pseudo-concepts. The fact that a proposition contains an ethical 
symbol adds nothing to its factual content. The main ethical symbol that Lonergan uses is 
‘the good.’ As we have seen, this notion is grounded in a notion of being, which in turn is 
grounded in an analysis of human cognition. So, if a proposition contains the ethical concept 
‘good,’ as Lonergan understands it, this would indeed add something to the content of the 
proposition. To say that something is ‘good’ is to say that it corresponds with being. This is 
another way of saying that it is true or that it is real. So to say that stealing is wrong or bad, as 
Lonergan would understand these terms, is to say that it does not correspond with being, or 
that it is untrue or unreal. Of course the act of stealing is just a fact; it cannot be denied. 
However, to say that stealing is wrong is not to deny the fact of stealing; rather, it is to say 
that stealing is an act that goes against our true natures, an act that runs contrary to our true 
being. The addition of ethical symbols, then, as Lonergan understands them, adds greatly to 
the content of a proposition. ‘Stealing is wrong’ expresses much more than mere sentiment 




nature as human beings. The addition of the ethical symbol ‘wrong,’ points far beyond the 
mere act of stealing to the significance of this act for human beings. Furthermore, the 
judgement that ‘stealing is wrong,’ understood in Lonergan’s terms, will not only have 
meaning because of the grounding of ethical concepts in the notion of being; it will also have 
meaning as it is a virtually unconditioned judgement based on observation of the relevant 
data. 
 
3. ARE HUMAN BEINGS FREE TO ACT MORALLY? 
 Our method of investigating this question will be the same as the one we used to 
investigate the prior question of moral objectivity and knowledge, namely, St Thomas’s 
dialectical method. In the first section we shall present one version of the complex thesis 
known as determinism, followed by a brief examination of the implications of this thesis for 
ethics. In the second section we shall examine the contrary thesis, namely the theological 
tradition’s affirmation of free will. Finally, we shall present Lonergan’s notions of statistical 
residues and the contingency of the will in response to the thesis presented in the first section. 
 
3.1. Propositum: Determinism 
 In our discussion of freedom in this dissertation we have often referred to the notion 
of determinism. This term, however, has been used in a very broad sense to refer to any 
notion that suggests that human actions are not free but necessitated for one reason or 
another. However, when we come to investigate a little further the notion of determinism, we 
find two important things. Firstly, the term ‘determinism’ is indeed a very broad one. In fact, 




Sobel, points out that there are at least ninety varieties of determinism.459 Bishop also 
observes that there are several ways that determinism can be construed – he gives as 
examples physical, psychological, theological, logical, and metaphysical determinism. 
Secondly, in terms of the implications of determinism for ethics, philosophers have drawn 
diametrically opposed conclusions. On one side we have the philosophers who argue that 
determinism is incompatible with free will, and on the other we have those who argue that 
determinism and free will are compatible. 
  In this section, we shall examine an argument for physical determinism by Ted 
Honderich. My justification for choosing to examine this type of determinism is that the 
paradigm of all scientific enquiry today is natural science. So, in Method in Theology, 
Lonergan makes the following observation: ‘. . . today the English word, science, means 
natural science. One descends a rung or more in the ladder when one speaks of behavioural or 
human sciences. Theologians finally have to be content if their subject is included in a list not 
of sciences but of academic disciplines.’460 If we wish, therefore, to demonstrate scientifically 
that human actions are free, we shall do well to critique physical determinism, which is based 
on the paradigm of scientific enquiry, natural science.  
In the second part of this section, we shall briefly examine the implications of 
determinism for ethics. Specifically, we shall examine the notions of hard determinism or 
incompatibilism, and soft determinism or compatibilism. The notion that determinism is 
incompatible with free will has obvious implications for ethics. The contrary notion that 
determinism and free will are compatible is also important to us as we present determinism as 
a contrary thesis to the notion of free will, which, as we shall see when we come to examine 
the notion of ‘soft’ determinism, does not tell the whole story.  
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While it is important to mention these contrasting implications of determinism for 
ethics, later, when we come to respond to determinism by drawing on Lonergan, I intend to 
argue that determinism itself is false, thus making the issue of its compatibility with free will 
irrelevant.      
 
3.1.1. Ted Honderich’s Deterministic Argument from Common Experience 
 In a paper published in the Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Ted Honderich offers an 
argument for the truth of determinism based on our common experience of how physical 
events occur. We begin by looking at his definitions of three important terms: 1. Event, 2. 
Explanation, 3. Effect. This will help us to better understand his basic argument. 
 1) An event, Honderich says, is ‘something in space and time, just some of it, and so 
it is rightly said to be something that occurs or happens.’461 It is not a number or a proposition 
or any other abstract object. Events, then, are ‘individuals in a stretch of time and space.’462   
 2) Explanation: Honderich offers the following prerequisite for saying that an event 
has an explanation, in the fundamental sense. There must be, he says, ‘something else of 
which it is the effect.’463 In other words, if there is to be an answer to the fundamental 
question of why an event occurred, there must be something of which it was the effect. 
 3) Finally, we have Honderich’s definition of the term ‘effect.’ ‘A standard effect is 
an event that had to happen, or could not have failed to happen or been otherwise than it was, 
given the preceding causal circumstance, this being a set of events.’464 
 Let us now examine Honderich’s basic argument for determinism. He begins by 
observing that in his life so far he has never known a single event to lack an explanation in 
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the fundamental sense. No spoon, he says, has mysteriously levitated at breakfast. There has 
been absolutely no evidence of there being no explanation to be found of a particular event. 
On the contrary, he claims, despite the fact that we neither seek out nor arrive at the full 
explanations in question, our experience is basically made up of events that we understand to 
have such explanations. So, he argues, putting to one side such events as choices and 
decisions, our lives are made up only of events that we understand to have fundamental 
explanations. Thus, he concludes, ‘no general proposition of interest has greater inductive 
and empirical support than that all events whatever, including the choices or decisions and 
the like, have explanations.’465 In other words, returning to Honderich’s definitions, all 
events, including choices and decisions, are the result of something else of which the events 
are the effect. And a standard effect is ‘an event that had to happen, or could not have failed 
to happen or been otherwise than it was, given the preceding causal circumstance, this being 
a set of events.’466 Honderich’s basic argument is that going on our everyday experience of 
the occurrence of events, it is reasonable to conclude that all of these events are necessitated 
by prior circumstances of which the event is the effect. There is nothing in our experience 
that suggests that things are otherwise. 
 This argument is based on a particular scientific paradigm, namely, classical physics, 
which, put very simply, is a set of theories based on an understanding that every event is the 
effect of a prior cause. However, the twentieth century saw a paradigm shift in science from 
classical physics to quantum mechanics. Honderich examines quantum mechanics as a 
possible refutation of his argument. 
 According to Honderich, so-called ‘quantum events,’ are, reportedly, ‘far below the 
level of spoon movements and, more importantly, far below the neural events associated with 
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consciousness and conscious choices or decisions in neuroscience.’467 On this lower level of 
reality, so-called ‘micro events’ are not, like the ordinary macro events of our lives, 
necessitated by prior circumstances, but occur randomly or by chance.  
 According to Honderich there is ‘no direct and univocal experimental evidence of the 
existence of quantum events.’468 He proceeds, however, to consider how such quantum 
events, if they do exist, are to be conceived: ‘How are we to think of these items that are 
supposed to turn up in our heads and, as some say, leave room for traditional free will?’469 
According to Honderich, physicists say that they are ‘baffling, weird and wonderful, self-
contradictory, inexplicable, etc., etc.’470 These so-called events do not involve ‘particles’ as 
we generally understand and define the term, and the special use of the word ‘particle’ within 
analyses of the mathematics of quantum theory cannot be adequately defined. This is true 
also with uses of terms such as ‘position’ and ‘location.’  
Honderich proceeds by noting what he says is a well-known collection of physicists’ 
own speculations regarding the nature of quantum events. They are: observer-dependent 
facts, subjective ideas, contents of our consciousness of reality, epistemological concepts, 
ideal concepts, propositions, probabilities, possibilities, features of a calculation, 
mathematical objects or devices, statistical phenomena, measures and measurements, abstract 
particles, probability waves, waves in abstract mathematical space, waves of no real physical 
existence, abstract constructs of the imagination, theoretical entities without empirical reality. 
According to Honderich, this noted collection of speculations about the nature of quantum 
events shows that ‘physics has not started on the job . . . of showing that there are events that 
lack explanations. This is so, simply, because it remains a probability that quantum events, 
so-called, are not events. . . . it is probable that they are not things that occur or happen, but 
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are of the nature of numbers and propositions, out of space and time. They are theoretical 
entities in a special sense of that term, not events.’471 Honderich’s argument for determinism 
is both a positive argument from experience based on classical physics, and also a denial of a 
posited micro level of reality that some claim is capable of refuting this kind of argument.  
Honderich goes on to deal specifically with one of the items on the list of physicists’ 
speculations about the nature of quantum events, namely, probability. The first thing he notes 
is that while events may be very probable, there is no answer to the question of why, 
fundamentally, these events have occurred. To give an event a 95 percent probability is 
precisely not to maintain that it had to, or could not have failed to occur. Rather, this 
assignation of a 95 percent probability of an event precisely keeps open the possibility that it 
might not have occurred. In fact, he says, there is no answer to the question of why in the 
fundamental sense the event happened; there is no relevant fact to be known. 
There is, however, according to Honderich, a sense in which an event is explained if it 
is established as having been very probable. His argument proceeds as follows: What is it, he 
asks, for event A to have made the occurrence of event B 95 percent probable? He answers 
that in 95 percent of the situations where an event of the type of A occurs, there is a causal 
circumstance for an event of the type of B. He argues that we have good evidence for this, 
even if we do not know exactly what the circumstance consists of. Whatever this non-
fundamental explanation of B turns out to be, then, it presupposes the possibility of a 
fundamental explanation of B. It presupposes precisely the existence of an as yet unnamed 
causal circumstance for B. Honderich concludes that this non-fundamental explanation of B 
presupposes that B was a necessitated event.  
 
 





3.1.2. Implications of Determinism for Ethics and Sin 
 The notion that events, including human actions, are determined by prior 
circumstances has obvious implications for ethics and sin. The notion of determinism puts in 
question the idea that human actions are free. Or so it would seem. In fact philosophers who 
assume determinism to be true can be divided into two distinct groups. On the one hand we 
have the incompatibilists or hard determinists who contend that determinism is incompatible 
with free will, and on the other we have the compatibilists or soft determinists who contend 
that determinism is compatible with free will. In this subsection we shall examine each of 
these notions of determinism and their implications for ethics and sin. We shall also attempt 
to discern what the Church’s position is with regard to this debate. 
 
A. Incompatibilism or Hard Determinism 
 Incompatibilism or hard determinism is the thesis that free will and determinism are, 
as the first of these terms suggests, incompatible. The arguments for this thesis are many and 
complicated, but we need not concern ourselves with them here. As I have already indicated, 
when we come to examine Lonergan’s notion of freedom and how it responds to 
determinism, we shall argue that determinism itself is false, thus making the issue of its 
compatibility (or incompatibility) with free will irrelevant. Still, we need to briefly examine 
both the incompatibilist’s and the compatibilist’s arguments in order to get the full story of 
the relationship between determinism and its implications for ethics and sin.  
 In his book, An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen provides the following 
argument for the incompatibility of determinism and free will. 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and 




neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these 
things (including our present acts) are not up to us.472 
The implications of this argument for the notion of sin are rather obvious, so we shall not 
dwell on them here. Suffice it to say that if the incompatibilist’s argument is true, this 
seriously undermines the notion of sin as it is traditionally understood. If determinism is true, 
and this truth is incompatible with free will, the third of the traditional criteria for discerning 
whether or not a sin is mortal or venial, deliberate consent, is rendered meaningless. This is 
so because when we deliberate on an act, we can give our consent to it only if we have the 
freedom to choose or reject the act. However, if the incompatibilist is right, we do not have 
this freedom as our acts are determined by the laws of nature and past events. 
 There is, however, another view regarding determinism and free will that we must 
examine, as it does not, as the view we have just examined, undermine the traditional 
understanding of sin. 
 
B. Compatibilism or Soft Determinism 
 Compatibilism or soft determinism is the thesis that determinism and free will are 
compatible. In this subsection, we shall briefly examine a synopsis of this thesis and its 
implications for the traditional understanding of sin. 
 In his paper, ‘Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues,’ Bernard Berofsky provides a 
useful summary of the compatibilist’s notion of freedom and its relation to determinism. 
Basically, the compatibilists charged the opposition with two confusions. Causation, 
which is not freedom-undermining even in its deterministic forms, is confused with 
compulsion or coercion, which, of course, is freedom-undermining. A physical barrier or 
even an internal compulsion or addiction can be an impediment to action; but when one 
                                                          




acts simply because one wants to, one is not being impeded from acting otherwise. 
Hence, one is expressing one’s freedom by doing what one wants. Second, although 
determinism entails that all human behaviour is subsumable under universal law, 
freedom is not thereby threatened, for the sorts of laws involved are merely descriptive 
(natural, scientific), not prescriptive, like the laws of a legislative body. They just 
describe the way in which people behave; they do not force or constrain adherence.473 
This approach to the question of the compatibility of determinism and freedom seems quite 
reasonable. In fact it bears some resemblance to Lonergan’s notions of essential and effective 
freedom. In Lonergan’s terms the compatibilist is saying that there are restrictions upon a 
person’s effective freedom caused by 1: external constraint and 2: scotosis which results in a 
conflict between the operators of intellectual and psychoneural development. The person is, 
however, essentially free to do what he/she wants to do; he/she is not being impeded from 
acting otherwise. However, the major difference between Lonergan and the soft determinist is 
that Lonergan denies the reality of determinism.   
 While the soft determinist’s argument is somewhat plausible, the notion that natural 
laws are merely descriptive and not prescriptive is rather unconvincing. The classic 
expression of Newton’s law of gravity is not ‘What goes up also comes down,’ but ‘What 
goes up must come down.’ The law of gravity not only describes what happens but also 
predicts what will happen based on an understanding of cause and effect. For this reason, the 
compatibilist’s argument that natural, scientific laws merely describe the way that people 




                                                          




C. Church Teaching 
What, we might ask, is the Church’s position regarding the compatibility or 
incompatibility of determinism and freedom? Church teaching and theological reflection on 
freedom, while obviously in conflict with hard determinism is not, it seems, necessarily in 
conflict with soft determinism. Let us take for example the Catechism’s definition of 
freedom: ‘the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to 
perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility.’474 It is obvious that this definition is 
an affirmation of human freedom, but this, as we have seen, does not necessarily mean that it 
is a denial of determinism. So, in order to ascertain precisely what the Church’s position is, 
we must ask whether this definition of freedom also implies a denial of determinism. The 
question is not whether the Church’s position can be considered ‘hard determinist’ – 
obviously it cannot as the hard determinist denies the reality of human freedom – but whether 
it can be considered ‘soft determinist.’ 
 The soft determinist’s view of freedom is one of non-coercion, of not being physically 
constrained or impeded by compulsion or addiction. The Catechism recognises the reality of 
these impediments to freedom. While freedom, it says, makes a person responsible for her 
acts insofar as they are voluntary, there are a number of impediments to such voluntariness: 
‘Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by 
ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments and other psychological 
or social factors.’475 Putting aside these factors, the person is free to ‘perform deliberate 
actions on one’s own responsibility.’ This is in accordance with the soft determinist’s 
position. Both the Catechism and the soft determinist recognise serious impediments to 
freedom, but ultimately affirm its reality. While it may be argued that the Catechism’s view 
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of freedom is much richer than that of the soft determinist’s, still there seems to be nothing in 
its view of freedom that obviously refutes the soft determinist’s position.  
I contend, then, that the Church’s position could be construed as soft determinist, 
although I am not suggesting that it is soft determinist. It is impossible to be sure about this as 
it is not the Church’s business to take decisive positions on purely scientific arguments such 
as causal determinism. For this reason, we shall examine magisterial teaching on freedom as 
a contrary thesis to hard determinism only. Our response, which will draw on Lonergan, by 
refuting causal determinism itself, will serve as a refutation of both hard and soft 
determinism. The position we shall be left with will be what’s known as indeterminism, the 
doctrine that determinism itself is false. This doctrine leaves room for the possibility of 
human free will and, consequently, sin as it has been traditionally understood. 
 
3.2. Sed Contra: Magisterial Teaching on Freedom as a  
Contrary Thesis to Hard Determinism 
 Hard determinism, as we have seen, is the thesis that causal determinism is true, and 
that this truth is incompatible with human freedom. Freedom, therefore, according to this 
thesis, does not exist. Contrary to this thesis is magisterial teaching on freedom, which 
unequivocally affirms the truth that human beings are free with regard to their actions. This 
truth stems from a theological anthropology that asserts that human beings are created by 
God with the freedom to choose. In this section we shall briefly examine some important 
magisterial texts that reflect this teaching on human freedom. While I examined these texts in 
the first section of this dissertation, I focused on what I argued were the texts weaknesses, 
whereas here I shall focus on their strengths. The Church’s teaching on freedom is strong in 




and social impediments to freedom, and 2) Despite this recognition it unequivocally affirms 
the freedom and the consequent dignity of the human person. 
 Paragraph 1730 of the Catechism, which quotes scripture, Gaudium et Spes, and St 
Irenaeus, perfectly reflects the doctrine of freedom stemming from the aforementioned 
theological anthropology.  
God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person who can 
initiate and control his own actions. ‘God willed that man should be “left in the hand of 
his own counsel,” so that he might of his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain 
his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him.’476 
‘Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master over his 
acts.’477  
 Despite the fact that the Catechism, as we have seen, recognises a number of 
impediments to freedom, it also unequivocally asserts that human beings are, to borrow 
Lonergan’s terminology, essentially free. Human beings are ‘created with free will’ and are 
masters of their own behaviour. This teaching is directly opposed to the hard determinist’s 
position, which denies the reality of human freedom.  
 Paragraph 1731 defines freedom as ‘the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not 
to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility.’478 
This too is in contradiction with the hard determinist’s position, as one of the implications of 
the hard determinist’s position is a lack of moral culpability of the person acting. If 
determinism is true and all human actions are the result of the laws of nature and past events, 
then the person cannot be held responsible for his or her actions because of his or her lack of 
freedom. On the contrary, the Catechism again unquestionably asserts the culpability of the 
person acting, as such a person is said to ‘perform deliberate actions on one’s own 
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responsibility.’ Such freedom, according to the Catechism, is ‘the basis of praise or blame, 
merit or reproach.’479 While past events are taken into account as they can affect a person in a 
number of different ways – namely the above-mentioned social and psychological factors – 
human freedom and culpability are unambiguously proclaimed.  
 Gaudium et Spes also gives an account of freedom, which, while pastorally sensitive, 
in that it recognises both social and psychological factors that can impede human freedom, 
unequivocally affirms the freedom and consequent dignity of the human person.   
Genuine freedom is an exceptional sign of the image of God in humanity. . . . Their 
dignity therefore requires them to act out of conscious and free choice, as moved and 
drawn in a personal way from within, and not by their own blind impulses or by external 
constraint. People gain such dignity when, freeing themselves of all slavery to the 
passions, they press forward towards their goal by freely choosing what is good, and, by 
their diligence and skill, effectively secure for themselves the means suited to this end. 
Since human freedom has been weakened by sin it is only by the help of God’s grace 
that people can properly orientate their actions towards God.480 
Like the Catechism, the Council reflects the theological anthropology behind its teaching on 
freedom: ‘Genuine freedom is an exceptional sign of the image of God in humanity.’ Again 
like the Catechism, the Council recognises impediments to freedom, namely ‘blind impulses’ 
and ‘external constraint,’ but unequivocally asserts that human beings are free, that they can 
‘act out of conscious and free choice.’  
This is again in contradiction with the hard determinist’s position which denies the 
reality of ‘conscious and free choice.’ For the hard determinist, human perception of acting in 
freedom is merely an illusion. The reality is that the choices that human beings make are 
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inevitable given the laws of nature and past events. The Council, on the other hand, 
recognises that human freedom has been weakened but not completely diminished by sin.  
 Like the Catechism, the Council unquestionably asserts the accountability of the 
acting person. Citing St Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians, it proclaims that ‘before the 
judgement seat of God everybody will have to give an account of their life, according as they 
have done either good or evil.’481 This culpability is a consequence of the fact that despite the 
impediments to freedom and the fact that freedom has been weakened by sin, human beings 
are still fundamentally free. So, while the hard determinist denies that human beings can be 
held accountable for their actions, as these actions are determined by natural laws and past 
events, the Council on the other hand contends that human beings, because fundamentally 
free, are responsible for their actions.  
 In Reconciliatio et Paenitentia John Paul II provides the following account of sin and 
freedom: 
Sin, in the proper sense, is always a personal act, since it is an act of freedom on the part 
of an individual person, and not properly of a group or community. This individual may 
be conditioned, incited and influenced by numerous and powerful external factors. He 
may also be subjected to tendencies, defects and habits linked with his personal 
condition. In not a few cases such external and internal factors may attenuate, to a 
greater or lesser degree, the person’s freedom and therefore his responsibility and guilt. 
But it is a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience and reason, that the human 
person is free.482 
This text displays both of the strengths I mentioned in the introductory paragraph to this 
section. In it John Paul II recognises various impediments to human freedom and how these 
impediments can reduce a person’s responsibility for his or her action. He deals with both 
                                                          
481 Ibid.; 2 Cor. 5:10. 




external (social) and internal (psychological) factors. However, despite his recognition of 
these impediments to freedom, John Paul II leaves the reader in no doubt that the human 
person is essentially free: ‘It is a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience and reason, 
that the human person is free.’ This, again, is in direct contrast to the hard determinist’s 
position. For the hard determinist, everything, including the condition of a particular society 
and a person’s psychological condition, is determined by the laws of nature and past events. 
Regardless, then, of whether social conditions are positive or negative, or whether a person is 
psychologically healthy or ill, human actions are inevitable given the laws of nature and past 
events. The human being, in the hard determinist’s conception, is left with neither freedom 
nor dignity.  
 Despite the strengths of these texts, they remain philosophically weak. They are, I 
argued earlier, incapable of engaging with determinism on its own terms. For this reason we 
now turn to Lonergan to respond to Honderich’s argument for causal determinism. As I have 
already mentioned, this response will serve to refute both hard and soft determinism, and the 
position we shall be left with is indeterminism. This position is in accordance with the 
Catholic doctrine of freedom as it affirms the freedom and dignity of the human person. It 
also fits in with the traditional Catholic doctrine of sin in that it allows for ‘deliberate 
consent.’ 
   
3.3. Responsio: Drawing on Lonergan to Answer Honderich 
 In their discussions of determinism both Lonergan and Honderich deal with classical 
physics and probability. The conclusions they draw, however, are diametrically opposed. For 
Honderich the existence of probability does not refute the argument that all events, including 
human actions, are the result of prior causes. Lonergan’s notions of statistical residues, 




shall draw on Lonergan to respond to Honderich’s argument that all events, even those that 
have been established as probable, are necessitated.  
This section will be divided into two subsections. In the first we shall briefly recap on 
Lonergan’s notion of statistical residues. In the second we shall compare this notion with 
Honderich’s arguments. We shall also in the second section revisit Lonergan’s notion of the 
contingency of the act of will as part of our refutation of Honderich’s argument.   
 
3.3.1. Statistical Residues  
 In dealing with the question of whether abstract classical laws can be applied to the 
concrete universe, Lonergan provides the following response: 
There does not exist a single ordered sequence that embraces the totality of particular 
cases through which abstract system might be applied to the concrete universe. In other 
words, though all events are linked to one another by law, still the laws reveal only the 
abstract component in concrete relations; the further concrete component, though 
mastered by insight into particular cases, is involved in the empirical residue from which 
systematizing intelligence abstracts; it does not admit treatment along classical lines; it is 
a residue, left over after classical method has been applied, and it calls for the 
implementation of statistical method.483 
Statistical method, then, will be needed if we are to understand the concrete universe in its 
entirety.  
The objective significance of statistical laws, according to Lonergan, is that in 
general, physical events cannot be predicted by using a deductive method. As we have seen, 
for Lonergan, physical events occur according to what he terms ‘emergent probability.’ For 
                                                          




him, reality is not what must be, but ‘just what happens to be.’484 However, he continues, the 
existence of statistical residues brings with it the possibility of higher integrations. The 
sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology can operate independently because 
on each earlier level of systematization there are statistical residues that constitute that which 
is merely contingent and that therefore needs to be systematized on the next level. It follows 
that higher laws and higher schemes of recurrence cannot be deduced from lower laws and 
lower schemes of recurrence, as the higher is employed in regulating what the lower leaves as 
merely coincidental.  
In other words, chemical laws cannot be deduced from physical laws, nor biological 
laws from chemical or physical laws, nor psychological laws from biological or chemical or 
physical laws, because each of these areas of scientific enquiry is separate from the others. 
They are separate because each successive area of enquiry deals with purely coincidental 
phenomena that cannot be explained in terms of the lower laws or schemes of recurrence.  
 According to Lonergan, the significance of the canon of statistical residues ‘lies in the 
fact that it makes possible an account of the autonomy of the successive departments of 
science, that this autonomy excludes a determinism of the higher by the lower, and that the 
canon of statistical residues itself excludes a deductive determinism either in the lower or the 
higher.’485 This ‘determinism of the higher by the lower’ is precisely the kind of argument 
that Honderich uses. For him, psychological events, including choices and decisions, are 
determined by physical laws. In the next subsection, we shall draw on Lonergan’s notion of 
statistical residues in order to respond to Honderich’s arguments. We shall also briefly 
examine Lonergan’s argument for the contingency of the act of will.   
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3.3.2. Lonergan in Response to Honderich 
 Honderich’s argument for determinism is based on classical physics, on laws based on 
the observation that events have prior causes. Every event, then, for Honderich, is 
necessitated, because it is the result of prior circumstances. While Lonergan does not dispute 
the existence or the validity of these classical laws, he does point out their limitations. The 
example he uses of a phenomenon based on classical laws is the periodicity of the planetary 
system, which, he says, displays and ordered sequence of particular cases to which classical 
abstract laws can be applied. However, he continues, the periodicity of the planetary system 
can neither explain its origin nor guarantee its survival. Lonergan concludes more generally 
that ‘there does not exist a single ordered sequence that embraces the totality of particular 
cases through which abstract system might be applied to the concrete universe.’ So, while 
Lonergan is in agreement with Honderich on the existence and validity of classical laws, he 
points out that the existence of such laws is limited in terms of a full explanation of the 
universe. For Honderich, classical laws are sufficient to provide a ‘fundamental explanation’ 
of phenomena, while for Lonergan the introduction of statistical laws is necessary.  
The existence of statistical residues and the consequent necessity of introducing 
statistical laws, means that the sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology are 
completely autonomous. Lonergan demonstrates this autonomy of the sciences by arguing 
that although all events are linked to one another by law, the laws reveal only the abstract 
component in concrete relations, and that the further concrete component is involved in the 
empirical residue from which systematizing intelligence abstracts. One of the implications of 
this autonomy of the sciences is that there can be no ‘determinism of the higher by the lower.’ 
This determinism of the higher by the lower is what Honderich has attempted to achieve in 
his argument. He argues that choices and decisions, which are the domain of psychology, are 




to respect the autonomy of the aforementioned sciences. Lonergan’s argument for the 
autonomy of the sciences, and the consequent impossibility of psychological events being 
determined by physical laws, provides a strong counter-argument to Honderich’s notion that 
choices and decisions are necessitated as they are the result of prior circumstances.  
 To be fair to Honderich, he does not completely ignore statistical method. Part of his 
argument deals with probability. There is, he says, a sense in which an event is explained if it 
is established as having been very probable. What is it, he asks, for event A to have made the 
occurrence of event B 95 percent probable? He answers that in 95 percent of the situations in 
which an event of the type of A occurs there is a causal circumstance for an event of the type 
of B. He argues that there is good evidence for this, even if we do not know exactly what the 
circumstance consists of. This non-fundamental explanation of B, he argues, presupposes the 
possibility of a fundamental explanation of B. It presupposes precisely the existence of an as 
yet unknown circumstance for B. It presupposes, Honderich argues, that B was a necessitated 
event. 
 My response to this argument will be twofold. Firstly, I shall point out what I consider 
to be a flaw in its logic. Secondly, I shall present as a counter-argument Lonergan’s argument 
for the contingence of the act of will. 
 The main problem with Honderich’s argument is that he argues for the necessity of 
events that have already occurred, and not for events that will occur. I shall illustrate this by 
quoting him directly, and adding my own emphasis. He begins by asking the question: ‘What 
is it for event A to have made it 95 percent probable that event B would occur?’486 He 
answers that ‘in 95 percent of the situations in which an event of the type A occurs, there is 
precisely a causal circumstance for an event of the type B,’ and concludes from this that ‘B 
was a necessitated event.’487 Let us assume for a moment that Honderich’s argument is 
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correct. What, in terms of the argument against free choice, does it actually demonstrate? It 
demonstrates that B was a necessitated event. Let us say that event B was a decision made by 
a person. All that Honderich’s argument demonstrates (still assuming it is correct) is that 
given the prior causal circumstances, the person’s decision was inevitable. However, 
Honderich’s argument does not demonstrate the general theory that people’s decisions are 
determined. This is because when we look backwards at a decision a person made in the past, 
we can say that given all of the circumstances which resulted in the person making that 
decision, the decision was inevitable. The ‘all’ here includes everything in the circumstance, 
including all of the elements (whatever they may be) that constitute the free decision. 
However, if we look forward to ask whether a person will in the future make a particular 
decision, we do not have all of the circumstances at our disclosure. The all important 
elements that constitute the free decision are missing, because the person has not yet made 
the decision. So, one may argue that events were necessitated, but this is entirely different to 
arguing that events, including decisions and choices, are necessitated.  
 Perhaps we can advance this argument further by drawing on Lonergan’s argument 
for the contingency of the act of will. For Lonergan, the main constituent of a choice or 
decision is the will, and the act of will is not necessitated but contingent. We may recall the 
following argument that we looked at in chapter three: 
If a proposed action is obligatory, then one cannot be a rational knower and deny the 
obligation, and one cannot be a rational doer and not fulfil the obligation. But one can be 
a rational knower without an act of willing, and one cannot be a rational doer without an 
act of willing.488  
It is ‘the addition of the further constitutive requirement of an act of will’489 that indicates the 
movement from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness, and changes what is 
                                                          





rational necessity in the area of knowledge into rational exigence in the larger area of both 
knowledge and action. For Lonergan, then, the will is an absolutely essential component in 
human action, and the act of will is not necessitated but contingent. So, returning to 
Honderich’s argument, the essential component missing when we ask what a person might do 
in the future is the contingent and free act of will. If we look backwards to a decision a person 
made in the past, we may take into account all of the factors, including the decision itself 
with its constituent part, the will, and argue that the decision was inevitable. However, if we 
attempt to look to the future, we do not possess all of the factors: we do not possess the 
decision itself with its constituent will. So, while we may be able to argue that a past decision 
was necessitated, we cannot argue that our future decisions are necessitated or determined 
because we cannot take into account a decision that has not yet occurred. 
 One might ask how a person can said to be free even if we only say that his decision 
was determined, and not that his future decisions are determined. After all, future decisions 
will become past decisions, so how can we say that one and the same decision is not 
determined, and then later say that it was determined? This seems paradoxical. My response 
to this apparent paradox is as follows: it is possible to say, without contradiction, that a past 
decision was necessitated by a number of different factors, including a free act of will. The 
decision, then, was both necessitated and free. There is no contradiction here because the 
necessity stems from past events, and one of the past events in the case of the past decision is 
the free act of will. 
 Our critique of Honderich’s argument, and our analysis of Lonergan’s notions of 
statistical residues and the contingence of the act of will, leaves us with a position known as 
indeterminism. This position, as I have said, is compatible with the Catholic doctrine of sin, 






By following St Thomas’s dialectical procedure we have examined some notions of 
moral scepticism and determinism and provided a two-fold response to these theses. Firstly I 
presented a contrary thesis, namely the Church’s teaching on knowledge and freedom 
respectively. This provided us with an authoritative rebuttal of the sceptical arguments. These 
rebuttals are authoritative not only because they are supplied by the magisterium, but because 
they are supported by scripture and two thousand years of theological tradition. Secondly we 
drew on Lonergan to respond to the same sceptical arguments. The purpose of this was to 
compliment Church teaching on knowledge and freedom by providing a more thorough 





















In this dissertation I have attempted to demonstrate the rational plausibility of the 
concept of sin. In doing so I have dealt with two fundamental questions in moral theology: Is 
there an objective moral order which is discernible by human beings? and are human beings 
free to act morally? I have argued that a traditional theological approach to these issues, 
because it presupposes that the reader has strong religious beliefs and accepts the authority of 
scripture and the theological tradition, is inadequate in terms of providing a critical theology 
of sin. While it is impossible within the confines of a single work to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of theological reflection and Church teaching on sin, an analysis that would include 
every relevant magisterial text and the work of all of the major moral theologians, I have 
attempted to be as comprehensive as possible. While there are limits to my exposition and 
critique of theological reflection and magisterial teaching on sin, I contend that the approach 
to the themes of sin, objectivity and knowledge, and freedom in the texts I have selected 
represents a general trend in moral theology. 
 My own approach to these questions has been to construct a synthetic account of sin 
that incorporates the ideas of Lonergan with scripture and the theological tradition in 
response to questions raised by a selection of moral sceptics and determinists. This method 
too has its limitations. The terms ‘moral scepticism’ and ‘determinism’ describe a whole host 
of philosophical ideas that one could not possibly hope to deal with adequately in a single 
thesis. However, while there are many varieties of moral scepticism and ‘hard’ determinism, 
there is a central tenet at the heart of each of these types of philosophy: the moral sceptic 
claims that moral knowledge is impossible, while the hard determinist claims that free human 




knowledge, and for the possibility of freedom should, therefore, be capable of responding to 
any form of moral scepticism or hard determinism.  
  My use of Lonergan to provide these arguments also has its limitations. The body of 
Lonergan’s works is extensive (a projected 25 volume Collected Works is underway with the 
University of Toronto Press), while I have analysed only his two most important works and 
rejected one of these as a means to providing critical arguments for the possibility of sin. 
Furthermore, the single work that I have drawn upon in constructing a synthetic account of 
sin, namely Insight, is long and notoriously difficult. This book is also structured in such a 
way that each chapter builds upon the previous one so that abstracting ideas from chapter 18 
(the chapter on ethics) in order to utilize these ideas for one’s own purposes is an endeavour 
fraught with difficulties. My interpretation of Lonergan, then, could no doubt be scrutinized 
by expert Lonergan scholars and found wanting. However, Lonergan’s approach to 
foundational moral issues is too valuable to be left only to the experts. Even if we fail to 
grasp every contextual nuance (the contexts I have in mind are Insight as a whole and the 
larger field of Thomistic studies) this does not mean that we cannot implement these ideas in 
a critical theology of sin. After all, even the experts will disagree on how Lonergan should be 
interpreted. So, while we may not be Lonergan experts we are still capable of comprehending 
well structured, logical, and coherent arguments and such arguments Lonergan has supplied 
us with in abundance in Insight. 
 While my method of constructing a critical theology of sin has its limitations, it also 
has its merits. A synthetic account of sin that integrates magisterial teaching on sin with the 
more philosophical insights of Lonergan should make a significant contribution to the 
theology of sin. Such an account of sin achieves three things.  
Firstly, it considers and takes seriously the theological anthropology provided by the 




grounding in scripture and tradition a theology loses its connection with a body of reflections, 
experiences, and insights that constitutes a living faith. Such a theology would merely be the 
reflections of a single individual and would be in opposition to the meaning of faith and of 
Church.  
 Secondly, such a theology of sin investigates a philosophical anthropology that uses a 
more scientific method than that of arguing from the “evidence” of scripture and tradition. 
This too is important, as while a theology must take into account scripture and tradition if it is 
to maintain its connection with the Church, it is also vital that we do not alienate those who 
are not completely immersed in the faith, for example people who are perhaps no longer as 
certain about their faith as they used to be but are still open to education, or people who 
struggle with the idea of belief in God in a world where such belief has been widely rejected 
and is often ridiculed. The investigation of a philosophical anthropology in a theology of sin 
will help to make such a theology convincing to those who are uncertain of their faith. If one 
can first convince a person that the notion of sin is plausible, this may lead to the same person 
being more open to the theological anthropology provided by scripture and the theological 
tradition. 
Thirdly, this synthesis attempts to merge current theological approaches to sin with 
Lonergan’s more philosophical approach, in order to create an account of sin that is 
acceptable to both a Christian and secular audience. Such an account of sin would be capable 
of withstanding critical scrutiny from other academic disciplines apart from theology, as well 
as conforming to a more traditional approach to theology that has faith as its starting-point. 
Such a synthetic account of sin is vital today as we can no longer presuppose the faith 
suggested in the traditional definition of theology as fides quaerens intellectum. If we alienate 
those who struggle to accept our particular world-view, we fail in our Christian responsibility 
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